Appeal by plaintiffs from an order entered 12 September 2005
by Judge Howard E. Manning, Jr. in Wake County Superior Court.
Heard in the Court of Appeals 23 August 2006.
Robert J. Willis for plaintiff-appellants.
Bailey & Dixon, LLP, by David Wisz and Kenyann Brown Stanford,
for defendant-appellees.
Carol Brooke for North Carolina Justice Center, amicus curiae.
BRYANT, Judge.
Robert A. Leverette, Ricky Whitehead and John Allen Clark
(plaintiffs) appeal from an order entered 12 September 2005
granting Labor Works International, L.L.C., Batts Temporary
Services, Bill C. Schleuning and Sean Fore (collectively
defendants') motion for summary judgment. For the reasons stated
below, we affirm.
Facts/Procedural History
Defendants operate
(See footnote 1)
as “daily work, daily pay” temporary
services with locations in Raleigh, Durham, and Greensboro, North
Carolina. Defendants' offices provide additional workers for jobs
which entail temporary light industrial labor and hire day laborers
on a first come, first served basis. The Raleigh office opens at
5:30 a.m. to begin dispensing job tickets to those individuals in
search of work. First time applicants are asked to complete an
employment application provided by defendants. Defendants make vantransportation available to employees to and from the job site; use
of van transportation is voluntary and based upon each employee's
transportation needs. A section of the employment application
allows an applicant to sign the “Voluntary Payroll Deduction for
Van Use”:
I understand that I am not required by Batt's
[sic] to use the Van Service offered by Batt's
[sic]. I further understand and acknowledge
that if I voluntarily elect to ride in the
Batt's [sic] van, that I will be charged $4.00
and hereby authorize these deductions. I also
understand that the amount charged for Van
Transportation is subject to vary without
notice.
The amount of the fee deducted from an individual's wages for
transportation service is further stated on signs posted in the
Raleigh office as well as inside each transportation van and
updated accordingly. Defendants' clients often required safety
equipment such as goggles, hard hats, gloves, and boots for
employees to use while working at a particular job site. Those
individuals employed by defendants who do not own this type of
safety equipment may elect to purchase or rent the equipment from
defendants and must sign the “Voluntary Payroll Deduction for
Safety Equipment” section of the Batts employment application. The
purchase price or rental fee is then deducted from the individual's
daily wages at the end of the workday. The amount of the fee to be
deducted is stated in the employment application itself, as well as
on signs posted in defendants' offices.
In addition to signing the wage deduction forms for
transportation and equipment purchase/rental, it is defendants'policy to submit every prospective employee to a breathalyzer exam
prior to sending the employee to the job site. An individual whose
breathalyzer result is positive for alcohol will not be permitted
to work on that day. After having passed the breathalyzer
examination, an employee may use their own transportation, walk to
the assigned job site, or board defendants' transportation van if
desired. Once a workday is complete, defendants' van returns to
each job site to pick up any employees desiring to use the
transportation service. These employees are returned to
defendants' office and are then issued a paycheck according to the
time listed on their job tickets by the supervisor on the job site.
Employees are paid an hourly wage in accordance with the North
Carolina Wage and Hour Act (NCWHA) and the Federal Wage and Hour
Laws for the amount of time they spend under the client's
supervision on the job site. Deductions are made from each daily
paycheck, as appropriate, for any transportation and/or equipment
rental or purchase charges. An individual who performs well on a
job site may return the next day for work on a “repeat ticket.”
When an individual earns a “repeat ticket,” defendants request the
individual return to defendants' office the next day one hour prior
to the start time of the job to take the mandatory breathalyzer as
a pre-condition to employment that day. There is no specific
requirement that the employee comply with this request, however, or
even that they work the “repeat ticket” the next day.
