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All opinions are subject to modification and technical correction prior to official publication in the North Carolina Reports and North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports. In the event of discrepancies between the electronic version of an opinion and the print version appearing in the North Carolina Reports and North Carolina Court of Appeals Reports, the latest print version is to be considered authoritative.
1. Workers' Compensation_injury at morale boosting event_compensable
There was competent evidence to support the conclusion that a morale boosting event
was paid for by the Town (although not from its operating budget), and the Industrial
Commission did not err by finding that an EMT captain sustained a compensable injury arising
from her employment where she was injured at the event.
2. Workers' Compensation_morale boosting event_benefit to employer_employee
urged to attend
In a workers' compensation case brought by an EMT captain injured at a morale boosting
event, there was competent evidence supporting the finding that the Town received a benefit and
that EMT volunteers were urged to attend, including plaintiff's undisputed testimony that her
Chief wanted her to attend.
3. Workers' Compensation_morale boosting event_Chilton factors
In a workers' compensation case brought by an EMT captain injured at a morale boosting
event, there were findings supporting the presence of at least four, if not all six, of the factors to
be considered in awarding workers' compensation from a recreational event. There is no
requirement that all six questions be answered affirmatively.
4. Workers' Compensation_disability_burden of proof_carried
The Industrial Commission did not err by finding and concluding that an EMT captain
injured at a morale building event had met her burden of proving disability. There was testimony
to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that plaintiff's pain was related to her accident and
that her inability to work as a waitress (a second job) was related to her accident.
5. Workers' Compensation_disability_continuation_insufficient proof
The Industrial Commission did not err by concluding that plaintiff's entitlement to
temporary total disability ended on 1 July 2002. The Watkins presumption of continuing
disability did not apply and plaintiff did not prove the extent to which she was unable to work
after she was released by her doctor for restricted sedentary work.
Judge TYSON dissenting.
Ward and Smith, P.A., by S. McKinley Gray, III and William A. Oden, III, for plaintiff.
Cranfill, Sumner & Hartzog, L.L.P., by Jonathan C. Anders and Meredith T. Black, for defendants.
HUDSON, Judge.
Plaintiff Tammy P. Frost, an employee of defendant Salter Path
Fire and Rescue (“Salter Path”), claimed an injury as a result of
a go-cart accident which occurred during a Fun Day event on 3
October 2001. Following a hearing on 31 March 2003 the deputy
commissioner issued an opinion and award on 29 April 2004, denying
plaintiff's claim for benefits. Plaintiff appealed, and on 8
February 2005, the Full Commission issued an opinion and award
unanimously reversing the Deputy Commissioner's opinion and award,
and awarding plaintiff temporary total disability benefits for her
compensable injury. Defendants and plaintiff appeal. As discussed
below, we affirm.
Plaintiff was employed by Salter Path as a volunteer emergency
medical technician (“EMT”), eventually becoming captain of
emergency medical services (“EMS”). Plaintiff also worked as a
waitress at The Crab Shack in the Town of Salter Path. On 3
October 2001, Salter Path held an annual Fun Day event at Lost
Treasures Golf and Raceway. Salter Path sponsored and paid for the
event and encouraged volunteers to attend. The Chief of Salter
Path EMS encouraged plaintiff to attend in her capacity as captain
of EMS. Plaintiff planned to give a “pep” speech to volunteers
during the event, but was injured in a go-cart accident at LostTreasures. Plaintiff was transported to the hospital and diagnosed
with cervical strain and thoracic strain and contusion. Plaintiff
and her husband testified, and she presented evidence from three of
her treating physicians.
The Full Commission made numerous findings of fact including
those challenged by defendants:
2. Plaintiff was injured at the Salter Path
Fire and Rescue Fun Day on September 30, 2001.
Fun Day was essentially an appreciation day,
in which the community thanked volunteer
firemen and rescue workers for their
contribution and work in the community. The
purpose for Fun Day was to boost morale and
goodwill for Salter Path volunteers, show
appreciation for the unpaid volunteers of
Salter path, and to help develop camaraderie
among volunteers. Fun Day was initiated in
2000.
3. The Fun Day event was put on by Salter Path
Fire and Rescue Corporation and paid for out
of a Special Donations Fund, rather than out
of the Department's operating budget. Salter
Path Fire and Rescue Corporation paid for the
admission of volunteers and their families to
Lost Treasures Golf and Raceway (“Lost
Treasures”), the private amusement park where
Fun Day was held, and provided lunch to the
participants while at Fun Day.
