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Appeal and Error_appealability permanency planning order
An appeal from an initial permanency planning order was dismissed as interlocutory. In
re B.N.H., 170 N.C. App. 157, is directly controlling.
Holland & O'Connor, P.L.L.C., by Jennifer S. O'Connor for
petitioner-appellee.
Sofie W. Hosford for respondent-appellant.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Daniel B. (respondent) appeals the trial court's initial
permanency planning order that maintained legal custody of L.D.B.
(L.D.B.) with her mother, Stephanie M. (Stephanie M.), denied
visitation rights to respondent, and repeated previous directives
of the trial court that reunification efforts be ceased. We
dismiss as interlocutory.
L.D.B. lived with respondent and Stephanie M. Although
Stephanie M. had named another man as L.D.B.'s father, paternity
testing confirmed that respondent was L.D.B.'s biological father.
In September 2002, the Johnston County Department of Social
Services (D.S.S.) filed an initial juvenile petition. D.S.S.
alleged that L.D.B. was neglected as a result of domestic violence
in her presence causing her to live in an environment injurious toher welfare. An amended petition alleged that the juvenile was
dependent and further alleged a history of domestic violence
between respondent and Stephanie M:
[B]oth parents admitt[ed] to domestic fights,
which include[d] an incident where the mother
attacked [respondent] with a knife, while
[respondent] was holding [L.D.B.]. Both
[respondent and Stephanie M.] have been
instigators in the domestic violence . . . and
have a history of substance abuse that
contributed to the domestic violence.
D.S.S.'s Intact Families Unit worked with Stephanie M. and
respondent on a weekly basis beginning on 4 October 2002.
Respondent admitted using marijuana, and Stephanie M. admitted
using marijuana and alcohol. As part of a Family Services Case
Plan, both respondent and Stephanie M. were required to complete
domestic violence prevention programs, substance abuse evaluations,
and psychological evaluations. The plan further required that
respondent and Stephanie M. follow all recommendations from the
programs and evaluations. Respondent and Stephanie M. were also
required to maintain safe and stable housing. Additionally, both
were to refrain from engaging in acts of coercion, intimidation, or
violence against each other, and they were to submit to random drug
testing performed by a social worker.
Subsequently, conflict continued within the family.
Respondent made accusations against Stephanie M. and her family
regarding death threats, and he reported that on a couple of
occasions Stephanie M. had assaulted him, although he did not press
charges. Respondent filed four complaints and motions for domestic
violence protective orders and ex parte domestic violence ordersagainst Stephanie M. All of them were dismissed. Stephanie M., in
turn, claimed respondent was controlling.
In September 2002, respondent and Stephanie M. entered a
visitation and custody plan. Respondent had primary physical
custody, and Stephanie M. had joint legal custody. On 25 October
2002, upon hearing that respondent was fleeing to California,
Stephanie M. filed for emergency custody of L.D.B. At the
conclusion of an ex parte custody hearing on 5 November 2002, the
trial court granted D.S.S. custody of L.D.B. Subsequently,
Stephanie M. stipulated to neglect, and the trial court adjudicated
L.D.B. neglected as to respondent. Stephanie M. presented evidence
at the adjudication hearing that she completed a substance abuse
program, followed through on recommendations from a psychological
evaluation, substantially participated in a domestic violence
program, completed parenting classes, and maintained stable housing
and employment.
Respondent, on the other hand, had lost his job and was
working for his mother. In addition, he had been diagnosed with
Acute Adjustment Disorder with Mixed Emotion and Conduct, which
would require six months of treatment. He failed to attend two
anger management courses, although he had on one occasion attended
a class. He additionally failed to attend parenting classes and
complete a psychological evaluation. Respondent also had moved to
Carteret County, and Carteret County's D.S.S. reported difficulty
in both verifying the services that respondent had received and in
conducting home studies due to the number of excuses he gives fornot being able to meet with the social worker. In the
dispositional phase, the trial court ordered D.S.S. to return
L.D.B. to the care, custody, and control of Stephanie M. The trial
court also suspended respondent's visitation and granted Stephanie
M. a restraining order against respondent. Respondent was ordered
not to have any direct or indirect contact with Stephanie M. or the
children; however, the trial court asked him to locate an
individual who would be willing to supervise visitations.
