IRIS M. REAVES,
Plaintiff
v
.
Halifax County
No. 93 CVD 1443
RONNIE C. REAVES,
Defendant
No brief for plaintiff-appellee.
Ronnie C. Reaves, defendant-appellant, pro se.
HUNTER, Judge.
Ronnie C. Reaves (defendant) appeals from an order of the
trial court modifying a former child support order and ordering him
to pay $1,255.00 in monthly child support payments to his former
wife, Iris M. Reaves (plaintiff), in support of their two minor
children. Defendant contends the trial court erred in averaging
defendant's income for the years 2001 and 2002 in order to
calculate his monthly child support award, where the trial court
did not find that defendant reduced his income in bad faith to
avoid or minimize his child support obligation. We agree that the
trial court's findings do not support its award, and we therefore
reverse and remand the order of child support. On 13 December 1994, defendant and plaintiff entered into a
consent judgment in which defendant agreed to pay monthly child
support to plaintiff in the amount of $750.00. Defendant
subsequently filed a motion to modify child support, which motion
came before the trial court on 4 June 2004. After hearing the
evidence, the trial court made the following pertinent findings of
fact concerning defendant's income:
The Defendant[']s tax return for the year
2000 showed the Defendant had an income of
$166,042.00. When the court heard evidence in
this matter on March 31, 2003, the Defendant
had not filed his 2001 and 2002 tax returns.
[T]he Defendant has filed U.S. Federal Income
tax returns showing the Defendant had a gross
net income of:
$148,628.00 for the year ending December
31, 2001; and
$54,321.00 for the year ending December
31, 2002.
The Defendant has filed with the court
under the signature of the Defendant, dated
April 15, 2003, a Motion wherein the Defendant
stated that in October 2001, the Defendant had
heart surgery and was unable to work from
October 2001 until April, 2002. That after
that time (after April 2002), the Defendant
was on a reduced schedule (from work).
The Defendant has not filed a 2003 U.S.
Income Tax return as of June 4, 2004.
The Defendant is a licensed attorney
working full time and capable of earning more
than $54,321.00 per year.
Because the Defendant was ill for a
portion of 2002 and when he returned to work,
worked a reduced schedule in 2002 and is now
healthy and worked a full schedule in 2003,
the court determines that the sum of
$54,321.00 is not an appropriate sum [upon
which] to base the Defendant[']s child support
payments.
The court determines that the appropriate
income to determine the Defendant's child
support is the average of the Defendant's
income for the year[s] 2001 and 2002.
The total income for child support
purposes to determine the Defendant's child
support is the sum of $101,474.00 per year.
Based on its findings, the trial court concluded defendant
should pay the sum of $1,255.00 per month in child support. The
trial court entered an order accordingly. Defendant appeals. Defendant contends the trial court's findings do not support
its order of child support. We agree and therefore reverse and
remand the order of the trial court.
Under the Child Support Guidelines, [c]hild support
calculations . . . are based on the parents' current incomes at the
time the order is entered. N.C. Child Support Guidelines, 2005
Ann. R. N.C. 47, 49. While the Child Support Guidelines provide
that [d]ocumentation of current income must be supplemented with
copies of the most recent tax return to provide verification of
earnings over a longer period[,] id., it is well-established that
child support obligations are ordinarily determined by a party's
actual income at the time the order is made or modified. Ellis v.
Ellis, 126 N.C. App. 362, 364, 485 S.E.2d 82, 83 (1997). [T]he
court must determine [the parent's] gross income as of the time the
child support order was originally entered, not as of the time of
remand nor on the basis of [the parent's] average monthly gross
income over the years preceding the original trial. Lawrence v.
Tise, 107 N.C. App. 140, 149, 419 S.E.2d 176, 182 (1992); see also
Cook v. Cook, 159 N.C. App. 657, 660, 583 S.E.2d 696, 698 (2003)
([w]hen modifying the amount of a child support obligation, the
trial court must generally consider the party's actual income at
the time of trial in accordance with the North Carolina Child
Support Guidelines).
However, the Child Support Guidelines also provide that:
If either parent is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed to the extent that the parent
cannot provide a minimum level of support forhimself or herself and his or her children
when he or she is physically and mentally
capable of doing so, and the court finds that
the parent's voluntary unemployment or
underemployment is the result of a parent's
bad faith or deliberate suppression of income
to avoid or minimize his or her child support
obligation, child support may be calculated
based on the parent's potential, rather than
actual, income.
N.C. Child Support Guidelines, 2005 Ann. R. N.C. at 49. Thus, a
party's capacity to earn income may become the basis of an award if
it is found that the party deliberately depressed [his] income or
otherwise acted in deliberate disregard of the obligation to
provide reasonable support for [his] child. Askew v. Askew, 119
N.C. App. 242, 244-45, 458 S.E.2d 217, 219 (1995). Before the
earnings capacity rule is imposed, however, it must be shown that
the party's actions in reducing his income were not taken in good
faith. Id.
Thus, where the trial court finds that the
decrease in a party's income is substantial
and involuntary, without a showing of
deliberate depression of income or other bad
faith, the trial court is without power to
impute income, and must determine the party's
child support obligation based on the party's
actual income.
Ellis, 126 N.C. App. at 364-65, 485 S.E.2d at 83.
In the case sub judice, defendant failed to submit evidence of
his current income at the time of the hearing, in that he had not
filed a 2003 tax return as of June 2004, and gave no testimony
regarding his current income. His most recent tax return, that of
2002, showed an income of $54,321.00. The trial court found that
this sum did not accurately reflect defendant's current income,however, as defendant had been ill and worked a reduced schedule in
2002. Moreover, the trial court found that [t]he Defendant is a
licensed attorney working full time and capable of earning more
than $54,321.00 per year. The trial court therefore averaged
defendant's income for the years 2001 and 2002 and determined that
defendant's income for purposes of his child support obligation was
$101,474.00 per year, with a resulting monthly support obligation
of $1,255.00. The trial court made no findings, however, that
defendant had deliberately decreased his income.
It is unclear from the trial court's findings whether the
trial court improperly imposed the earnings capacity rule upon
defendant without making appropriate findings regarding defendant's
bad faith, or whether the trial court was simply attempting to
devise an appropriate method of determining defendant's current
income given the lack of evidence therefor. Because we conclude
the trial court's order is unclear and unsupported by its findings,
we reverse and remand this case to the trial court.
(See footnote 1)
On remand,the trial court should receive more evidence regarding defendant's
current income, whether by direct testimony or by defendant's
income tax returns. The trial court may impose the earnings
capacity rule upon defendant only if it finds that defendant has
deliberately depressed his income or otherwise demonstrated bad
faith. For example, the trial court could impose the earnings
capacity rule if it finds that defendant has deliberately failed to
file his income tax returns in an effort to avoid submitting data
to the trial court regarding his current income level, and thereby
avoid or minimize his child support obligations.
In conclusion, we hold the trial court's order modifying the
former order of child support is unsupported by the findings. We
therefore reverse and remand the order of the trial court.
Reversed and remanded.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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