1. Workers' Compensation_injury by accident_giving CPR_exhaustion and aneurysm
rupture
There was evidence supporting the Industrial Commission's finding in a workers'
compensation case that a deputy sheriff suffered an aneurysm rupture after giving CPR and that
this was a compensable injury by accident. Although there was testimony that deputies rarely
perform CPR, it is the extent and nature of the exertion that determines whether the resulting
injury was an injury by accident, and plaintiff did not need to show that the overexertion occurred
while he was engaged in some unusual activity.
2. Workers' Compensation_aneurysm rupture after giving CPR_causal
relationship_medical testimony not speculative
Medical testimony that the stress and excitement of performing CPR caused a deputy
sheriff's aneurysm to rupture was unequivocal and not speculative and supported the Industrial
Commission's findings that the aneurysm rupture was causally related to the deputy's
employment. The Court of Appeals does not weigh the credibility or relative strength of
evidence.
MacRae, Perry, & MacRae, L.L.P., by Daniel T. Perry, III, for
plaintiff-appellee.
Teague, Campbell, Dennis & Gorham, by Dayle A. Flammia and
Courtney L. Coates for defendant-appellants.
HUDSON, Judge.
Plaintiff Alfred R. Ferreyra, an employee of defendant
Cumberland County (“the county”), claimed an injury by accident
after he suffered a burst aneurysm at work on 26 February 2002. Following a hearing on 28 May 2003, Deputy Commissioner George T.
Glenn, II, issued an opinion and award on 30 January 2004,
concluding that plaintiff had sustained a compensable injury by
accident at work and awarding benefits. Defendant appealed, and on
13 January 2005, the Full Commission issued an opinion and award
affirming the Deputy Commissioner's opinion and award with minor
modifications. Defendants appeal. As discussed below, we affirm.
At the relevant time, plaintiff was employed as a deputy
sheriff. On 26 February 2002, plaintiff was on routine patrol with
a trainee, when a young woman sought help for her mother (“the
victim”). The victim had stopped breathing while in her daughter's
car. Plaintiff was certified in cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(“CPR”) and as a First Responder, but had never had occasion to use
CPR during his eight years as a deputy sheriff. Plaintiff
performed chest compressions on the victim in the front seat of the
car, while the trainee began rescue breathing. After performing
twenty-one sets of five chest compressions, plaintiff felt a sharp
pain in his head, and another deputy took over performing the CPR.
Plaintiff was unable to complete his shift due to his severe
headache and went home. After over-the-counter medications and
rest did not alleviate his pain, plaintiff went to the hospital
where he was diagnosed as suffering from a brain aneurysm. Dr.
Bruce P. Jaufmann treated plaintiff and performed surgery on him on
1 March 2002.
Dr. Jaufmann testified that:
It is my opinion that most likely the stress
and excitement while performing CPR inattempting to save the individual's life
resulted in an increase in blood pressure,
which caused the aneurysm to rupture at that
time . . . .
We begin by noting the well-established standard of review for
worker's compensation cases from the Industrial Commission. This
Court does not assess credibility or re-weigh evidence; it only
determines whether the record contains any evidence to support the
challenged findings. Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509
S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998), rehearing denied, 350 N.C. 108, 532 S.E.2d
522 (1999). We are “limited to reviewing whether any competent
evidence supports the Commission's findings of fact and whether the
findings of fact support the Commission's conclusions of law.”
Deese v. Champion Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549,
553 (2000). In addition, findings of fact not challenged on appeal
are binding on this Court. Johnson v. Herbie's Place, 157 N.C.
App. 168, 180, 579 S.E.2d 110, 118, disc. review denied, 357 N.C.
460, 585 S.E.2d 760 (2003).
We note that defendants assign error to the commission's
findings of fact 6, 7, 8, 13, 14, and 15, but fail to argue them in
their brief to this Court. Accordingly, these findings are
conclusive on appeal.
[1] Defendants first argue that the Commission erred in
concluding that plaintiff sustained an injury by accident. We
disagree.
The Workers Compensation Act provides benefits “only [when an]
injury by accident aris[es] out of and in the course of the
employment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(6) (2003). An accident is “anunlooked for and untoward event which is not expected or designed
by the person who suffers the injury.” Adams v. Burlington
Industries Inc., 61 N.C. App. 258, 260, 300 S.E.2d 455, 456 (1983)
(citations omitted). “An accident therefore involves 'the
interruption of the routine of work and the introduction thereby of
unusual conditions likely to result in unexpected consequences.'”
Calderwood v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Hosp. Auth., 135 N.C. App. 112,
115, 519 S.E.2d 61, 63 (1999), disc. review denied, 351 N.C. 351,
543 S.E.2d 124 (2000) (quoting Adams, 61 N.C. App. at 260, 300
S.E.2d at 456).
