IN THE MATTER OF: Richmond County
S.N.W., Juvenile. No. 02J40
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Karen A. Blum, for the State.
Robert W. Ewing, for the juvenile-appellant.
LEVINSON, Judge.
Juvenile appeals from adjudication and disposition orders of
the trial court adjudicating the juvenile delinquent and placing
her on court supervision for six months. We affirm.
At a hearing held 5 October 2004, the juvenile was adjudicated
delinquent pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1501(7). The court
found that on 2 September 2004 the juvenile “unlawfully, willfully
did assault Melvin Ingram, Jr., a school employee of the Richmond
County Schools . . . in violation of G.S. § 14-33(c)(6) assault on
a school employee.” On 2 December 2004 the trial court ordered a
Level 1 disposition for the juvenile of six months in-home court
supervision with, inter alia, the following conditions:
1. Remain on good behavior and not violate any
laws.
2. Not violate any reasonable and lawful rules of
the juvenile's parent, guardian, or custodian.
3. Attend school regularly.
. . . .
5. Not associate with (specify person):
ANY PERSON DEEMED INAPPROPRIATE BY THE
JUVENILE COURT COUNSELOR.
6. Not be in the following place(s):
ANY PLACE DEEMED INAPPROPRIATE BY THE JUVENILE
COURT COUNSELOR.
. . . .
10. Abide by the following curfew:
ABIDE BY A CURFEW AS TO PERSON, PLACES AND
TIMES AT THE DISCRETION OF THE JUVENILE COURT
COUNSELOR.
. . . .
12. Possess no firearm, explosive device, or other
deadly weapon.
13. Report to a court counselor as often as
required by the court counselor.
. . . .
The trial court did not stay the court supervision pending
appeal. From the orders of adjudication and disposition, the
juvenile appeals.
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Due to the passage of time, we conclude the juvenile's first
two arguments on appeal, that the trial court erred by (1)
authorizing the Juvenile Court Counselor to establish the
conditions of the juvenile's curfew, and (2) failing to stay the
court supervision pending appeal, have been rendered moot.
“A case is 'moot' when a determination is
sought on a matter which, when rendered,cannot have any practical effect on the
existing controversy.” Further, “[w]henever,
during the course of litigation it develops
that the relief sought has been granted or
that the questions originally in controversy
between the parties are no longer at issue,
the case should be dismissed, for courts will
not entertain or proceed with a cause merely
to determine abstract propositions of law.”
In re Stratton, 159 N.C. App. 461, 463, 583 S.E.2d 323, 324 (2003)
(quoting Roberts v. Madison County Realtors Ass'n, 344 N.C. 394,
398-99, 474 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1996), and Dickerson Carolina, Inc. v.
Harrelson, 114 N.C. App. 693, 697, 443 S.E.2d 127, 131 (1994)).
The juvenile's court supervision, which began December 2004,
was for a duration of six months. Court supervision was not stayed
pending appeal, and there is nothing in the record to indicate that
the term of supervision was extended. Because the record on appeal
shows only that the juvenile's court supervision has already
expired, any opinion of this Court regarding the validity of the
conditions of her court supervision, and whether the court
supervision should have been stayed pending appeal, could have no
practical effect on any existing controversy. Therefore, the
juvenile's first two arguments on appeal are moot and are
dismissed.
While the doctrine of mootness controls our disposition of the
juvenile's first two arguments on appeal, we conclude the doctrine
does not apply to the juvenile's third argument on appeal, which
concerns the court's adjudication and disposition order. The
juvenile contends the trial court erred by denying her motion for
the trial court to recuse himself from her case. We disagree. [W]here a party moves for recusal, the burden
is on the movant to “demonstrate objectively
that grounds for disqualification actually
exist. Such a showing must consist of
substantial evidence that there exists such a
personal bias, prejudice or interest on the
part of the judge that he would be unable to
rule impartially.”
In re Lineberry, 154 N.C. App. 246, 249, 572 S.E.2d 229, 232 (2002)
(quoting State v. Fie, 320 N.C. 626, 627, 359 S.E.2d 774, 775
(1987)) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
The juvenile's motion follows:
[ATTORNEY FOR JUVENILE]: Your Honor, I have a motion
before we begin. A motion to request that you recuse
yourself.
[THE COURT]: Yes, sir.
[ATTORNEY FOR JUVENILE]: Judge, my client's father has
asked me to make a motion for you to recuse yourself in
the case based on a prior history with, I believe, him
and his family.
[THE COURT]: That motion is denied.
There is nothing else in the record beyond defense counsel's
statement supporting the juvenile's motion for recusal. The
juvenile failed to demonstrate that grounds for disqualification
existed. Consequently, we cannot hold that the trial court erred
by denying the motion. This assignment of error is overruled.
Affirmed.
Judges MCCULLOUGH and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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