IN THE MATTER OF:
Rowan County
T.A.T., No. 04 J 1
Juvenile
Blake Evans and Robert A. Lester, for petitioner-appellee
Rowan County Department of Social Services.
Nancy Gaines, Guardian ad Litem.
Susan J. Hall for respondent-appellant.
HUNTER, Judge.
Respondent-mother (“respondent”), L.M.T., appeals from an
order terminating her parental rights to the minor child. The
order also terminated the parental rights of T.A.T.'s putative
father, J.E.P. (“respondent-father”), and any unknown father,
neither of whom has appealed. For the reasons stated herein, we
affirm.
The record shows that T.A.T. was born on 21 November 2001.
The Rowan County Department of Social Services (“RCDSS”) filed a
petition in district court on 26 February 2002, alleging that
T.A.T. was a neglected juvenile as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
101(15) (2003). In an order entered by the court on 15 May 2002,respondent consented to an adjudication of neglect and to T.A.T.'s
placement in the non-secure custody of RCDSS. The consent order
further provided that respondent “is not seeking reunification with
[T.A.T.] and the permanency plan is to give legal guardianship to
the maternal grandparents, C[I.] and J[.I.]”
On 26 August 2002, the district court appointed T.A.T.'s great
aunt, C.T., as her guardian. When C.T. determined that she could
not provide for T.A.T.'s care, RCDSS placed the child in the home
of C.I. on 3 June 2003. On 7 August 2003, C.I. advised RCDSS that
she was unable to provide the special care T.A.T. required for her
skin condition. C.T., who had remained T.A.T.'s guardian, executed
a voluntary placement agreement returning the child to RCDSS's
custody.
Although represented by her attorney and guardian ad litem at
hearings held 20 October 2003 and 3 November 2003, respondent
failed to attend the hearings or to cooperate with her attorney.
Following the 3 November 2003 hearing, the court entered an order
establishing adoption as the permanent plan for the child.
On 2 January 2004, RCDSS filed a petition to terminate
respondent's parental rights to T.A.T., alleging the following five
grounds for termination: (1) respondent continued to neglect
T.A.T. within the meaning of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15); (2)
respondent willfully left T.A.T. in a placement outside of the home
for more than twelve months without reasonable progress in
correcting the circumstances which led to the placement; (3) T.A.T.
had been in the care and custody of RCDSS for more than sixconsecutive months, and respondent had willfully failed to pay a
reasonable portion of the cost of her care while being physically
and financially able to do so; (4) respondent was incapable of
providing proper care and supervision of T.A.T., such that she was
a dependent juvenile as defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(9)
(2003), and there was a reasonable probability that respondent's
incapacity would continue for the foreseeable future; and (5)
respondent had willfully abandoned T.A.T. for at least six
consecutive months immediately prior to the filing of the petition.
See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1)-(3), (6), (7) (2003). After a
hearing held 26 July 2004, the district court found grounds for
termination based on neglect, dependency, abandonment, and
respondent's failure to make reasonable progress to correct the
conditions leading to T.A.T.'s out-of-home placement. The court
then separately determined that termination was the appropriate
disposition in this cause, serving the best interests of T.A.T.
By her first four assignments of error on appeal, respondent
claims the district court abused its discretion at the initial,
adjudicatory stage of the termination proceedings by concluding
that four grounds for termination existed under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a). See generally N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109 (2003). Under
the familiar standard of review in termination cases, we must
determine whether the court's findings of fact are supported by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence and whether the court's
findings, in turn, support its conclusions of law. See In re Huff,
140 N.C. App. 288, 291, 536 S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000). Althoughrespondent claims generally that the evidence was insufficient to
support the court's conclusions of law, she has not challenged any
of the individual findings of fact set forth in the termination
order. Accordingly, these findings are deemed to be supported by
competent evidence and are binding on appeal. See Koufman v.
Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991).
Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), the district court may
terminate a respondent's parental rights if it determines that she
has neglected the child. For purposes of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(1), a juvenile is deemed to be neglected if she “does not
receive proper care, supervision, or discipline[,]” is denied
“necessary medical care[,]” or if she “lives in an environment
injurious to [her] welfare[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15).
