An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA05-250


Filed: 15 November 2005


         v.                        Craven County
                                Nos.    03 CRS 55070
MILTON E. LANCASTER                        04 CRS 02853

    Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 8 November 2004 by Judge Benjamin G. Alford in Craven County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 31 October 2005.

    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General John F. Oates, Jr., for the State.

    Haral E. Carlin for defendant-appellant.

    CALABRIA, Judge.

    The State presented evidence that Carl Hollis (“Hollis”) owned a vinyl siding installation business called Hollis Vinyl Creations. On 7 August 2003, he discovered that a tool called a “siding break” had been stolen from a work site on Old Washington Road in Vanceboro, North Carolina. Hollis's name was painted in several locations on the siding break. He reported the theft to the police. On 7 August 2003, Milton E. Lancaster (“defendant”) sold Hollis's siding break for $200 to William Preston Blount (“Blount”). A sheriff's deputy recovered Hollis's siding break from Blount's backyard on 19 August 2003.     Blount testified that he worked as a vinyl siding repairman and had known defendant since “he was a child, all of his life.” On 7 August 2003, at approximately 12:00 p.m., defendant knocked on Blount's door and said he had a siding break to sell. Defendant told Blount that “some guy had pawned him a break” and had later “changed his mind and told [defendant] to go ahead and keep it.” After driving with defendant to examine the siding break, Blount paid defendant $100 of the $200 purchase price and took it home. He gave defendant an additional $40 toward the purchase price “[l]ike a week later[.]” Blount estimated that the tool would have cost $1000 if he had purchased it new but explained that “you can find them used [for] decent prices.” Although he had seen a used siding break at a yard sale for $300, defendant's price “was the best deal” Blount had found.
    At trial on this matter, a jury found defendant guilty of obtaining property by false pretenses and misdemeanor possession of stolen goods. Upon his guilty plea to attaining habitual felon status, the trial court consolidated his offenses and sentenced him to a minimum term of ninety-six months to a maximum of 125 months in the North Carolina Department of Correction. Defendant appeals.
    Defendant argues on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of obtaining property by false pretenses, absent evidence that Blount was actually deceived by defendant's false representation as to the origin of the siding break. When reviewing a motion to dismiss, we view “the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State thebenefit of all reasonable inferences.” State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 161, 604 S.E.2d 886, 904 (2004) (citing State v. Gladden, 315 N.C. 398, 430, 340 S.E.2d 673, 693). If we find that “substantial evidence exists to support each essential element of the crime charged and that defendant was the perpetrator, it is proper for the trial court to [have denied] the motion.” Id. (citing State v. Malloy, 309 N.C. 176, 178, 305 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1983)). “Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Brown, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313 S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984) (citing State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78, 265 S.E.2d 164, 169 (1980)).
    Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-100(a) (2003), in order to convict a defendant of obtaining property by false pretenses, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt: “'(1) a false representation of a subsisting fact or a future fulfillment or event, (2) which is calculated and intended to deceive, (3) which does in fact deceive, and (4) by which one person obtains or attempts to obtain value from another.'” State v. Hutchinson, 139 N.C. App. 132, 138, 532 S.E.2d 569, 573 (2000) (quoting State v. Cronin, 299 N.C. 229, 242, 262 S.E.2d 277, 286 (1980)). Here, defendant challenges only the sufficiency of the evidence of the third element.
    Blount testified that defendant claimed the tool had been pawned by a “white boy,” who later “changed his mind” and surrendered the property to defendant. Blount explicitly stated that defendant “convinced me that it was straight, that it was legit[imate].” When asked on cross-examination about the name“Hollis” which was painted on the tool, Blount explained, “I assumed that was the man that pawned it to [defendant].” Blount's credibility was an issue for the jury to resolve since the State presented substantial evidence to support a finding that Blount was deceived by defendant's false representation regarding the origin of the siding break and that he paid defendant $140 in reliance upon that representation. See State v. Rowsey, 343 N.C. 603, 617, 472 S.E.2d 903, 910 (1996). Accordingly, the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss.
Defendant failed to offer any argument in support of his second assignment of error, and we deem it abandoned. See N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).
    No error.
    Judges WYNN and JACKSON concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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