An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

    NO. COA04-1390


    Filed: 5 July 2005

    YU                                Guilford County
    SU                                Nos. 03 J 26, 27, 28

    Appeal by respondent-mother from judgment entered 19 February 2004 by Judge Lawrence McSwain in Guilford County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 12 May 2005.

Brannon Strickland, PLLC, by Anthony M. Brannon, for respondent-mother appellant.

Terry F. Rose, for respondent-father appellee.


    Respondent-mother appeals from an order removing her minor children YU, SU, and IU (the children) from the care of the Guilford County Department of Social Services (DSS) and returning custody of the children to their father, who was previously the primary custodial parent. We affirm.
    In February 2003, DSS filed a petition alleging respondent- parents had neglected their minor children YU, SU, and IU. At a 21 April 2003 hearing, both parents consented to entry of an adjudication that the juveniles were neglected as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2003). The trial court ordered that the children be placed in the custody of DSS, and ordered bothparents to comply with individual and family therapy designed to facilitate the reunification of the juveniles with the custodial parent, the children's father.
    On 15 September 2003 DSS filed a petition alleging sexual abuse against the children's father. Likewise, criminal charges were filed against the father for the alleged sexual abuse. An adjudicatory hearing was held on 1 December 2003 to address the DSS allegations. Following the hearing, the court dismissed the allegations of abuse made by DSS. The criminal charges against the father were also dismissed on 10 December 2003.
    A permanency planning review hearing was held pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-906 and 7B-907 (2003) on 19 February 2004. At the close of this hearing, the trial judge entered an order which included, inter alia, the following findings of fact:
        6.    That the criminal charges filed against Respondent Father were dismissed by the District Attorney in Randolph County on December 10, 2003;

        7.    That the Court has heard evidence that both parents intend to work together to co-parent their children;

        8.    That the commitment level of each parent to allow the other to co-parent the children has not been clearly shown to this Court, however, Respondent Father commits to the Court that he will allow the children's mother to co-parent the children;

        9.    That both parents have completed the counseling and education requested by DSS and/or ordered by this Court;
        10.    That both Respondent parents have worked to show this Court that they are fit and proper parents for their children;

        11.    That it is no longer in the best interests of the children that they remain in the custody of DSS[.]

Based on its findings, the trial court ruled that custody of the children should be returned to their biological father. Respondent-mother now appeals.
    At the outset, we note that the arguments contained in respondent-mother's brief do not correspond with her assignments of error in the record. The scope of appellate review is limited to those issues presented by assignments of error set out in the record on appeal. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a); State v. Thomas, 332 N.C. 544, 554, 423 S.E.2d 75, 80 (1992), overruled on other grounds, State v. Richmond, 347 N.C. 412, 495 S.E.2d 677 (1998). Where the issues presented in an appellant's brief do not correspond to an assignment of error, the issues raised in the brief are not properly considered by this Court. Bustle v. Rice, 116 N.C. App. 658, 659, 449 S.E.2d 10, 11 (1994); see also Viar v. N.C. Dep't of Transp., 359 N.C. 400, 401, 610 S.E.2d 360, 360 (2005) (holding that the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure are mandatory and a failure to follow these rules will result in dismissal).
    In her brief, respondent-mother argues the trial court abused its discretion and did not act in the children's best interest when it returned the children to their biological fatherbecause “most” of the competent evidence before the trial court supported transferring the children to their biological mother. However, respondent-mother's assignments of error allege only that some of the trial court's findings and conclusions of law are unsupported by competent evidence in the record. Specifically, respondent-mother's assignments of error challenge findings nos. 7-11, which are set forth earlier in this opinion.
    Because it does not correspond to any of her assignments of error, respondent-mother's argument that the trial court abused its discretion is not properly before this Court. Furthermore, respondent-mother has abandoned her assignments of error by failing to bring them forward in her brief. N.C. R. App. P. 28 (“Assignments of error not set out in appellant's brief, or in support of which no reason or argument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned.”).
    Nevertheless, even assuming arguendo that respondent-mother has preserved the contentions included in her assignments of error and brief, respectively, these contentions lack merit. As already indicated, respondent-mother's assignments of error allege that there was no competent record evidence to support some of the trial court's findings. However, respondent-mother's brief argues only that “most of the competent evidence before the trial court” supported transferring the custody of the children to her. Thus, her brief does not assert that the record is bereft of evidence that custody should be returned to the father;in fact, she apparently concedes that the record contained some competent evidence to support a decision to award custody of the children to their biological father. Furthermore, our review of the record reveals that there was competent evidence presented to support the trial court's findings of fact. Moreover, we discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to place custody of the children with the father. See Shipman v. Shipman, 357 N.C. 471, 474, 586 S.E.2d 250, 253 (2003) (“Our trial courts are vested with broad discretion in child custody matters.”) (citation omitted); In re Webb, 60 N.C. App. 410, 413, 299 S.E.2d 240, 242 (1983) (finding no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to continue custody of minor child with the local DSS).
    Finally, we note that, although she did not make a corresponding assignment of error, respondent-mother argues in her brief that the trial court did not make the appropriate findings of fact to support its order as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1) (2003). While it is true that the order issued by the trial court is far from perfect, the record reveals that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting custody of the children to the father. Therefore, we decline to remand for additional findings and conclusions.
    The assignments of error are overruled.
    Judges TIMMONS-GOODSON and STEELMAN concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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