In the instant case, plaintiffs worked exclusively through
defendants' Raleigh office. Plaintiff Leverette first sought workwith defendants on 6 November 2000. On that date, Leverette filled
out defendants' employment application, signing the “Voluntary
Payroll Deduction for Van Use” section. However, Leverette did not
sign the “Voluntary Payroll Deduction for Safety Equipment” section
of the application and no deductions were ever taken from his wages
for the rental or purchase of safety equipment. Leverette worked
numerous temporary jobs through defendants' Raleigh office from
November 2000, through approximately 20 June 2001, utilizing the
transportation service frequently. During that seven month time
period, defendants deducted a total of $549.00 for Leverette's use
of the transportation service.
Plaintiff Whitehead also sought temporary work through
defendants in November 2000. At that time, Whitehead filled out
the employment application, but did not sign the “Voluntary Payroll
Deduction for Van Use” or “Voluntary Payroll Deduction for Safety
Equipment” sections of the application. Whitehead testified that
he had no knowledge as to why those sections were unsigned and
stated the sections were neither knowingly nor intentionally left
unsigned. Whitehead worked temporary jobs through defendants on
six days between 3 November 2000 and 10 November 2000, utilizing
the transportation service each day. During that time, defendants
deducted a total of $18.00 for his use of the transportation
service. No deductions were ever made for the rental or purchase
of safety equipment.
Plaintiff Clark first sought temporary work through defendants
on 15 August 2003. On that date, he filled out the employmentapplication, signing both the “Voluntary Payroll Deduction for Van
Use” and “Voluntary Payroll Deduction for Safety Equipment”
sections of the application. Clark worked temporary jobs through
defendants' Raleigh office on twenty-six days between 15 August
2003 and 6 July 2004, utilizing the van service several times. A
total of $40.00 was deducted during this time for Clark's use of
defendants' transportation service, and a total of $5.50 was
deducted for four occasions on which Clark elected to rent safety
equipment. None of the plaintiffs held a North Carolina driver's
license at the time of their employment with defendants. None of
them had access to a vehicle or other means of transportation.
Plaintiffs relied on either public transportation or defendants'
van service to travel to and from the job site.
Plaintiff Robert Leverette (Leverette) instituted this action
on 21 February 2002. Batts Temporary Service, Inc., Lorraine
Schleuning, Bill C. Schleuning, and Sean Fore were initially named
as defendants. On two different occasions, the complaint was
amended to add Ricky Whitehead (Whitehead) and John Allen Clark
(Clark) as additional plaintiffs; and Labor Works International,
L.L.C., Labor Works Source-Raleigh, L.L.C., Labor Works
Source-Greensboro, L.L.C., and Labor Works Source-Durham, L.L.C.
were added as additional defendants. The complaint was also
amended to dismiss the action as to Lorraine Schleuning. On 15
March 2005, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
as to liability. Defendants filed an Answer in response to
plaintiffs' Second Amended Complaint on 18 March 2005. Defendants'Motion for Summary Judgment and plaintiffs' Motion for Class
Certification were scheduled for hearing on 3 May 2005. The trial
court declined to hear the class certification motion at that time.
Instead, the class certification motion was heard on 27 July 2005,
but was never ruled on by the trial court. By Order dated 12
September 2005, the trial court denied plaintiffs' Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment and granted defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment. Plaintiffs appeal.
______________________
On appeal plaintiffs argue the trial court erred: (I) by
ruling on defendants' motion for summary judgment before it decided
plaintiffs' motion for class certification; (II) in granting
defendants' motion for summary judgment; and (III) in determining
there was no genuine issue of material fact that Labor Works
International, L.L.C., Labor Works Source-Raleigh, L.L.C., Labor
Works Source-Durham, L.L.C. and Labor Works Source-Greensboro,
L.L.C. were not part of an “enterprise” under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-
25.2(18).
On cross-appeal, defendants argue the trial court erred: (IV)
in denying defendants' motion for summary judgment as to plaintiff
Whitehead based on statute of limitations; and (V) denying
defendant Schleuning and Fore's motion for summary judgment where
plaintiffs failed to forecast any evidence of individual liability.
