BRANCH BANKING AND TRUST
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
v
.
Durham County
No. 04 CVS 422
KEITH R. PEARCE, SANDRA U.
PEARCE, WILLIAM E. TRENT,
III, and LISA H. TRENT,
Defendants.
Kennon, Craver, Belo, Craig & McKee, P.L.L.C., by Erin M.
Locklear, for plaintiff-appellee.
The Peake Law Firm, P.A., by Thomas R. Peake, II, for
defendant-appellants.
HUDSON, Judge.
On 22 June 2000, defendants executed a promissory note as
managers of Colonial Acquisitions, L.L.C., promising to repay
$25,000.00 plus interest to plaintiff Branch Banking & Trust (BB
& T)on 22 November 2000. The defendants each signed separate
guaranty agreements, providing for joint and several liability of
the signors/guarantors. The parties executed several modification
agreements extending the time for payment, with the final
modification extending the payment date to 15 May 2003. On 12 June
2003, the North Carolina Secretary of State administrativelydissolved Colonial Acquisitions, L.L.C. In January 2004, BB & T
commenced action against defendants to collect payment on the note.
On 28 June 2004, the superior court granted summary judgment to BB
& T. Defendants appeal. For the reasons discussed below, we
dismiss the appeal.
On appeal, defendants contend that the trial court abused its
discretion in denying its motion to continue the summary judgment
hearing and that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
to BB & T. We conclude that defendants failed to properly preserve
these issues for appeal.
In civil actions, a party must file and serve a notice of
appeal:
(1) within 30 days after entry of judgment if
the party has been served with a copy of the
judgment within the three-day period
prescribed by Rule 58 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure; or
(2) within 30 days after service upon the
party of a copy of the judgment if service was
not made within that three-day period . . .
N.C.R. App. P. 3(c) (2004). Here, the court entered judgment on 30
June 2004, and nothing in the record indicates that proper service
did not occur, nor have the defendants objected on this ground. On
30 July 2004, thirty days after judgment was entered, the parties
signed a stipulation extending deadline to appeal, attempting to
extend the deadline for notice of appeal to 13 August 2004.
However, the requirements of Rule 3 cannot be waived or extended by
consent:
Jurisdiction is the power of a court to decidea case on its merits. Appellate Rule 3
requirements for specifying judgments are
jurisdictional in nature. [J]urisdiction
cannot be conferred by consent, waiver, or
estoppel . . . [j]urisdiction rests upon the
law and the law alone. It is never dependent
on the conduct of the parties.
Von Ramm v. Von Ramm, 99 N.C. App. 153, 158, 392 S.E.2d 422, 425
(1990) (holding that parties' stipulation that notice of appeal was
timely could not supplant Rule 3 designation requirements)
(citations omitted, ellipses in original). Without proper notice
of appeal, the appellate court acquires no jurisdiction and neither
the court nor the parties may waive the jurisdictional requirements
even for good cause shown under Rule 2. Sillery v. Sillery, 168
N.C. App. 231, 234, 606 S.E.2d 749, 751 (2005) (citation and
quotation marks omitted). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.
Dismissed.
Judges HUNTER and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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