4. Fun Day was a voluntary event, but Salter
Path volunteers and their families were urged
to attend if possible. Many volunteers did
not attend. Those in attendance signed in at
the Treasure Island main window and were given
passes for free rides and a free lunch. One
purpose of this sign-in sheet was to allow
Treasure Island to compute the total cost,
according to the discount ticket rates
provided. Another possible purpose was to
give management of the fire and rescue unit an
attendance log. Notwithstanding that
attendance was voluntary, Salter Path did keepattendance for the event. The employer
received a tangible benefit from this event in
that it helped to improve morale of volunteers
and it provided an opportunity for leaders of
the fire and rescue unit to encourage
volunteers to continue their participation as
volunteers. The volunteers viewed Fun Day as
a benefit of their voluntary employment. The
Chief of Salter Path, Ritchie Frost, told
plaintiff that he wanted her to attend Fun
Day.
5. Plaintiff and her husband then took the
Salter Path Fire & Rescue ambulance to
Treasure Island and proceeded inside to ride
the go-carts. Plaintiff had signed in as “on
duty” prior to her injury and had intended to
give a pep speech thanking the EMS volunteers
and encouraging their continued participation
with Salter Path just as she had done at the
previous Fun Day.
We begin by noting the well-established standard of review for
worker's compensation cases from the Industrial Commission. We do
not assess credibility or re-weigh evidence; we only determine
whether the record contains any evidence to support the challenged
findings. Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411,
414 (1998), rehearing denied, 350 N.C. 108, 532 S.E.2d 522 (1999).
This Court is “limited to reviewing whether any competent evidence
supports the Commission's findings of fact and whether the findings
of fact support the Commission's conclusions of law.” Deese v.
Champion Int'l Corp., 352 N.C. 109, 116, 530 S.E.2d 549, 553
(2000).
[1] Defendants first argue that the Commission erred in
finding and concluding that plaintiff sustained a compensableinjury because the injury did not arise out of and in the course of
her employment. We do not agree.
Defendants challenge the Commission's findings 2 through 5,
and the conclusions that plaintiff's injury arose out of and in the
course of her employment. The Worker's Compensation Act provides
compensation only for injuries “arising out of and in the course of
the employment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. 97-2(6) (2003). This Court has
identified a list of relevant factors the Commission and Court may
consider when determining whether compensation is appropriate for
an injury sustained during an employer's recreational event.
Chilton v. Bowman Gray School of Medicine, 45 N.C. App. 13, 15, 262
S.E.2d 347, 348 (1980). Chilton lists several questions to
consider in determining whether to award compensation:
(1) Did the employer in fact sponsor the
event?
(2) To what extent was attendance really
voluntary?
(3) Was there some degree of encouragement to
attend evidenced by such factors as:
a. taking a record of attendance;
b. paying for the time spent;
c. requiring the employee to work if he
did not attend; or
d. maintaining a known custom of
attending?
(4) Did the employer finance the occasion to a
substantial extent? (5) Did the employees regard it as an
employment benefit to which they were entitled
as of right?
(6) Did the employer benefit from the event,
not merely in a vague way through better
morale and good will, but through such
tangible advantages as having an opportunity
to make speeches and awards?
Id. at 15, 262 S.E.2d at 348 (internal citation omitted). In
applying these factors, the Commission here made findings,
including those quoted above, and after citing Chilton, concluded
that the evidence established affirmative answers to at least four
of the six Chilton factors.
Defendants contend that no competent evidence supported
finding 3, that Salter Path put on and paid for the Fun Day,
because it was funded by a special contribution fund rather than
out of Salter Path's regular operating budget. However, three
witnesses testified without objection that Salter Path did sponsor
the event and defendants do not dispute that the volunteers'
admission to the event was paid for by Salter Path's special
contribution fund. Because competent evidence supports this
finding, it is conclusive on appeal. This finding in turn supports
the portion of conclusion 3 stating that “Salter Path organized and
sponsored the Fun Day event.”
