STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Cumberland County
Nos. 99 CRS 72607,
RICHARD LEE EDGE 72612-19
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney
General Mary S. Mercer, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate
Defender Matthew D. Wunsche, for defendant-appellant.
JACKSON, Judge.
On 26 April 2000, defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to attempting to obtain property by false pretenses,
obtaining property by false pretenses, and eight counts of making
a false bomb report.
Defendant's sentences were suspended and he
was placed on supervised probation for thirty-six months.
Defendant was ordered to pay $1,680.00 as a condition of his
probation. The amount was later modified to $1,580.00.
On 15 May 2003, probation violation reports were filed
alleging that defendant had failed to comply with the monetary term
of his probation. Specifically, the report alleged that defendant
was $1,526.00 in arrears, and had
only paid $54.00 since the dateof judgment.
On 23 August 2004, a probation violation hearing was held in
Cumberland County Superior Court. Defendant admitted that he had
failed to comply with the monetary obligation of his probation, but
denied the willfulness of the violation. Defendant testified that
he had “[d]epression and anxiety disorder and I have a bullet in my
back that's causing nerve damage to my right leg.” Defendant
argued that as a result he was on various prescription medications,
was disabled and could not work, and thus could not make his
probation payments. He also testified that he was on probation in
other cases, and that money he sent might have been credited
towards those obligations rather than his obligation in this case.
However, the trial court found that defendant willfully violated
the terms of his probation. Accordingly, the trial court revoked
defendant's probation and activated his suspended sentences.
Defendant appeals.
Defendant argues the trial court erred by concluding that he
willfully violated his probation. Defendant contends the evidence
demonstrated that he had persistent psychological and physical
ailments which prevented him from maintaining employment and
complying with the monetary conditions of his probation. See State
v. Hill, 132 N.C. App. 209, 510 S.E.2d 413 (1999).
After careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of
the parties, we find no error.
This Court has stated:
Any violation of a valid condition of
probation is sufficient to revoke defendant's
probation. All that is required to revoke
probation is evidence satisfying the trialcourt in its discretion that the defendant
violated a valid condition of probation
without lawful excuse. The burden is on
defendant to present competent evidence of his
inability to comply with the conditions of
probation; and that otherwise, evidence of
defendant's failure to comply may justify a
finding that defendant's failure to comply was
wilful or without lawful excuse.
State v. Tozzi, 84 N.C. App. 517, 521, 353 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1987)
(internal citations omitted).
In Hill, cited by defendant, this Court vacated the
defendant's probation revocation because the trial court refused to
consider evidence demonstrating that the defendant's health
problems prevented him from both providing restitution and
completing his community service requirements, and because the
trial court failed to find as fact that defendant did not have a
lawful excuse for his violation. Hill, 132 N.C. App. at 213, 510
S.E.2d at 415
. This Court stated that “[i]n applying the 'lawful
excuse' rule, a trial court is mandated to consider facts brought
forth by the defendant which demonstrate that he has a lawful
excuse for his probation violation.” Id. at 212, 510 S.E.2d at 415
(citing State v. Smith, 43 N.C. App. 727, 259 S.E.2d 805 (1979)).
In the case sub judice,
defendant similarly offered evidence
of an inability to comply with the monetary terms of his probation
due to health issues. Defendant was permitted to testify
concerning his previous gunshot injury, and the fact that he had
been on short and long term disability while living in Minnesota.
In addition, the State's witness testified that Defendant and hisprobation officer in Minnesota told her that we was receiving
disability payments, and that he repeatedly complained of medical
problems which prevented him from working. However, the State's
witness testified that neither Defendant nor his probation officer
were ever able to provide her with documentation regarding his
alleged medical problems and the limitations they placed upon him.
The court allowed into evidence two North Carolina Division of
Mental Health psychiatric reports on Defendant, from December 1999
and July 2004. The reports indicated that defendant had depression
and some minor personality disorders, both of which were deemed
partially related to his current situation and partially related to
his character.
The trial court considered defendant's testimony
and evidence, but rejected it, finding that “what the evidence in
this case demonstrates to me is an tempt [sic] to manipulate on the
part of the defendant . . . .” Based on this finding, the court
concluded that the violation was willful and revoked defendant's
probation.
When revoking an individual's probation, the trial court need
only be “reasonably satisfie[d] . . . that the defendant has
violated a valid condition upon which the sentence was suspended.”
State v. Freeman, 47 N.C. App. 171, 175, 266 S.E.2d 723, 725, disc.
review denied, 301 N.C. 99, 273 S.E.2d 304 (1980); see also, State
v. White, 129 N.C. App. 52, 58, 496 S.E.2d 842, 846 (1998) (“All
that is required is that the evidence be sufficient to reasonably
satisfy the judge in the exercise of his sound discretion that the
defendant has willfully violated a valid condition of probation.”),aff'd in part, review dismissed in part, 350 N.C. 302, 512 S.E.2d
424 (1999). In this case, the trial court weighed the limited
available evidence of defendant's purported mental illness and
disabilities with his acts of manipulation, his crimes, and his
violations of the conditions of probation. The decision to revoke
probation is one that rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court, and the decision will not be reversed absent a
manifest abuse of discretion. State v. Tennant, 141 N.C. App. 524,
526, 540 S.E.2d 807, 808 (2000).
We conclude the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
revoking Defendant's probation.
Accordingly, we find no error.
No error
.
Judges WYNN and CALABRIA concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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