An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA05-372

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 1 November 2005

ALAN LEE SCOTT, JR.,
    Plaintiff,
                                Cabarrus County
            v.                    No. 04 CVS 00309

FAIRBANKS CAPITAL CORPORATION,
GMAC MORTGAGE CORP., JP
MORGAN CHASE BANK AS TRUSTEE
FOR GSPRM MORTGAGE LOAN TRUST,
SERIES 2002-1, SHAPIRO &
INGLE, LLP and ELIZABETH B.
ELLS and/or DAVID W. NEILL,
    Defendants.

    Appeal by Plaintiff from an order entered 22 October 2004 by Judge Larry G. Ford in Superior Court, Cabarrus County . Heard in the Court of Appeals 10 October 2005.

    Legal Services of Southern Piedmont, Inc., by Andrea Young Bebber, for plaintiff-appellant.

    Smith Debnam Narron Wyche Saintsing & Myers, L.L.P., by Bettie Kelley Sousa, for defendant-appellee Fairbanks Capital Corporation.

    WYNN, Judge.

    “Where . . . an order entered by the trial court does not dispose of the entire controversy between all parties, it is interlocutory. As a general rule, a party is not entitled to immediately appeal an interlocutory order.” Hudson-Cole Dev. Corp. v. Beemer, 132 N.C. App. 341, 344, 511 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1999) (citations omitted) . In this case, Plaintiff's claims against Defendants GMAC Mortgage Corp., JP Morgan Chase, and the remainingparties continue, therefore, the instant appeal is dismissed as interlocutory.
     On 21 April 1998, Plaintiff Alan Lee Scott closed a mortgage loan with NationsCredit Financial Services Corporation secured by a deed of trust on Plaintiff's home. NationsCredit assigned servicing rights for Plaintiff's loan to Defendant Fairbanks Capital Corporation (“Fairbanks”) on 4 February 2002. Plaintiff filed this action on 5 February 2004, alleging that Fairbanks had: imposed and collected unnecessary and excessive fees, charges, and interest; failed to properly credit Plaintiff's account; improperly charged Plaintiff for unnecessary force placed insurance; misled Plaintiff about amounts properly due and owing; proceeded with wrongful foreclosure; failed to properly administer Plaintiff's account; and, treated Plaintiff unfairly and without regard to obligations of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff asserted claims of unfair and deceptive trade practices, breach of contract, breach of reinstatement agreements, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, unfair debt collection practices, usury, and sought injunctive relief.
    On 16 September 2004, Fairbanks moved for summary judgment. Fairbanks argued that Plaintiff's claims were resolved as part of a class action lawsuit (Curry, et al. v. Fairbanks Capital Corp., Docket no. 03-10895-DPW (D. Mass)), and that Plaintiff was bound by the settlement agreement because he had not opted out of the agreement. On 22 October 2004, the trial court granted Fairbank's motion and dismissed it from the action. Plaintiff appeals.         __________________________________________
     The threshold issue to consider in this case is whether Plaintiff's appeal is premature, and therefore, not properly before this Court. Plaintiff appeals from an order dismissing the claims against Fairbanks. Plaintiff's claims against GMAC Mortgage Corp, JP Morgan Chase, and the remaining parties continue. This Court has stated:
        Where, as here, an order entered by the trial court does not dispose of the entire controversy between all parties, it is interlocutory. As a general rule, a party is not entitled to immediately appeal an interlocutory order. However, there are two situations in which an appeal of right lies from an order that is interlocutory. The first situation is where the order represents a “'final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties' and the trial court certifies in the judgment that there is no just reason to delay the appeal.” Secondly, a party may appeal an interlocutory order where delaying the appeal will irreparably impair a substantial right of the party.

Hudson-Cole Dev. Corp., 132 N.C. App. at 344, 511 S.E.2d at 311 (citations omitted); see also N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-27(d)(1) (2004).
     The trial court did not certify this case for immediate appeal pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. Thus, Plaintiff's right to an immediate appeal, if one exists, depends on whether the order affects a substantial right. North Carolina Appellate Rule 28(b)(4) requires that the brief contain a statement of the grounds for appellate review containing “sufficient facts and argument to support appellate review on the ground that the challenged order affects a substantial right.” N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(4). Plaintiff cites no substantial right that will be lost absent immediate review. “It is not the duty of this Court to construct arguments for or find support for appellant's right to appeal from an interlocutory order.” Jeffreys v. Raleigh Oaks Joint Venture, 115 N.C. App. 377, 380, 444 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1994).
    Accordingly, because there was no final judgment in this case, nor were there any substantial rights of the parties affected, we hold that this appeal is premature, and therefore, dismiss it as interlocutory.
    Appeal dismissed.
    Judges CALABRIA and JACKSON concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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