IN THE MATTER OF:
E.F.C.K. and C.F.W.,
Minor Children Forsyth County
Nos. 03 J 271-272
Assistant County Attorney Theresa A. Boucher, for petitioner-
appellee Forsyth County Department of Social Services.
Womble, Carlyle, Sandridge & Rice, PLLC by Alison R. Bost, for
the Guardian Ad Litem for the minor children, E.F.C.K. and
C.F.W.
Don Willey for respondent-appellant Shanequa Scott aka Naheen
King.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Respondent is the mother of the minor children E.F.C.K. (born
9-14-01) and C.F.W. (born 12-18-02). On 18 August 2003, Forsyth
County Department of Social Services filed a petition to terminate
respondent mother's parental rights, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §§
7B-1111(a)(2) and (a)(9), which provide for termination of parental
rights if: “(2) The parent has willfully left the juvenile in
foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months
without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable
progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting thoseconditions which led to the removal of the juvenile.” And: “(9)
The parental rights of the parent with respect to another child of
the parent have been terminated involuntarily by a court of
competent jurisdiction and the parent lacks the ability or
willingness to establish a safe home.”
This matter was heard on 1 December 2003. The evidence tends
to show the following: Department of Social Services first became
acquainted with respondent in August 2000, when her infant daughter
I.K. was removed from her custody due to allegations of neglect and
dependency. I.K. was adjudicated to be a neglected and dependent
juvenile, and thereafter Department of Social Services began to
work intensively with respondent to reunite the child with her.
The minor child E.F.C.K. came into the care and custody of
Department of Social Services just one day after his birth because
respondent tested positive for marijuana at the time of the minor
child's birth. C.F.W., who was born premature, with special needs
requiring hospitalization for some three weeks after birth, was
also removed from respondent mother's custody soon after her birth.
When respondent failed to complete the requirements for
reunification with I.K., she was placed in the custody of her
father. Additionally, despite Department of Social Services's
efforts, respondent failed to submit to the necessary evaluations
and treatments to be reunited with E.F.C.K. and C.F.W.
E.F.C.K. and C.F.W. have been continually in foster care since
birth. The two minor children have been living in the same foster
home, and have close relationships with each other and their fosterfamily. E.F.C.K. is developing normally, but C.F.W. has had some
health issues. The foster parents have expressed a desire to adopt
both of the minor children. Patricia Lutman, the Department of
Social Services social worker assigned to the case, was of the
opinion that it was in the best interests of the children that
respondent mother's parental rights be terminated. Lutman's
opinion was based upon the length of time the children had been in
foster care and the attachment between the children and their
foster family, which includes the relationship between the minor
children and the other children in the foster home.
Respondent has been homeless since 29 July 2003. In the six
months prior to the termination hearing, she only had three visits
with the two minor children, E.F.C.K. and C.F.W. In fact, despite
the opportunity for weekly visits, respondent had not visited the
children since August 2003. Though she testified to having had two
jobs at fast food restaurants, respondent refused to provide any
further information about her employment. Respondent failed to pay
any of the court-ordered $50 per month support payments in the six
months preceding the termination hearing.
Psychologist Deborea Winfrey, who evaluated respondent in
Spring 2003, diagnosed respondent with paranoid schizophrenia,
Asperger's Syndrome and reactive attachment disorder. Winfrey
recommended a minimum 18-month course of treatment for respondent
mother, which would include individual psychotheraphy and anti-
psychotic medications. Though she testified to the contrary at the
hearing, respondent told Dr. Winfrey that she was completelyopposed to taking anti-psychotic medications. Further, respondent
testified during the termination hearing that she would not comply
with any recommendations as to counseling. Dr. Winfrey opined that
it was unlikely that respondent could create an environment for
appropriate child development; and that without treatment for her
condition, any children in respondent mother's care would be at
risk.
