IN THE MATTER OF:
T.C. Wilkes County
No. 02 J 193
Paul W. Freeman, Jr. for petitioner-appellee Wilkes County
Department of Social Services.
Winifred H. Dillon for respondent-appellant Robert Bobbitt.
ELMORE, Judge.
Respondent, Robert Bobbitt, appeals from a permanency planning
order relieving petitioner, Wilkes County Department of Social
Services (DSS), from efforts to reunify him with his daughter T.C.
On 29 October 2002 petitioner filed a petition alleging that
T.C. was dependent, in that T.C.'s mother was unable to provide for
her care or supervision and lacks an appropriate alternative child
care arrangement. Respondent's whereabouts were unknown at the
time. A nonsecure custody order was issued on 1 November 2002,
and T.C. was placed in DSS custody. Respondent was served with the
summons on 6 November 2002.
On 13 January 2003, the trial court adjudicated T.C.
neglected, with the consent of T.C.'s mother and respondent, andcontinued her in DSS custody. The trial court ordered respondent
to establish paternity and ordered petitioner to conduct a home
study of respondent's household. After conducting a review hearing
on 2 June 2003, the trial court entered an order continuing T.C.'s
custody with DSS. The trial court also ordered respondent and his
wife to complete psychological evaluations. On 26 May 2004, the
trial court entered a permanency planning order which continued
T.C.'s custody with DSS and ordered that the permanent plan for
T.C. be changed to adoption. From this order, respondent appeals.
The issue on appeal is whether the trial court erred by
entering a permanency planning order that does not comply with the
statutory requirements of N.C. Gen Stat. § 7B-907 (2003).
The goal of the permanency planning hearing is “to develop a
plan to achieve a safe, permanent home for the juvenile within a
reasonable period of time.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(a) (2003).
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(b), if at the conclusion of the
permanency planning hearing the trial court determines the children
are not to return home, the trial court must consider the following
enumerated factors and make written findings of fact regarding
those relevant to the case:
(1) Whether it is possible for the juvenile to
be returned home immediately or within the
next six months, and if not, why it is not in
the juvenile's best interests to return home;
(2) Where the juvenile's return home is
unlikely within six months, whether legal
guardianship or custody with a relative or
some other suitable person should be
established, and if so, the rights and
responsibilities which should remain with the
parents;
(3) Where the juvenile's return home is
unlikely within six months, whether adoption
should be pursued and if so, any barriers to
the juvenile's adoption;
(4) Where the juvenile's return home is
unlikely within six months, whether the
juvenile should remain in the current
placement or be placed in another permanent
living arrangement and why;
(5) Whether the county department of social
services has since the initial permanency plan
hearing made reasonable efforts to implement
the permanent plan for the juvenile;
(6) Any other criteria the court deems
necessary.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(b) (2003).
This Court has acknowledged that “[w]hile it is true that the
court is not expressly required to make every finding listed, it
must still make those findings that are relevant to the permanency
plans being developed for the children.” In re J.S., 165 N.C. App.
509, 512, 598 S.E.2d 658, 660-61 (2004) (trial court committed
reversible error by entering a permanency planning order that
continued custody with DSS without making proper findings as to the
relevant statutory criteria required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
907(b)). This rule applies even if “the evidence and reports in
this case might have supported the determination of the trial
court.” In re Ledbetter, 158 N.C. App. 281, 286, 580 S.E.2d 392,
395 (2003) (reversing on the grounds that “our statute requires the
court to consider the [N.C. Gen. Stat.] § 7B-907(b) factors and
make relevant findings”).
Here, the trial court found that “[r]eturn of the juvenile to
her father's home within the next six (6) month[s] is highlyunlikely,” however, the order fails to state why it was not
possible for the minor T.C. to return home. See In re Ledbetter,
158 N.C. App. at 286, 580 S.E.2d at 395 (reversing the trial
court's order as it failed to explain why it was not in the child's
best interest to be returned to his mother and because it did not
make the findings required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-907(b)).
Furthermore, the order fails to explain why T.C. should stay in her
current placement. Because the trial court's findings fail to
comply with the statutory requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-907(b), we remand this matter to the trial court to make the
appropriate findings of fact.
Reversed and remanded.
Judges BRYANT and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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