STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Avery County
No. 03 CRS 753
ROY D. TEASTER,
Defendant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
John P. Barkley, for the State.
Matthew D. Wunsche and Staples Hughes, for defendant-
appellant.
WYNN, Judge.
Under North Carolina law, a search warrant is not required to
conduct a lawful search based on probable cause of a motor vehicle
in a public roadway or in a public vehicular area. State v.
Isleib, 319 N.C. 634, 638, 356 S.E.2d 573, 576 (1987). In this
case, Defendant argues that his constitutional rights were violated
by the illegal search of his vehicle. Because the record indicates
facts which show that probable cause existed to search the vehicle,
we affirm the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to
suppress evidence obtained from the search.
The evidence at the motion to suppress hearing tended to show
that: On 2 July 2003, Kevin Hodges, a police officer with theSugar Mountain Police Department, responded to a call at Lowe's
Food in Invershield, North Carolina. An employee for Lowe's Food
told Officer Hodges that an individual inside the store was buying
large quantities of nasal decongestant and inquiring to buy drain
cleaner. The employee pointed out the individual who was later
identified as Defendant Roy Teaster. Officer Hodges followed
Defendant out of the store and into the parking lot to a vehicle,
but then lost sight of the vehicle.
In the meantime, Officer Mike Darcy, who had been waiting in
the parking lot, had been directed to Defendant's vehicle by an
unidentified Lowe's Food employee. Officer Darcy followed the
vehicle, a black Dodge pickup truck, to McDonald's in Invershield.
Defendant and Harold Russell went into the McDonald's. A check on
the vehicle revealed that the license tag of the truck was
registered to a different vehicle. Detective Derek Roberts arrived
and went into McDonald's to develop a conversation with Defendant.
Defendant and Mr. Russell appeared “extremely nervous” to Detective
Roberts.
The three officers approached the truck and, from the outside,
observed a three to four gallon glass container on the front seat,
a couple of cellophane bags with Actifed and Sudafed boxes in them,
a couple of gallons of mineral spirits laying in the bed of the
truck, and some Citronella lantern fuel. Detective Roberts
testified as to his knowledge of the use of these items in
manufacturing methamphetamine. Detective Roberts asked Defendant about the truck's ownership.
Defendant was “extremely wishy washy[,]” and first stated that the
vehicle belonged to someone else before admitting ownership.
Defendant did not consent to a search of his vehicle.
Officer Darcy arrested Defendant for driving with a fictitious
tag. The three officers then conducted a complete search of the
vehicle, including a toolbox in the back of the truck. Prohibited
items were found in the toolbox, although not separately listed by
any officer.
Defendant was indicted on the charge of possession of
precursor chemical knowing manufacture. Following a hearing, the
trial court denied Defendant's motion to suppress the items seized
from the truck. Defendant was found guilty by a jury of possession
of precursor chemical knowing manufacture and sentenced to six to
eight months imprisonment. Defendant appeals.
__________________________________________
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
erroneously denied his motion to suppress because his
constitutional rights were violated by the illegal search of his
vehicle. We disagree.
“The standard of review in evaluating a trial court's ruling
on a motion to suppress is that the trial court's findings of fact
'are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even
if the evidence is conflicting.'” State v. Smith, 160 N.C. App.
107, 114, 584 S.E.2d 830, 835 (2003) (citation omitted). If the
trial court's conclusions of law are supported by its factualfindings, we will not disturb those conclusions on appeal. State
v. Logner, 148 N.C. App. 135, 138, 557 S.E.2d 191, 193-94 (2001).
Where an appellant fails to assign error to the trial court's
findings of fact, the findings are “presumed to be correct.”
Inspirational Network, Inc. v. Combs, 131 N.C. App. 231, 235, 506
S.E.2d 754, 758 (1998). As Defendant failed to assign error to any
findings of fact, our review is limited to the question of whether
the trial court's findings of fact, which are presumed to be
supported by competent evidence, support its conclusions of law and
judgment. State v. Downing, __ N.C. App. __, __, 613 S.E.2d 35, 38
(2005); Okwara v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 587
591-92, 525 S.E.2d 481, 484 (2000).
Defendant contends that the search of his vehicle by the
police violated his constitutional rights as it was conducted
without a warrant and without probable cause.
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
Article I, Section 20 of the North Carolina Constitution prohibit
unreasonable searches and seizures. It is a well-established rule
that a search warrant is not required before a lawful search based
on probable cause of a motor vehicle in a public roadway or in a
public vehicular area may take place. United States v. Ross, 456
U.S. 798, 809, 72 L. Ed. 2d 572, 583-84 (1982); Isleib, 319 N.C. at
638, 356 S.E.2d at 576-77 (“[N]o exigent circumstances other than
the motor vehicle itself are required in order to justify a
warrantless search of a motor vehicle if there is probable cause to
believe that it contains the instrumentality of a crime or evidencepertaining to a crime and the vehicle is in a public place.”).
“'Probable cause exists where 'the facts and circumstances within
their [the officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonable
trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant
a man of reasonable caution in the belief that' an offense has been
or is being committed.'” State v. Earhart, 134 N.C. App. 130, 133,
516 S.E.2d 883, 886 (1999) (quoting State v. Zuniga, 312 N.C. 251,
261, 322 S.E.2d 140, 146 (1984)). “It is not required that there
be proof beyond a reasonable doubt or even prima facie evidence of
guilt, rather it is enough if based upon the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life, the evidence would actuate a
reasonable person acting in good faith.” State v. Corpening, 109
N.C. App. 586, 589, 427 S.E.2d 892, 894 (1993).
Here, the trial court found the following facts supported
probable cause: (1) a large glass container, mineral spirits, and
Actifed or Sudafed were in the vehicle in plain view; (2) Detective
Roberts testified, based on his training and experience, that all
three of the items found in plain view in the vehicle are used in
the production of methamphetamine; and (3) Defendant had been
making inquires in a store about purchasing large quantities of
items containing pseudoephedrine and drain cleaner, which are also
used in the production of methamphetamine. The trial court
concluded that “given the totality of the circumstance[s]” probable
cause existed to search Defendant's vehicle. We agree with the
trial court's conclusion. The totality of the circumstances of the items observed in
plain view in the vehicle, as well as Detective Roberts' training
and experience that the items in the vehicle were commonly used in
the production of methamphetamine, support the conclusion that the
officers believed that an offense was being committed. Earhart,
134 N.C. App. at 133, 516 S.E.2d at 886; see also Corpening, 109
N.C. App. at 589-90, 427 S.E.2d at 894-95 (probable cause existed
when a police officer observed that the defendant was very nervous
and also the officer smelled illegal contraband which he recognized
from his experience). Accordingly, the officers did not violate
Defendant's federal or state constitutional rights when searching
the vehicle. Isleib, 319 N.C. at 638, 356 S.E.2d at 576.
Defendant failed to argue his remaining assignments of error;
they are therefore deemed abandoned. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).
Affirmed.
Judges CALABRIA and LEVINSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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