[2] Defendants also contend that finding 4 is not supported by
competent evidence. Specifically, defendants assert that
volunteers were encouraged to attend the event, rather than urged
to attend. This distinction makes no meaningful difference. Inaddition, plaintiff's undisputed testimony established that the
Chief of Salter Path told plaintiff he wanted her to attend the
event. Defendants claim that no evidence supports the finding that
defendant received a tangible benefit through morale boosting and
increased volunteer retention. Defendants draw our attention to
language in Chilton stating that
Personal camaraderie and respect between the
faculty and students involved in professional
education greatly enhance the educational
experience. We cannot say that this vague
benefit transforms an annual social occasion
into a business meeting.
Id. at 18, 262 S.E.2d at 350. Here, testimony indicated and the
Commission found as fact that the event served the purpose of
encouraging volunteers to continue their participation with
defendant, not merely of fostering personal camaraderie. Without
the continuing participation of volunteers, defendant here would
have no organization. Keeping the fire and rescue organization
operational with volunteers is tangible indeed. Thus, the benefits
of building morale and camaraderie are more tangible for a
volunteer fire and rescue organization like defendant than for the
medical school in Chilton. This evidence supports finding 4 which
in turn supports the portion of conclusion 3 stating that
Plaintiff justifiably believed that her
attendance at Fun Day was mandatory . . . .
Fun Day was not really voluntary for Plaintiff
due to the extra responsibility she undertook
and the request from the Chief that she
attend.
The finding also supports the portion of the conclusion stating
that Slater Path tangibly benefitted through increased volunteer
retention.
[3] Defendants also challenge the statement in finding 5 that
plaintiff was “on-duty” at the event, alleging that as a volunteer
EMS worker, plaintiff was always “on-duty.” Defendants contend
that “to the extent [finding 5] insinuates that plaintiff's status
as 'on-duty' is relevant to this analysis, it is unsupported.” We
see no such insinuation in the Commission's opinion and award, nor
do we find this relevant to the Commission's conclusion that
plaintiff suffered a compensable injury.
The findings discussed above, which are supported by the
evidence, in turn support the Commission's conclusion that at least
four, if not all six, of the Chilton factors are present here. We
note that Chilton did not establish a requirement that all six
questions must be answered affirmatively in order to support an
award of compensation. Rather, the Court found that “these
questions are helpful in establishing a structural analysis of when
to award compensation.” Id. at 15, 262 S.E.2d at 348. This Court
has affirmed that evidence of four of the six Chilton factors
“established a sufficient nexus between claimant's injury and her
employment to permit the award of compensation.” Martin v. Mars
Mfg. Co., 58 N.C. App. 577, 580, 293 S.E.2d 816, 819, cert. denied,
306 N.C. 742, 295 S.E.2d 759 (1982). This assignment of error is
overruled. [4] Defendants next argue that the Commission erred in making
findings and conclusions that plaintiff met her burden of proving
disability. We disagree.
The Supreme Court has explained what a plaintiff must prove to
obtain an award of benefits for disability. Hilliard v. Apex
Cabinet Co., 305 N.C. 593, 595, 290 S.E.2d 682, 683 (1982).
[I]n order to support a conclusion of
disability, the Commission must find: (1) that
plaintiff was incapable after his injury of
earning the same wages he had earned before
his injury in the same employment, (2) that
plaintiff was incapable after his injury of
earning the same wages he had earned before
his injury in any other employment, and (3)
that this individual's incapacity to earn was
caused by plaintiff's injury. In workers'
compensation cases, a claimant ordinarily has
the burden of proving both the existence of
his disability and its degree.
Id. (internal citation omitted). The burden is on the employee to
show that she is unable to earn the same wages she had earned
before the injury, either in the same employment or in other
employment. Id. at 595, 290 S.E.2d at 684 An employee may meet
the Hilliard burden in one of the following four ways:
(1) the production of medical evidence that he
is physically or mentally, as a consequence of
the work related injury, incapable of work in
any employment; (2) the production of evidence
that he is capable of some work, but that he
has, after a reasonable effort on his part,
been unsuccessful in his effort to obtain
employment; (3) the production of evidence
that he is capable of some work but that it
would be futile because of preexisting
conditions, i.e., age, inexperience, lack of
education, to seek other employment; or (4)
the production of evidence that he hasobtained other employment at a wage less than
that earned prior to the injury.
Russell v. Lowes Prod. Distribution, 108 N.C. App. 762, 765, 425
S.E.2d 454, 457 (1993) (internal citations omitted).
