Appeal by respondents from order dated 16 July 2004 by Judge
Donna H. Johnson in District Court, Cabarrus County. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 14 September 2005.
Kathleen Arundell Widelski for petitioner-appellee Cabarrus
County Department of Social Services; Victoria Bost for
Guardian Ad Litem.
M. Victoria Jayne for respondent-appellant P.M.
Robert W. Ewing for respondent-appellant R.D.M.
McGEE, Judge.
The Cabarrus County Department of Social Services (DSS) filed
juvenile petitions on 8 August 2002, alleging neglect of L.T.M.,
K.R.M., and C.R.M. (the children) by P.M. (respondent-mother) and
R.D.M. (respondent-father) (collectively respondents). The
children were initially removed from respondents' home and placed
in foster care on 8 August 2002. The children were subsequently
adjudicated neglected juveniles on 31 October 2002. Placement of
the children was reviewed at three hearings between 30 January 2003
and 24 October 2003. At the third review hearing, designated as
the permanency planning hearing, the trial court changed thepermanency plan from reunification to adoption.
DSS filed a motion in the cause dated 22 January 2004 to
terminate respondents' parental rights pursuant to Article 11,
Chapter 7B of our General Statutes. DSS alleged that grounds for
terminating respondents' parental rights existed under four
different subsections of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a): subsection
(1) neglect; subsection (2) children willfully left in foster care
for more than twelve months; subsection (3) parents' willful
failure to pay reasonable portion of cost of care for the children
for a period of six months; and subsection (6) parents'
incapability of proper care and supervision and a reasonable
probability of continuation thereof.
The trial court determined that termination of parental rights
was warranted pursuant to all four of the grounds alleged by DSS.
The trial court then concluded that it was in the best interests of
the children to terminate respondents' parental rights and ordered
termination on 16 July 2004. Respondents appeal.
Standard of Review
Termination of parental rights proceedings are conducted in
two phases: adjudication and disposition.
See generally,
In re
Brim, 139 N.C. App. 733, 741, 535 S.E.2d 367, 371 (2000). During
the adjudication phase, a petitioner has the burden of proving by
clear, cogent and convincing evidence that one or more of the
statutory grounds for termination exist.
In re Blackburn, 142 N.C.
App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2001). The statutory grounds
for termination are set forth in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2003). The standard for appellate review of a trial court's
determination that grounds exist for termination of parental rights
is whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and whether those findings
support its conclusions of law.
In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288,
292, 536 S.E.2d 838, 841 (2000),
disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 374,
547 S.E.2d 9 (2001).
If a petitioner meets its burden of proving that there is at
least one statutory ground on which to terminate parental rights,
the trial court then moves to the disposition phase and must
consider whether termination is in the best interests of the child.
In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. at 610, 543 S.E.2d at 908. A trial
court's decision to terminate parental rights is reviewed by an
abuse of discretion standard.
In re Brim, 139 N.C. App. at 745,
535 S.E.2d at 374.
Failure to Pay Reasonable Portion of Cost of Care
Respondents assign error to the trial court's conclusion that
termination of parental rights was warranted by N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a)(3). Specifically, respondents argue that the trial
court failed to make sufficient findings to support its conclusion
that respondents willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of
the cost of care for the children. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3)
(2003) provides for termination of parental rights where
[t]he juvenile has been placed in the custody
of a county department of social services
. . . or a foster home, and the parent, for a
continuous period of six months next preceding
the filing of the petition or motion, has
willfully failed for such period to pay areasonable portion of the cost of care for the
juvenile although physically and financially
able to do so.
A trial court must find that a parent has the ability to pay
support before ordering termination for nonsupport on this ground.
In re J.D.S., ___ N.C. App. ___, 612 S.E.2d 350 (2005).
In this case, the trial court made detailed findings about
respondents' employment history during the relevant six-month
period from August 2003 to January 2004. The trial court found
that respondent-father was employed by Bobby's Tire Service for a
couple of months during the summer of 2003, earning $400.00 per
week; that respondent-father was employed part-time by Lowe's Motor
Speedway Security from July 2003 until the date of the hearing; and
that respondent-father was employed by Nate's Tire Service for one
month in October 2003, earning $10.00 per hour. The trial court
found that respondent-mother was employed by Lowe's Motor Speedway
in October 2003 and that she was employed by McDonald's for at
least three weeks in October 2003. While so employed, respondents
failed to pay any portion of the cost of care for the children.
Despite the failure to pay any portion of the cost of care,
respondents argue that termination on this ground is not warranted
because the trial court failed to find what specific amount of
support would have constituted a "reasonable portion."
"[T]here is no requirement that the trial court make a finding
as to what specific amount of support would have constituted a
'reasonable portion' under the circumstances."
In re Huff, 140
N.C. App. at 293, 536 S.E.2d at 842.
Rather, the pertinent caselaw "simply require[s] that the trial court make specific findings
that a parent was able to pay some amount greater than the amount
the parent, in fact, paid during the relevant time period."
Id.
(citing
In re Garner, 75 N.C. App. 137, 141, 330 S.E.2d 33, 36
(1985);
In re Manus, 82 N.C. App. 340, 349-50, 346 S.E.2d 289, 295
(1986)).
The trial court made specific findings that respondents were
able to pay some amount greater than the amount paid. Accordingly,
we hold that the trial court did not err in concluding that
respondents willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the
cost of care for the children.
Respondent-mother makes the additional argument that the trial
court erred in finding that she willfully failed to pay a
reasonable cost of care because there was insufficient evidence of
willfulness on her part. She contends that the trial court needed
to make a specific finding as to what was reasonable for
respondent-mother to pay because the trial court also found that
respondent-mother was mentally incapable of parenting under
N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(6). Respondent-mother cites no authority for
this position but seems to imply that because the trial court found
that she suffered from mental illness, that it could not also find
that she willfully failed to pay. As discussed above, the relevant
inquiry for a trial court under N.C.G.S. § 7B-1111(a)(3) is whether
a parent has the ability to pay some amount greater than the amount
the parent in fact paid.
In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. at 293, 536
S.E.2d at 842. In this case, the trial court made the specificfinding that respondent-mother was employed during the time the
children were in foster care, "and therefore, had the ability to
pay an amount greater than zero." Accordingly, this assignment of
error is overruled.
"[W]here we determine the trial court properly concluded that
one ground exists to support the termination of parental rights, we
need not address the remaining grounds."
In re Clark, 159 N.C.
App. 75, 84, 582 S.E.2d 657, 663 (2003);
see In re Greene, 152 N.C.
App. 410, 416, 568 S.E.2d 634, 638 (2002). Because we hold that
termination of parental rights was proper under N.C.G.S. § 7B-
1111(a)(3), we need not address respondents' assignments of error
pertaining to the remaining grounds on which the trial court based
its decision.
See In re Ballard, 63 N.C. App. 580, 306 S.E.2d 150
(1983),
rev'd on other grounds, 311 N.C. 708, 319 S.E.2d 227
(1984).
Affirmed.
Judges McCULLOUGH and JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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