The district court entered the following findings pertinent to
its adjudication of neglect under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1):
5. On May 6, 2002, the juvenile and her
brother, [J.P.], were adjudicated neglected by
the consent of Respondent L[.M.T.] Respondent
L[.M.T.] consented to the adjudication of
T.A.T. as neglected by admitting that, among
other things, (1) there was no food in the
home, (2) she failed to take T.A.T. for
medical treatment when the child was having
difficulty breathing and when a neighbor took
the juvenile for medical treatment, she was
admitted to the hospital with a severe upper
respiratory infection, and (3) she kept an
open container of kerosene in the room with
the juvenile less than one foot from a burning
kerosene heater. The Respondent L[.M.T.] did
not seek reunification with either of her
children, and both children were placed with
relatives.
6. On February 25, 2002, Respondent L[.M.T.]
was involuntarily committed to Carolina
Medical Center's psychiatric ward fordelusional thoughts and depression, and she
was released on March 4, 2002.
7. Respondent L[.M.T.] denies any further
psychiatric treatment, and she has refused to
release any medical records to the RCDSS.
[She] attributes her involvement with the
RCDSS as a “misunderstanding,” and blames
[respondent father]'s “leaving her” on her
problems with maintaining care for her
children. Respondent L[.M.T.] is very
emotional about [respondent father], and she
remains extremely distraught over [his]
“leaving her” and not marrying her.
8. In August 2002, C[.T.], great aunt of the
juvenile, was given guardianship of the child.
On or about June 3, 2003, this placement
disrupted, and the juvenile was placed with
her maternal grandmother, C[.I.], through the
RCDSS on a kinship care assessment. On or
about August 7, 2003, [C.I.] contacted the
RCDSS and informed the RCDSS that she co[u]ld
no longer care for the child. The child was
placed in foster care at that time.
9. The juvenile entered foster care with
severe skin and behavioral problems. Since
being in foster care, those problems have
diminished.
10. Respondent L[.M.T.] testified that she
had occasional contact with the juvenile from
June 3, 2003, to August 7, 2003, when the
juvenile was placed with C[.I.]
. . .
12. T.A.T. has been in a placement outside of
Respondent L[.M.T.]'s home continuously since
the adjudication on May 6, 2002. . . .
13. In referring to the juvenile, Respondent
L[.M.T.] testified that it was “alright” if
she “got her back,” but that it was also
“alright” if she did not have the child
returned to her because the juvenile was
“being taken care of.”
14. During her testimony, Respondent L[.M.T.]
exhibited no understanding of why her children
were removed from her home though sheconsented to the adjudication of neglect on
May 6, 2002.
15. Respondent L[.M.T.] has not cooperated
with RCDSS. Respondent L[.M.T.] has refused
to release psychological and medical records
to the RCDSS. In February 2004, Respondent
L[.M.T.] told the RCDSS not to contact her
anymore. She also told the RCDSS that she was
not ready to care for her child.
16. Respondent L[.M.T.] testified that she
did not have any income and had been residing
with a friend for approximately seven (7)
months. She testified to living at the
Salvation Army and with strangers for the past
two (2) years because her family would not
allow her to stay with them.
17. Respondent L[.M.T.] had one (1) visit
with the juvenile at the RCDSS on or about
June 17, 2004, after appearing in Court to
answer the Petition to terminate her parental
rights to the juvenile. During the visit,
Respondent L[.M.T.] had little interaction
with the juvenile and did not play with her.
Respondent L[.M.T.] spent a lot of the time
during the visit speaking with Social Worker
Beverly Dupree about relinquishing her
parental rights so the child could be adopted.
After the visit, the child regressed [to]
behaviors previously exhibited before coming
back into foster care, including excessive
crying, soiling herself, and hitting others.
The juvenile's behavior has since improved
again.
Based upon these facts, the court concluded that “[r]espondent
L[.M.T.] has neglected [T.A.T.] within the meaning of North
Carolina General Statutes Section 7B-101, and there is a likelihood
that such neglect will continue.”
In challenging the court's adjudication of neglect, respondent
notes that RCDSS adduced no evidence at the termination hearing
that she “continues to fail to have food in the home, that she
continues to fail to take T[.A.T.] for medical treatment when thechild has difficulty breathing, or that she continues to keep open
containers of kerosene in the room with the juvenile[].”