Here, Dr. Tellis gave his opinion, to a reasonable degree of
medical certainty, that the pain that plaintiff was complaining of
and for which he was treating her was related to her 30 September
2001 accident. He also testified to his unequivocal opinion that
plaintiff's inability to perform her waitress position as indicated
in the medical notes was related to the 30 September 2001 accident.
Dr. Reece testified that he had last seen plaintiff 21 April 2003,
and that prior to that visit the accident required that she be out
of work, but could return with some restrictions as of that date.
This evidence supports the Commission's findings 27 and 28 that
plaintiff symptoms were caused by the injury during Fun Day and
that those symptoms prevented her from returning to work as a
waitress. These findings in turn support the Commission's
conclusion that plaintiff carried her burden of proving her
disability, at least up to 1 April 2003.
[5] Plaintiff argues that the Commission erred in concluding
that her entitlement to temporary total disability benefits ended
on 1 July 2002. We disagree.
Plaintiff contends that there was no evidence to support any
finding of fact which would support a conclusion that her total
temporary disability should be terminated on 21 April 2003. Anemployee seeking disability compensation bears the burden of
establishing the existence and extent of her disability. Hilliard,
305 N.C. at 595, 290 S.E.2d at 683.
It is a well-established legal principle in
North Carolina that once the disability is
proven [by the employee], there is a
presumption that [the disability] continues
until the employee returns to work at wages
equal to those [she] was receiving at the time
[her] injury occurred. In cases involving the
Watkins presumption, the claimant can meet the
initial burden of proving a disability in two
ways: (1) by a previous Industrial Commission
award of continuing disability, or (2) by
producing a Form 21 or Form 26 settlement
agreement approved by the Industrial
Commission.
Cialino v. Wal-Mart Stores, 156 N.C. App. 463, 470, 577 S.E.2d 345,
350 (2003) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted)
(emphasis in original). Here, plaintiff does not have a previous
Industrial Commission award of continuing disability, or a Form 21
or Form 26 settlement agreement approved by the Commission.
Instead, she argues that the presumption applies where she has been
injured at work and has been unable to continue working or find
suitable alternative employment. In Cialino, the plaintiff argued
that “a continuing presumption of total disability arose because
she was injured at work, and, thereafter, she was unable to
continue working or find suitable alternative employment at the
same wages and for same number of hours.” Id. at 471, 577 S.E.2d
at 351. This Court rejected that argument. Id.; see also Clark v.
Wal-Mart, 360 N.C. 41, 619 S.E.2d 491 (2005). Because the Watkins presumption does not apply here, plaintiff
was required to prove the extent and existence of her disability
pursuant to the factors in Hillard, supra. The Commission found
and concluded
30. Plaintiff has continued to present to Dr.
Reese, seeing him on December 5 and 30, 2002,
January 30, 2003, February 25, 2003, March 3,
8, and 25, 2003, and April 21, 2003.
According to Dr. Reece, plaintiff improved
during the December-through-April time period.
Dr. Reece indicated in his April 21, 2003,
notes that plaintiff could perform sedentary
activities at work.
31. The greater weight of the evidence does
not support a finding that plaintiff is now
unable to work by reason of her compensable
injuries.
***
4. Plaintiff is entitled to temporary total
disability compensation at the rate of $413.33
for those periods of time when she was unable
to work for Salter Path by reason of her
compensable injuries. She was unable to work
by reason of her compensable injuries from
September 30, 2001, through April 21, 2003,
when Dr. Reece found that she was capable of
sedentary work. Defendants are entitled to
credits for unemployment benefits in the
amount of: $139.00 per week for a period of
17 weeks (December 29, 2001, through May 4,
2002); $300.00 per week from the period of
October 1, 2001 through October 28, 2001, in
employer-sponsored disability benefits; and
$486.26 per week for the period of October 29,
2001, through July 12, 2002, in employer-
sponsored disability benefits. These credits
are week for week and dollar for dollar. N.C.
Gen. Stat. §97-42.
Dr. Reece released plaintiff to sedentary work with some
restrictions as of 21 April 2003. Although Dr. Reece stated thatplaintiff would not be able to resume her full-time waitress job at
that date because of limitations on her activities, the record does
not reflect that she proved the extent to which she was unable to
work after that time. Given this record, we cannot conclude that
the Commission's findings or conclusion were erroneous. We
overrule plaintiff's cross-assignment of error.
Affirmed.
Judge LEVINSON concurs.
Judge TYSON dissents in a separate opinion.