Defendants contend that this case is controlled by the holding
in Neely v. City of Statesville, in which a firefighter's heart
attack during a fire was found to be a non-compensable injury. 212
N.C. 365, 366, 193 S.E. 664, 665 (1937). The Supreme Court held
that
[t]he work in which the deceased was engaged
was the usual work incident to his employment.
The surrounding conditions might be expected
at a fire. The falling in of the roof is a
natural result of fire burning there. Heat
and smoke are expected. Physical exertion is
required in handling the hose and
fire-fighting equipment. The firemen, of
necessity, act hurriedly. We find no evidence
of an accident.
Id. at 366-67, 193 S.E. at 665. Likewise, defendants here contend
that plaintiff's injury occurred during usual work incident to his
employment and is thus non-compensable. We believe that the case
here is more analogous to King v. Forsyth County, 45 N.C. App. 467,
263 S.E.2d 283, disc. review denied, 3000 N.C. 374, 267 S.E.2d 676
(1980). In King, a deputy sheriff suffered a heart attack justafter chasing a fleeing suspect. Id. at 468, 263 S.E.2d at 283.
In reversing the commission's denial of compensation, this Court
held that it:
was not necessary for the plaintiff to show
that the overexertion which was the cause of
his injury occurred while he was engaged in
some unusual activity. It was the extent and
nature of the exertion that classifies the
resulting injury to the plaintiff's heart as
an injury by accident within the meaning of
G.S. 97-2(6).
Id. at 471, 263 S.E.2d at 285. The King opinion also cites Gabriel
v. Town of Newton, 227 N.C. 314, 42 S.E.2d 96 (1947), in which “our
Supreme Court clearly recognized that damage to heart tissue
clearly precipitated or caused by 'overexertion' constitutes an
injury by accident.” King, 45 N.C. App. at 468, 263 S.E.2d at 284.
In Gabriel, a policeman suffered a heart attack after struggling
with a man who was violently resisting arrest; the heart attack was
held to be a compensable injury by accident. Gabriel, 227 N.C. at
318, 42 S.E. 2d at 98-99.
Here, the commission found that plaintiff suffered an aneurysm
following exhaustion from administering CPR in the course of his
work, and that the physical exertion and stress of administering
CPR caused the aneurysm to burst. Further the commission found:
Plaintiff, Officer Mead and Wanda Smith the
dispatcher testified CPR is seldom done by
deputy sheriffs. Although they are trained in
CPR, deputies are rarely first responders to
medical emergencies. This was the first time
plaintiff had done CPR in his 8½ years on the
force and dispatcher Smith had not had any
officer on the Sheriff's department doing CPR
in her eight years as a dispatcher with the
Department.
This finding which is well-supported by the evidence, supports the
commission's conclusion that plaintiff, like the plaintiff in
Gabriel, suffered a compensable injury by accident. These
findings, which are conclusive on appeal, support the conclusion
that plaintiff suffered a compensable injury by accident on 26
February 2002. Because plaintiff did not need to show that the
overexertion which was the cause of his injury occurred while he
was engaged in some unusual activity, the commission's findings are
sufficient to support its conclusion. We overrule this assignment
of error.
[2] Defendants next argue that the commission erred in
concluding that plaintiff's employment was causally related to his
aneurysm. We disagree.
Defendants contend that the evidence before the commission did
not support the commission's finding that plaintiff suffered a
ruptured aneurysm as a result of his work doing CPR on 26 February
2002. However, the record indicates that Dr. Jaufmann stated by
letter that:
Alfred Ferreyra suffered a subarachnoid
hemmorage due to an anterior communicating
artery aneurysm while giving CPR . . . . It is
my opinion that most likely the stress and
excitement while performing CPR in attempting
to save the individual's life resulted in an
increase in blood pressure which caused the
aneurysm to rupture at that time.
This evidence supports the commission's finding that plaintiff's
administration of CPR while working caused the aneurysm which in
turn supports the conclusion that plaintiff suffered a compensable
injury. Defendants assert that this testimony was incompetent and
should not have been relied upon because it was based on
speculation and conjecture. See Dean v. Carolina Coach Co., 287
N.C. 515, 522, 215 S.E.2d 89, 94 (1975). Defendants contend that
testimony from another medical expert should have been given
greater weight than Dr. Jaufmann's. We conclude that Dr.
Jaufmann's testimony was unequivocal and not speculative. This
Court does not weigh the credibility or relative strength of
evidence. Adams, 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 414. Because the
evidence supports the commission's findings of fact, which in turn
support its conclusions of law, we overrule this assignment of
error.
Affirmed.
Judges TYSON and LEVINSON concur.
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