At the close of the evidence, the trial court found that
grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights to
E.F.C.K. pursuant to both N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1111(a)(2) and (9),
and that grounds existed to terminate respondent's parental rights
to C.F.W. pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(9). The court
further found and concluded that it was in the best interests of
the children to terminate those rights. Respondent appeals.
In her first argument, respondent contends that the trial
court erred in accepting her stipulation of a factual basis to the
allegations contained in the petition without taking evidence at
the adjudication hearing in contravention of the mandatory
statutory procedure. We disagree.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109 (e) provides: “The court shall take
evidence, find the facts, and shall adjudicate the existence or
nonexistence of any of the circumstances set forth in G.S. 7B-1111
which authorize the termination of parental rights of the
respondent.” This Court recently reminded, “'Stipulations are
judicial admissions and are therefore binding in every sense,
preventing the party who agreed to the stipulation from introducingevidence to dispute it and relieving the other party of the
necessity of producing evidence to establish an admitted fact.'” In
re I.S., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 611 S.E.2d 467, ___ (2005)(quoting
Thomas v. Poole, 54 N.C. App. 239, 241, 282 S.E.2d 515, 517
(1981)). Judicial notice is another evidentiary tool that may be
utilized in presenting adjudicatory facts. See N.C.R. Evid. Rule
201.
In this case, the trial court not only had before it the
stipulation of counsel, on behalf of respondent mother, but the
record also shows that “[the trial court] took judicial notice of
the termination of parental rights petition filed by the Forsyth
County DSS on August 18, 2003.” The court also received into
evidence, without objection, the 5 January 2000 order from South
Carolina terminating respondent mother's parental rights as to two
older children. Based upon that evidence, the trial court found
that grounds existed, as alleged in the 18 August 2003 petition, to
terminate respondent mother's parental rights. As the court's
finding that grounds existed under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2)
and (9) to terminate respondent mother's parental rights to
E.F.C.K. and C.F.W. was based upon proper evidence taken during the
adjudication hearing. This argument is without merit.
In her second argument, respondent contends that the trial
court erred in concluding that it would be in the minor children's
best interests to terminate her parental rights. We disagree.
Once at least one ground for termination is established, the
trial court proceeds to the dispositional stage where the bestinterests of the child are taken into consideration. In re
Hardesty, 150 N.C. App. 380, 385, 563 S.E.2d 79, 83 (2002). The
trial court's determination that it is in the child's best
interests to terminate parental rights is reviewable under an abuse
of discretion standard. In re Allred, 122 N.C. App. 561, 569, 471
S.E.2d 84, 88 (1996).
In the case sub judice, after determining that grounds existed
to terminate respondent mother's parental rights, the trial court
heard the testimony of Patricia Lutman, the social worker assigned
to this case, as well as that of Dr. Deborea Winfrey, the
psychologist who evaluated respondent mother. Despite respondent
mother's protestations of love for her children, the overwhelming
evidence of record tended to show that respondent had done little
to provide a stable environment for herself or the minor children;
that despite the attempts of Department of Social Services, she was
unable to create an environment for appropriate child development.
In fact, respondent stopped visiting her children once the petition
to terminate her parental rights was filed, and even before that
time, her visits were sporadic. Lutman noted that the children had
been in foster care for the entirety of their lives, that they had
bonded with their foster family, and that the foster parents were
interested in adopting the two minor children. Dr. Winfrey
affirmed that without the recommended treatment for her mental
illness, any child in respondent mother's care would be at risk.
Finally, the children's guardians ad Litem submitted reports to the
court recommending termination of respondent mother's parentalrights. Based upon this evidence, we conclude that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that it would be
in the best interests of the minor children to terminate respondent
mother's parental rights. This argument is without merit.
Having so concluded, the order terminating respondent mother's
parental rights is affirmed.
Because respondent has not argued her other assignments of
error in her brief, they are deemed abandoned. N.C. R. App. P. Rule
28(b)(6)(2005).
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge Martin and Judge Hunter concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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