We find no merit to respondent's argument. At the time of the
termination hearing, T.A.T. had been removed from her care and
custody more than two years, based upon an adjudication of neglect
in March of 2002. In this circumstance, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(1) does not require RCDSS to show that respondent was
continuing to neglect T.A.T. in the manner which led to the child's
removal from her home:
Where, as here, a child has not been in
the custody of the parent for a significant
period of time prior to the termination
hearing, the trial court must employ a
different kind of analysis to determine
whether the evidence supports a finding of
neglect. This is because requiring the
petitioner in such circumstances to show that
the child is currently neglected by the parent
would make termination of parental rights
impossible. “The determinative factors must
be the best interests of the child and the
fitness of the parent to care for the child at
the time of the termination proceeding.”
Although prior adjudications of neglect may be
admitted and considered by the trial court,
they will rarely be sufficient, standing
alone, to support a termination of parental
rights, since the petition must establish that
neglect exists at the time of hearing. Thus,
the trial court must also consider evidence of
changed conditions in light of the history of
neglect by the parent and the probability of a
repetition of neglect. In addition,
visitation by the parent is a relevant factor
in such cases.
In re Shermer, 156 N.C. App. 281, 286-87, 576 S.E.2d 403, 407
(2003) (emphasis omitted) (citations omitted).
As found by the district court, respondent consented to the
original adjudication of neglect on the grounds alleged by RCDSS,including her failure to have food in the house and failure to
obtain medication treatment for T.A.T.'s severe respiratory
infection. She expressly declined to seek reunification with
T.A.T. and took no steps to cooperate with RCDSS toward that end.
Respondent refused to grant RCDSS access to her medical and
psychiatric records, asked RCDSS not to contact her regarding the
child, and failed to attend hearings related to T.A.T's custody and
permanent placement plan. Respondent did not obtain employment or
stable housing, had no income, and made no effort to maintain a
relationship with T.A.T. beyond “occasional contact” during the
six-month period in 2003 when the child was living with C.I.
Respondent attended one visit with T.A.T. in June of 2004, but paid
little attention to the child and spent the majority of the time
discussing the relinquishment of her parental rights with the
social worker. Moreover, at the termination hearing, respondent
displayed no understanding of the reasons for the child's removal
from her custody. She claimed her psychiatric commitment had been
voluntary, stating, “I don't have a mental problem. I never did.”
Respondent also testified, “[i]f I get T[.A.T.] back, it's fine.
If I don't get [her] back, it's fine.” The district court did not
err in concluding that respondent neglected T.A.T. and that such
neglect was likely to continue. See e.g., In re Yocum, 158 N.C.
App. 198, 204, 580 S.E.2d 399, 403, per curiam aff'd, 357 N.C. 568,
597 S.E.2d 674 (2003); In re Humphrey, 156 N.C. App. 533, 540-41,
577 S.E.2d 421, 427 (2003). Because the district court properly found grounds for
terminating respondent's parental rights under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a)(1), we need not review the remaining grounds found by
the court. See In re Moore, 306 N.C. 394, 404, 293 S.E.2d 127,
132-33 (1982); In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230,
233-34 (1990).
Respondent next claims that the district court abused its
discretion by electing to terminate her parental rights. Having
found grounds for termination under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a) at
the adjudicatory stage, the court was required at the dispositional
stage to terminate respondent's parental rights “unless the court
shall further determine that the best interests of the juvenile
require that the parental rights of the parent not be terminated.”
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2003); In re Parker, 90 N.C. App.
423, 431, 368 S.E.2d 879, 884 (1988). In support of its
disposition, the district court made additional findings that
T.A.T. “has flourished” in her adoptive foster placement and that
her need for “a permanent plan of care at the earliest possible
age” could be met only by termination of respondent's rights. In
light of the uncontested facts of this case, we find no abuse of
the court's discretion. See In re McMillon, 143 N.C. App. 402,
408, 546 S.E.2d 169, 174, disc. review denied, 354 N.C. 218, 554
S.E.2d 341 (2001).
Affirmed.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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