TYSON, Judge dissenting.
The majority's opinion holds, “[g]iven this record, we cannot
conclude that the Commission's findings or conclusions were
erroneous” and affirms the North Carolina Industrial Commission's
(“Commission”) award. I respectfully dissent.
Plaintiff filed a worker's compensation claim, and on 29 April 2004, the deputy commissioner concluded “[a]lthough the Plaintiff suffered an injury by accident on September 30, 2001, her injury did not arise out of and in the scope of her employment with thedefendant-employer” and denied plaintiff's claim for benefits. Plaintiff appealed. The Full Commission reversed the deputy commissioner's decision and awarded plaintiff temporary total disability benefits for her compensable injury.
Plaintiff testified that her attendance at the event was purely voluntary. Plaintiff admitted it was not “frowned upon” if volunteers did not attend. Plaintiff also testified: (1) while she felt responsible to attend the event as captain of the department, her attendance was not mandatory; and (2) the department did not assign her any responsibilities at the event.
The event was paid for by community donations. When asked how volunteer members of the department would benefit from fun day, plaintiff answered, “[t]he only way I could say they could would be to keep morale up.”
Hunt v. Tender Loving Care Home Care Agency, Inc., 153 N.C. App. 266, 268, 569 S.E.2d 675, 677-78, disc. rev. denied, 356 N.C. 436,572 S.E.2d 784 (2002) (emphasis supplied) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
This Court has also stated,
The Commission is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and may accept or reject any of a claimant's evidence. However, the Commission is required to make specific findings as to the facts upon which a compensation claim is based, including the extent of a claimant's disability.
Grant v. Burlington Industries, Inc., 77 N.C. App. 241, 247, 335 S.E.2d 327, 332 (1985) (emphasis supplied).
On appeal to this Court, “[t]he Commission's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.” McRae v. Toastmaster, Inc., 358 N.C. 488, 496, 597 S.E.2d 695, 701 (2004).
Our Supreme Court has stated, “the phrase 'out of and in the course of the employment' embraces only those accidents which happen to a servant while he is engaged in the discharge of some function or duty which he is authorized to undertake and which is calculated to further, directly or indirectly, the master's business.” Sandy v. Stackhouse, Inc., 258 N.C. 194, 198, 128 S.E.2d 218, 221 (1962) (internal quotations and citation omitted). In Chilton v. Bowman Gray School of Medicine, this Court identified six factors for the Commission and the court to consider when determining whether a plaintiff's injuries arose “out of and in the course of her employment” to be compensable. 45 N.C. App. 13, 15, 262 S.E.2d 347, 348 (1980). The factors include:
(1) Did the employer in fact sponsor the event?
(2) To what extent was attendance really voluntary?
(3) Was there some degree of encouragement to attend evidenced by such factors as:
a. taking a record of attendance;
b. paying for the time spent;
c. requiring the employee to work if he did not attend; or
d. maintaining a known custom of attending?
(4) Did the employer finance the occasion to a substantial extent?
(5) Did the employees regard it as an employment benefit to which they were entitled as of right?
(6) Did the employer benefit from the event, not merely in a vague way through better morale and good will, but through such tangible advantages as having an opportunity to make speeches and awards?
Id. (citation omitted).
In Chilton, the plaintiff was injured while playing volleyball at an annual voluntary picnic for medical school faculty. Id. at18, 262 S.E.2d at 350. This Court reversed the Commission's order, which granted plaintiff's claim, and held:
First . . . sponsorship standing by itself would not indicate coverage.
Second, attendance was voluntary. There was testimony from faculty members that they felt they should go, but that they were not compelled to do so. The estimated attendance of around 80% of the department indicates that there was no compulsion.
Third, no record of attendance was taken. The participants were not paid for the time spent, nor was any employee required to work at the medical school if he did not attend.
Fourth, the picnic, while certainly an annual custom, was not an event that employee regarded as being a benefit to which he was entitled as a matter of right.
Id. at 17, 262 S.E.2d at 350.
Here, in applying the Chilton factors, the Commission concluded, “the evidence in the instant cause establishes affirmative answers to at least four of the six Chilton questions, and arguably, all six.” The Commission stated:
(1) Did the employer in fact sponsor the event?
Yes. Salter Path organized and sponsored the Fun Day event.
. . . .
(2) To what extent was attendance really voluntary?
. . . .
