STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Mecklenburg County
Nos. 03CRS236048-49
WILLIE D. WILLIAMS,
Defendant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Angel E. Gray, for the State.
Bryan Gates, Jr., for defendant-appellant.
WYNN, Judge.
Where it can be reasonably inferred that the sentence imposed
on a defendant was based on the defendant's insistence on a jury
trial, the defendant is entitled to a new sentencing hearing.
State v. Gantt, 161 N.C. App. 265, 588 S.E.2d 893 (2003). In this
case, the trial court's statements to defense counsel and Defendant
merely clarified the record that Defendant had been offered a plea
agreement, and he knowingly declined the offer. Accordingly, we
find no error by the trial court.
Defendant Willie D. Williams was charged with two counts of
armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill
inflicting serious injury, and assault with a deadly weaponinflicting serious injury. Before trial, the State and Defendant
engaged in plea negotiations and a plea conference was held with
the trial court. Defendant, however, rejected all of the State's
offers, and Defendant elected to plead not guilty and proceed to
trial.
The evidence at trial tended to show that on the evening of 15
June 2003, Defendant and another male assaulted and robbed Jimmy
Furtick, Jr. and Furtick's friend, identified only as “Jersey.”
Specifically, Defendant held a twelve-gauge shotgun on Furtick,
while removing five or ten dollars from Furtick's pockets.
Thereafter, Defendant beat “Jersey” in the head with the shotgun.
Defendant's accomplice had a pistol, which he used to hit Furtick
on the side of the head. When Furtick tried to escape, he was shot
in the outside, upper portion of his left leg. Defendant and his
accomplice then fled the scene.
The jury found Defendant guilty of robbery with a dangerous
weapon and the lesser-included offense of assault with a deadly
weapon inflicting serious injury. The trial court entered
judgments on the jury's verdicts, sentencing Defendant to
consecutive, presumptive sentences of 117 to 150 months
imprisonment for the armed robbery conviction, and forty-six to
sixty-five months imprisonment for the assault conviction.
Defendant appeals.
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On appeal, Defendant argues only that the trial court
improperly imposed a harsher sentence based upon his decision toexercise his right to a jury trial. Defendant directs this Court's
attention to the trial court's remarks during the charge conference
as support for his position to that end.
It is well settled that a defendant has the right to plead not
guilty and he should not be punished for exercising that right.
State v. Boone, 293 N.C. 702, 712, 239 S.E.2d 459, 465 (1977).
Accordingly, where it can be reasonably inferred that the sentence
imposed on a defendant was based on the defendant's insistence on
a jury trial, the defendant is entitled to a new sentencing
hearing. Gantt, 161 N.C. App. 265, 588 S.E.2d 893.
During the charge conference and before closing arguments, the
trial court had the following exchange with defense counsel:
THE COURT: . . . I think the record -- we
probably ought to put on the record that
counsel for the State and for the defendant
had a plea conference with the Court, and that
the Court was asked what sentence might be
entered if the defendant pled to all charges,
and that was communicated to counsel.
And, Mr. Sanders, I assume you've communicated
that to your client; is that correct?
MR. SANDERS: Yes, Your Honor. I communicated
to him exactly what the Court had offered, 120
to 153 months. Mr. Williams does not want to
accept that as a plea offer.
THE COURT: Mr. Williams, do you understand
what the Court -- what the result of the plea
conference were?
THE DEFENDANT: Sir?
THE COURT: Do you understand what the results
of the plea conference were?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And you've talked with your counselabout the plea offer, and it's your decision
not to accept it; is that correct?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: And is that your plea and voluntary
decision? That is, has anyone promised you
anything to get you to turn the plea offer
down?
THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.
At sentencing, the trial court allowed Defendant to present
evidence as to mitigating factors.
Similar facts and circumstances have been analyzed by our
Court in State v. Poag, 159 N.C. App. 312, 583 S.E.2d 661, appeal
dismissed and disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 661, 590 S.E.2d 857
(2003), and Gantt, 161 N.C. App. 265, 588 S.E.2d 893. In Poag, the
trial court had a discussion with the defendant about a pending
plea offer, noting that “if [he] accept[ed] the plea . . . the time
for the robbery would run with or at the same time as the time for
the murder and the attempted murder.” 159 N.C. App. at 323, 583
S.E.2d at 670. The defendant refused the State's plea offer and
proceeded to trial, after which the defendant was convicted and
sentenced to consecutive sentences. Id. at 323-24, 583 S.E.2d at
670. On appeal, the defendant argued that the court
unconstitutionally punished him for exercising his right to a jury
trial by ordering that his sentences be served consecutively
instead of concurrently. Id. at 323, 583 S.E.2d at 669. This
Court disagreed, holding that the trial court's comments were
merely an effort to “make the plea bargain more definitive and
eliminate any question that defendant might have about theresulting sentence that the trial court would impose in its
discretion.” Id. at 324, 583 S.E.2d at 670. The Court concluded
that the comments were not such as to show an unconstitutional
decision to punish defendant for his decision to exercise his right
to a trial by jury. Id.
In Gantt, the trial court made the following statement prior
to sentencing the defendant:
At the beginning of the trial I gave you one
opportunity where you could have exposed
yourself probably to about 70 months but you
chose not to take advantage of that. I'm
going to sentence you to a minimum of 96 and a
maximum of 125 months in the North Carolina
Department of Corrections.
161 N.C. App. at 272, 588 S.E.2d at 898. Again, this Court held
that the trial court's statements did not rise to the level of
those statements our appellate courts have determined to be
improper considerations of a defendant's exercise of his right to
a jury trial. Id.
Though Defendant references several cases in which our
appellate courts have held that the trial court's remarks show a
decision to impose a harsher penalty based upon a defendant's
decision to proceed with a jury trial, the facts of those cases are
readily distinguishable from the instant case. See State v. Young,
166 N.C. App. 401, 411-12, 602 S.E.2d 374, 380-81 (2004) (remanded
for resentencing where the trial judge stated prior to trial that
if the defendant pled guilty to all charges then he would be
sentenced in the mitigated range, but if he proceeded to trial he
would be sentenced at least within the presumptive range); State v.Williams, 98 N.C. App. 68, 73-74, 389 S.E.2d 830, 833 (1990)
(remanded for resentencing where the trial judge sentenced the
defendant in the aggravated range for failing to “express remorse”
to the victim). Indeed, the facts of this case are more similar to
those of Poag and Gantt. Poag, 159 N.C. App. at 324, 583 S.E.2d at
670; Gantt, 161 N.C. App. at 272, 588 S.E.2d at 898. A thorough
review of the record shows that the trial court here engaged in the
subject exchange with the parties to clarify, on the record, that
Defendant had been offered a plea agreement and that Defendant
knowingly declined that offer. Hence, we conclude the trial court
did not improperly sentence Defendant to a harsher punishment
because of his decision to exercise his right to a trial by jury.
Defendant's argument to the contrary fails.
Having so concluded, we hold that Defendant received a fair
trial, free from prejudicial error.
No error.
Judges CALABRIA and JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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