STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Wake County
Nos. 04 CRS 017767-68
DAVID EARL JONES,
Defendant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Tina A. Krasner, for the State.
Anne Bleyman for defendant-appellant.
WYNN, Judge.
“The standard of review in evaluating a trial court's ruling
on a motion to suppress is that the trial court's findings of fact
'are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even
if the evidence is conflicting.'” State v. Smith, 160 N.C. App.
107, 114, 584 S.E.2d 830, 835 (2003) (citation omitted).
In this
case, competent evidence supports the trial court's findings of
fact that Defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived his rights.
Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Defendant's
motion to suppress his statements.
On 5 April 2004, Defendant David Earl Jones was indicted on
two counts of assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill
inflicting serious injury
. The case was tried at the 20 July 2004Criminal Session of Wake County Superior Court.
The evidence presented at trial tended to show the following:
On 12 March 2004, Tonya Bridges was living in an apartment with
Defendant and their three-year-old daughter, Miracle.
Bridges and
Defendant had an argument, and Bridges told Defendant not to
return.
The next day, Bridges had friends come over to her apartment,
including Maurice Adams. Bridges and her friends were “all sitting
around talking, drinking, listening to music.” Eventually some of
the friends left, and Adams left and returned with more beer.
Bridges consumed about three to four beers, while Adams consumed
ten cans or more of beer. Defendant later showed up at the
apartment and asked to use the bathroom. After using the bathroom,
Defendant, Adams, and another person went outside to smoke a
cigarette.
After finishing the cigarettes, Defendant and Adams walked
back into the apartment. Adams placed his hand on a DVD player
that Defendant had recently given Bridges for her birthday.
Defendant then started “saying stuff,” calling Bridges “bitches”
and suggesting that he and Adams have sex with her. Defendant went
into the kitchen to get some water, and came back out and said he
was going to kiss Miracle, who was seated next to Bridges. When he
bent down to kiss Miracle, Defendant stabbed Bridges in the chest.
Defendant then quickly stabbed Bridges a second time, this time
under her left breast. Defendant was using a “big restaurant
knife” that he had found in the kitchen. Bridges estimated thatthe knife was eight or nine inches long.
After stabbing Bridges, Defendant attempted to cut Adams by
the throat, but instead cut him on the right side of his neck. He
then pushed Adams off of him and Adams went out the front door.
Bridges picked up Miracle, and Defendant told Bridges to put her
down. After putting her down, Defendant stabbed Bridges through
her right hand. Bridges headed for the bathroom, hoping to get
some Clorox to fight Defendant off with. However, before she could
get the Clorox, Defendant stabbed her in the left side. Defendant
was pushing the knife into Bridges while she tried to pull it out.
Bridges hit Defendant and he fell on his back. Defendant left the
apartment and Bridges walked to her front door and called for help.
At trial, Defendant moved to suppress an oral statement he
made to police, arguing that the statement was not knowingly and
voluntarily given. Defendant specifically cited the State's
failure to produce a signed waiver form, which the State claimed
had been lost. The trial court denied the motion.
Defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon with
intent to kill inflicting serious injury and assault with a deadly
weapon, and was sentenced to a term of 116 to 149 months
imprisonment
.
Defendant appeals.
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We first consider whether the trial court
erred in denying
Defendant's motion to suppress.
Defendant contends that because
there was evidence that he was intoxicated and agitated, it was
necessary for the State to present a signed waiver in order to showthat his waiver of his Miranda rights was voluntary, knowing, and
understanding. Without the form, Defendant argues that there was
insufficient evidence to support the findings of fact in the order
denying the motion to suppress.
After careful review of the
record, briefs, and contentions of the parties, we affirm.
“The standard of review in evaluating a trial court's ruling
on a motion to suppress is that the trial court's findings of fact
'are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even
if the evidence is conflicting.'” Smith, 160 N.C. App. at 114, 584
S.E.2d at 835 (citation omitted). If the trial court's conclusions
of law are supported by its factual findings, we will not disturb
those conclusions on appeal. State v. Logner, 148 N.C. App. 135,
138, 557 S.E.2d 191, 193-94 (2001).
In the case sub judice,
the trial court found as fact that
“defendant was not so impaired by alcohol or that he was unable to
comprehend his rights or waive his rights.” The trial court
further found that Defendant “was coherent and sufficiently clear
headed to make informed decisions.” There was evidence in the
record to support the trial court's findings.
Defendant was
driving a moped when he was arrested. The arresting officer
testified that although Defendant “had an alcohol odor about him,”
he did not pursue an impaired driving arrest. The officer stated
that Defendant was cooperative, and answered in the negative when
asked if Defendant was “stumbling, falling down drunk.” Detective
J.P. Arnold of the Raleigh Police Department, who interviewed
Defendant after his arrest, testified that he advised Defendant ofhis Miranda rights, that Defendant appeared to understand his
rights, and Defendant signed and waived his Miranda rights.
Although the form was lost and could not be located for the trial,
the State was not required to produce the signed written waiver of
rights form in order to make Defendant's statement admissible at
trial. State v. Monroe, 27 N.C. App. 405, 407, 219 S.E.2d 270, 271
(1975) (“What was at issue here was whether defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his rights, not what were the contents or terms
of the written document itself.”).
Accordingly, we conclude that
Defendant's statements were properly admitted as evidence at trial.
The assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next argues
that the trial court committed plain
error by instructing the jury and prospective jurors prior to trial
that the knife used in the assaults was a deadly weapon as a matter
of law. The trial court stated to the prospective jurors that
Defendant was “accused of assault __ feloniously assaulting Tonya
Bridges with a knife, a deadly weapon, with the intent to kill.”
The trial court repeated the accusation in reference to Maurice
Adams, again stating that Defendant was accused of attacking Adams
“with a knife, a deadly weapon.”
Defendant contends that the trial
court's instructions amounted to an improper expression of opinion.
Defendant contends that the error was prejudicial, because it
shifted away from the State the burden of proving that the knife
was a deadly weapon.
We disagree with Defendant and find no error. Despite
Defendant's contentions to the contrary, the trial court was notexpressing any opinion or instructing the jury on the law of the
case. The trial court was merely informing the prospective jurors
about the case in accordance with section 15A-1213 of the North
Carolina General Statutes. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1213 (2004)
(“Prior to selection of jurors, the judge must identify the parties
and their counsel and briefly inform the prospective jurors, as to
each defendant, of the charge, the date of the alleged offense, the
name of any victim alleged in the pleading, the defendant's plea to
the charge, and any affirmative defense of which the defendant has
given pretrial notice[.]”). The trial court identified Defendant,
the names of the victims, the date of the alleged offense, and
Defendant's plea to the charge. The trial court then summarized
the indictments, explaining to the prospective jurors the charges
against Defendant. “This procedure is entirely appropriate and
certainly complies with the spirit of G.S. 15A-1213.” State v.
McNeil, 47 N.C. App. 30, 34, 266 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1980). Moreover,
the trial court explained to the jury that the charges against
Defendant were mere accusations, stating that Defendant was
presumed to be innocent, and that the State had the burden of
proving Defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Accordingly,
the assignment of error is overruled.
No error
.
Judges CALABRIA and JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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