Despite the voluntary nature of Salter Path's operations, Plaintiff justifiably believed that her attendance at Fun Day was mandatory.
. . . .
(3) Was there some degree of encouragement to attend?
Even the defendant's own witness, Taffie Baysden, testified that volunteers were encouraged to attend if they could. In addition, Ms. Baysden ultimately testified that there was a record of attendance (which she previously had denied on direct). In fact, she acknowledged that the names of attendees were recorded in Salter Path's login book as well as a separate sign-in sheet at the check-in window at [the park].
(4) Did the employer finance the occasion to a substantial extent?
Yes. Salter Path paid for the event.
(5) Did the employees regard it as an employment benefit to which they were entitled as of right?
Yes. Fun Day was a benefit for the volunteers and their families. If volunteers did not keep their hours up, they could not attend.
(6) Did the employer benefit from the event, not merely in a vague way through better morale and good will, but through such tangible advantages as having an opportunity to make speeches and awards?
Yes. . . Plaintiff was going to make a speech to her EMS workers to thank them for their participation and to encourage continued participation from these volunteers within the department.
The Commission's findings of fact do not support this conclusion of law. Hunt at 271, 569 S.E.2d 679 (“The Commissionerred in its application of the findings of fact to its conclusions of law.”).
The Commission concluded the department “sponsored the Fun Day event.” In finding of fact number two, the Commission found that the event was “essentially an appreciation day, in which the community thanked volunteer firemen and rescue workers for their contribution and work in the community.” The community, not the department, paid for and sponsored the event.
Under the second Chilton factor, the Commission concluded plaintiff's attendance at the event was mandatory. The Commission did not find attendance at the event was mandatory. Plaintiff testified attendance at the event was purely voluntary. Also, in finding of fact number three the Commission found, “Fun Day was a voluntary event.”
Regarding the third Chilton factor, the Commission concluded that attendance was encouraged, and the department maintained a record of the volunteers who attended. Even if attendance by the volunteers was taken at the event, undisputed evidence reveals names were taken merely to compute costs to pay the amusement park, rather than for any business purpose. The Commission wholly failed to address the remaining factors under this prong. Undisputed evidence shows the volunteers: (1) were not compensated for attending the event; (2) were not required to work if they failed to attend; and (3) there was no longstanding custom of attendingthe event since this was only the second time the community had sponsored the event.
The Commission's conclusion that the department funded the event is unsupported by the findings of fact. In finding of fact number three, the Commission found the event was “paid for out of a Special Donations Fund, rather than out of the Department's operating budget.” The event was paid for with community donations. The community, not the department, funded the event.
In its analysis of the fifth Chilton factor, the Commission held the event was a benefit to employees who maintained certain hours. This conclusion was not supported by any findings of fact or any evidence. The Commission failed to find that only “active” volunteers were permitted to take part in the event.
Plaintiff initially testified the active volunteers were entitled as a matter of right to attend the event, but she later recanted her statement and admitted the event was open to every volunteer. Gutierrez v. GDX Automotive, 169 N.C. App. 173, 178, 609 S.E.2d 445, 449, disc. rev. denied, _ N.C. _, 619 S.E.2d 408 (2005). (“Without competent evidence, the Commission's conclusions are likewise unsupported and the opinion and award must be reversed.”).
The Commission concluded the department benefitted from the event because plaintiff planned to make a speech. Plaintiff testified her intent was simply to make an impromptu comment regarding her appreciation for the volunteers' work. Shetestified, “I try to thank my EMTs anytime I can.” When asked if she had any role at the event, she testified, “no.” Plaintiff admitted the only way the department benefitted from the event was “to keep morale up.” In finding of fact number two, the Commission found, “[t]he purpose for Fun Day was to boost the morale and goodwill of Salter Path volunteers.” In finding of fact number four, the Commission found, “[t]he employer received a tangible benefit from this event in that it helped to improve morale of volunteers.” The Commission's findings of fact do not support the notion that the department benefitted in a tangible way from the event; rather, the department benefitted “merely in a vague way through better morale and good will.” Chilton, at 18, 262 S.E.2d at 350. Upon de novo review of the Commission's conclusion of law, I find error in no competent evidence supports some of the Commission's findings of fact and in some cases undisputed evidence is to the contrary. These unsupported findings do not support the Commission's conclusions of law. Id. The Commission's opinion and reward should be reversed.
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