The trial court subsequently conducted a review hearing in
this matter on 12 March 2003 and 30 April 2003. Respondent had
made little progress, and the trial court concluded it was in
L.D.B.'s best interests that respondent not have visitation until
such time as he provides to the Court a completed psychological
evaluation. At the latter review hearing, respondent again failed
to complete the psychological evaluation, and the trial court
relieved D.S.S. of further efforts toward reunification of L.D.B.
with respondent.
An initial permanency planning hearing in this matter was held
on 21 May 2003. Although respondent again failed to complete
parenting classes, he had completed his psychological evaluation.
The evaluation revealed that respondent had a failure to cope with
life's demands and major depression. The report further revealed
that [h]is potential for aggressive behavior is high and his
capacity for perceptual distortion based on perceived threats to
himself increase the likelihood of his acting out in response to
his fears. Finally, the report warned that respondent'sretreating into fantasy when stressed limits the number of
reasonable options he might exercise in solving problems.
The trial court found that based upon the history of this
case, including but not limited to domestic violence in the
presence of the juvenile, as well as upon [respondent's] continued
action to attempt to have contact [with] the mother and the results
of [respondent's] psychological evaluation, it would not be in the
juvenile's best interest to have unsupervised contact with
[respondent]. Because respondent failed on numerous occasions to
identify anyone to supervise visitations in Johnston County between
himself and the children, the trial court repeated its previous
directive that respondent be denied visitation. The trial court
also ordered both D.S.S. and the Guardian ad Litem relieved of
further efforts toward reunification with respondent and terminated
further reviews in the matter, in accordance with § 7B-906(d)
(2003), since custody was restored to a parent. Respondent
appeals.
We initially address whether this case is interlocutory.
North Carolina General Statutes § 7B-1001 (2003)
(See footnote 1)
states that
appeal may be taken from any final order of the court in a
juvenile matter[.] The statute defines a final order to
include: (1) Any order finding absence of jurisdiction;
(2) Any order which in effect determines the
action and prevents a judgment from which
appeal might be taken;
(3) Any order of disposition after an
adjudication that a juvenile is abused,
neglected, or dependent; or
(4) Any order modifying custodial rights.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1001(1 - 4) (2003).
In In the Matter of B.N.H, 170 N.C. App. 157, 611 S.E.2d 888
(2005), this Court recently held
[i]n our view, the statutory language of G.S.
§ 7B-1001(3), referring to an order of
disposition after an adjudication that a
juvenile is abused, neglected, or dependent,
means the dispositional order that is entered
after an adjudication under G.S. § 7B-905, and
does not mean every permanency planning,
review, or other type of order entered at some
unspecified point following such a
disposition.
B.N.H., 170 N.C. App. at 160, 611 S.E.2d at 890.
The B.N.H. panel of this Court narrowly interpreted an earlier
opinion, In re Weiler, 158 N.C. App. 473, 581 S.E.2d 134 (2003).
The B.N.H. panel distinguished Weiler as follows:
In Weiler, the permanency planning order on
appeal changed the plan from reunification to
adoption. The order on appeal here is not
such an order, not only because it was an
initial permanency planning order but also
because it repeats the previous directives of
the court that reunification be ceased. We
therefore limit the holding of Weiler to the
specific facts of that case, and decline to
extend its reasoning further.
B.N.H., 170 N.C. App. at 161, 611 S.E.2d at 891.
B.N.H. is directly controlling on the facts at issue. The
order on appeal in this case is an initial permanency planning
order that does not change the plan from reunification to adoption. Furthermore, the order repeats the previous directives of the
court that reunification [with respondent] be ceased. See id.
Moreover, the order on appeal is not a final order under any of
the other orders listed in § 7B-1001 because it is not: [an] order
finding absence of jurisdiction, [an] order . . . that prevents
a judgment from which appeal might be taken, or an order
modifying custodial rights. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1001.
Accordingly, this appeal is interlocutory, and we dismiss the
appeal.
Dismissed.
Judges HUDSON and BRYANT concur.
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