An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA05-374

NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS

Filed: 15 November 2005

IN RE:    B.R.H.                    Mecklenburg County
                                No. 02 J 849
    

    Appeal by juvenile from order entered 22 November 2004 by Judge Elizabeth D. Miller in Mecklenburg County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 31 October 2005.

    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Donna D. Smith, for the State.

    Brian Michael Aus for respondent-appellant.

    CALABRIA, Judge.

    B.R.H. (the “juvenile”) appeals from a Level 3 disposition and commitment order entered upon revocation of his probation. We affirm.
    On 28 July 2004, the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent for two counts of felonious breaking and entering. The court ordered a Level 2 disposition and placed the juvenile on probation for twelve months. Subsequently, the court counselor filed a motion for review on 11 August 2004, alleging the juvenile violated the conditions of his probation by leaving “his residence without just cause or permission on the 8th, 9th, and 10th days of August 2004 with his whereabouts unknown.”
    Since the juvenile was not transported to the hearing, it was continued until 22 November 2004 when the juvenile admitted theprobation violation in the court counselor's motion. The prosecutor informed the court that the juvenile was under indictment for felonious breaking and entering, larceny, and “in the meantime he has more charges for breaking and entering and larceny and larceny of a firearm.” The juvenile's counsel asked the court “to close this juvenile case” since the juvenile was facing a prison term of “at least six to eight months” for his criminal charges and would be “pull[ed] . . . out of the juvenile” system upon his conviction. When the court explained that the juvenile was “not going to get [the] services in the adult system [that] he can get in the juvenile system[,]” his counsel responded, “[h]e can go to school in the adult system.” The court noted that “[i]t could be six months” before the juvenile's criminal charges were resolved, during which time “he could be getting the benefit of all those services in training school.” The juvenile's counsel cast the court's proposal as “a duplication of . . . resources that would be better served and applied to other juveniles.” When the juvenile told the court that jail was “easier” than training school, the court replied:
        I think that [the juvenile] needs to understand that there are consequences for the choices that he makes, . . . and for me just to close this case and say, [“]I'm not going to give any consequences for this,[”] I don't think it teaches him what he needs to learn. I think that's number one. I think number two, he wants to stay in the adult system because it's easier . . . to be where he is now than to be in training school and have to do all the things that he'd have to do in training school. And if he is convicted on the adult charges and he gets active time,they will pull him out of training school and they'll put him in the adult system.

        But in the meantime he can still get the services available to him in the juvenile system, and there are consequences to him.

In order to “give [the juvenile] one more opportunity to try to get . . . these services[,]” the court revoked his probation and imposed a Level 3 disposition, ordering him “committed to [a] youth development center for no less than 6 mo[nth]s not to exceed [his] 18th birthday.”
    In his lone assignment of error, the juvenile claims the district court failed to make sufficient findings of fact to support its disposition of commitment to a youth development center. He argues in his brief, however, that insufficient evidence supported the district court's findings of fact. Since the juvenile failed to assign error to any of the individual findings, the juvenile has failed to preserve for appellate review the issue of the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the district court's findings. See N.C. R. App. P. 10(a) (2004); Koufman v. Koufman, 330 N.C. 93, 97, 408 S.E.2d 729, 731 (1991) (saying, “Where no exception is taken to a finding of fact by the trial court, the finding is presumed to be supported by competent evidence and is binding on appeal.”). Similarly, we do not address whether the court's findings of fact are sufficient to support its disposition under the rule that assignments of error not argued on appeal are abandoned. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2004) (saying, “assignments of error . . . in support of which no reason orargument is stated or authority cited, will be taken as abandoned.”).
    Affirmed.
    Judges WYNN and JACKSON concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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