IN THE MATTERS OF:
M.I.S. and Cabarrus County
S.M.S.
Nos. 03 J 92-93
Kathleen Arundell Widelski,
for petitioner-appellee Cabarrus
County Department of Social Services, and Victoria Bost,
Guardian Ad Litem.
Robert T. Newman, Sr., for respondent-appellant Michael
Sellers.
Carol Ann Bauer, for respondent-appellant Carrie Sellers.
JACKSON, Judge.
On 3 May 2003, the Cabarrus County Department of Social
Services (“DSS”)
filed a petition alleging that M.I.S. and S.M.S.
were neglected juveniles. DSS alleged there was domestic violence
in the home; the children were not fed and were acting out
sexually; Michael Sellers was using drugs and had a history of
mental illness; M.I.S. had been left in his crib for long periods
of time with no interaction, and; M.I.S. had been found covered in
feces and urine. DSS assumed custody of the children by non-secure
custody order.
On 23 June 2003, respondents entered into a consent order,stipulating that the children were neglected
. The permanent plan
for the children at the time was reunification.
Respondent father
agreed to: (1) submit to psychological testing and follow through
with treatment recommendations; (2) submit to substance abuse
assessment and follow through with treatment recommendations; (3)
take an approved parenting course; (4) maintain stable employment
for three to six months without interruption
; (5) maintain stable
housing for three to six months and not be late on any rent or
utilities payment; (6) maintain weekly contact with DSS and report
changes in residence or employment; (7) abide by a DSS visitation
plan; and (8) submit to an assessment with New Options for Violent
Actions or a comparable agency. Respondent mother agreed to: (1)
submit to psychological testing and follow through with treatment
recommendations; (2) take an approved parenting course; (3)
maintain stable employment for three to six months without
interruption; (4) maintain stable housing for three to six months
and not be late on any rent or utilities payment; (5) maintain
weekly contact with DSS and report changes in residence or
employment; (6) abide by a DSS visitation plan;
and (7) participate
in a weekly support group for domestic violence.
On 15 July 2004, DSS filed a motion to terminate respondents'
parental rights. DSS alleged that: (1)
that respondents had
willfully left the children in foster care for more than twelve
months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that
reasonable progress under the circumstances had been made to
correcting the conditions which led to the children's removal; (2)that the children had been in the custody of DSS for six months and
respondents had failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of
child care; (3) that respondents had neglected the children as
defined by North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-101(15); and
(4) that respondent father was incapable of providing for the
proper care and supervision of the children such that they were
dependent juveniles and there was a reasonable probability that
such incapability would continue for the foreseeable future.
Accordingly, DSS argued that it was in the best interest of the
children that respondents' parental rights be terminated.
On 19 and 20 October 2004, hearings were held on the motion to
terminate respondents' parental rights. The trial court found that
respondent father had: (1) failed
to obtain stable housing; (2)
failed
to complete anger management classes; (3) failed
to complete
substance abuse treatment; and (4) had completed a parenting class,
but was unable to articulate a plan to protect his children from
sexual abuse. The trial court found that respondent mother had: 1)
failed
to obtain stable housing; (2) failed to maintain stable
employment; (3) failed to complete her domestic violence therapy
group; and (4) had completed a parenting class, but was unable to
articulate a plan to protect her children from sexual abuse.
Thus,
the trial court concluded that grounds existed pursuant to North
Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), and (3) to
terminate respondents' parental rights.
The court further
concluded that it was in the children's
best interest that
respondents' parental rights be terminated, noting the conditionthe children were in when taken into DSS custody and the fact that
they had been in the same foster home since two days after they had
come into DSS care, and had bonded with their foster parents.
Accordingly, respondents' parental rights were terminated.
Respondents appeal.
Respondent father first argues that the trial court erred by
finding that there were grounds to support the termination of his
parental rights
.
We disagree.
North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-1111 sets forth
the statutory grounds for terminating parental rights. A finding
of any one of the separately enumerated grounds is sufficient to
support a termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 64, 387
S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990). “[T]he party petitioning for the
termination must show by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
that grounds authorizing the termination of parental rights exist.”
In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1997) (citing
former N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7A-289.30(d) and (e), now codified as
N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 7B-1109(e) and (f)).
In the case sub judice,
the trial court concluded that
respondent father willfully
had left the children in foster care
for more than twelve months without showing to the satisfaction of
the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances had been
made to correct the conditions which led to their removal
. See
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2). We find sufficient evidence in
the record to support the trial court's findings.
DSS took custody
of the children after reports of domestic violence, substance abuseby respondent father, and a history of the family living in their
car and being evicted. Respondent father stipulated to the
adjudication order of neglect. The case plan developed for
respondent father sought to address the issues that led to the
children's removal. The case plan included tasks such as
respondent father submitting to a substance abuse assessment,
obtaining stable housing, and attending anger management classes.
However, the evidence shows that respondent father failed to comply
with this case plan. At the time of the hearing, respondent father
still did not have a permanent residence and was living with
friends. He also could not provide verification that he had
completed substance abuse treatment or anger management counseling.
Thus, there was clear, cogent and convincing evidence in the record
to support the trial court's findings and conclusion that
respondent father had not made sufficient progress towards
correcting the conditions that led to the children's removal.
Since grounds exist pursuant to North Carolina General
Statutes, section 7B-1111(a)(2) to support the trial court's order,
the remaining grounds found by the trial court to support
termination need not be reviewed by the Court. Taylor, 97 N.C.
App. at 64, 387 S.E.2d at 233-34.
Respondent father next argues that the trial court failed to
state
affirmatively the standard of proof used in the termination
proceeding.
Pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section
7B-1109(f) (2004), the trial court is required to state
affirmatively in its order that the findings of fact adduced fromthe adjudicatory hearing were based upon clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence. See In re Church, 136 N.C. App. 654, 657, 525
S.E.2d 478, 480 (2000). Here, the court stated in the order that
it “makes the following Findings of Fact based on clear, cogent and
convincing evidence.” As this was a non-bifurcated hearing, we
conclude this statement was sufficient and there was no error.
Finally, both respondents argue the trial court erred in
determining that termination of their parental rights was in the
best interests of the children.
After careful review of the record, briefs, and contentions of
the parties, we affirm. Once the trial court has found that
grounds exist to terminate parental rights, “the court shall issue
an order terminating the parental rights of such parent with
respect to the juvenile unless the court shall further determine
that the best interests of the juvenile require that the parental
rights of the parent not be terminated.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1110(a) (2004). The trial court's decision to terminate parental
rights at the disposition stage is discretionary. See In re
Montgomery, 311 N.C. 101, 110, 316 S.E.2d 246, 252 (1984).
Here, the trial court found that M.I.S. had come into DSS
custody with unmet medical needs, neither parent had sought
treatment, and as a result surgery was required. The court also
noted that S.M.S. had exhibited sexualized behavior, and a medical
examination revealed prior anal penetration. As a result, S.M.S.
would need mental health therapy from caregivers who would be able
to protect her from sexual abuse. However, although respondentmother previously
had accused her stepfather of sexually assaulting
her, she had requested that he be allowed at visitation with S.M.S.
Thus, based on these findings, and based on respondents' failure to
fully address the court ordered plans for reunification, we
conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
determining that termination was in the children's best interest.
Accordingly, the order terminating respondent's parental rights is
affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges WYNN and CALABRIA concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***