I
[1] Plaintiffs first argue the trial court erred by ruling on
defendants' motion for summary judgment before it decided
plaintiffs' motion for class certification. We disagree.
The trial court's determination of the sequence in which
motions will be heard is reviewed on an abuse of discretion
standard.
Berkeley Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Terra Del Sol, 111
N.C. App. 692, 710, 433 S.E.2d 449, 458 (1993). The trial court
has discretion in addressing summary judgment arguments prior to
class certification.
See Gaynoe v. First Union Corp., 153 N.C.
App. 750, 756, 571 S.E.2d 24, 28 (2002). In
Reep v. Beck, 360 N.C.
34, 619 S.E.2d 497 (2005), our Supreme Court recently rejected any
argument that dispositive motions cannot properly be considered
until after ruling on a motion for class certification, and further
recognized the wide latitude that trial judges are given in this
regard. As the Court stated, “[t]his Court is confident that, in
determining the sequence in which motions will be considered, North
Carolina judges will continue to be mindful of longstanding
exceptions to the mootness rule and other factors affecting
traditional notions of justice and fair play.”
Id. at 40, 619
S.E.2d at 501.
In the instant case, plaintiff Leverette filed an initial
motion for class certification in April 2002, which was not
calendared for hearing until December 2002, after plaintiffs'
complaint was amended to add plaintiff Whitehead. A ruling was not
issued on plaintiffs' initial class certification motion.
Plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew their second class certification motion in January 2003. After this matter was dismissed and
remanded by this Court, plaintiffs amended their complaint a second
time to add plaintiff Clark and the Labor Works Source defendants.
See Leverette v. Batts Temp. Servs., 165 N.C. App. 328, 598 S.E.2d
192,
disc. rev. denied, 359 N.C. 69, 604 S.E.2d 666 (2OO4).
Plaintiffs filed their third motion for class certification on 21
February 2005, but did not calendar that motion for hearing until
3 May 2005. Also scheduled for hearing on that date was
defendants' motion for summary judgment and plaintiffs' motion for
partial summary judgment. The trial court declined to hear the
class certification motion on 3 May 2005, so plaintiffs calendered
the class certification motion for 27 July 2005, before a different
judge. No ruling was issued on the class certification motion
prior to the issuance of a ruling on the pending summary judgment
motions by Order dated 12 September 2005. In light of this
procedural history and the nature of plaintiffs' claims, the trial
court properly exercised its discretion to refrain from ruling on
the motion for class certification until first deciding the cross
motions for summary judgment. Plaintiffs have failed to establish
that the trial court abused its discretion. This assignment of
error is overruled.
II
[2] Plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in granting
defendants' motion for summary judgment because plaintiffs contend
genuine issues of material fact and law existed. Specifically,plaintiffs argue the trial court erred in determining the meaning
of the term “hours worked.” We disagree.
A trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is
reviewed
de novo.
Coastal Plains Utils, Inc. v. New Hanover
County, 166 N.C. App. 333, 340-41, 601 S.E.2d 915, 920 (2004). All
evidence must be considered in the light most favorable to the non-
movant.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Pennington, 356 N.C. 571, 579,
573 S.E.2d 118, 124 (2002).
Plaintiffs claim they should have received wages for the time
they spent waiting at defendants' offices to be transported to the
job site, as well as for any time spent traveling to and from each
job site in defendants' van, arguing this time was part of “hours
worked” under the North Carolina Wage and Hour Act (NCWHA). North
Carolina General Statutes, Section 95-25.6, part of the NCWHA,
provides that “[e]very employer shall pay every employee all wages
and tips accruing to the employee on the regular payday.” The
NCWHA further provides that the term “hours worked” means “all time
an employee is employed,” and the term “employ” in turn means
“suffer or permit to work.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-25.2 (3) & (8);
29 U.S.C. § 203 (g). Defendants concede they intended to pay
plaintiffs for all hours considered to be work under federal or
North Carolina law, however there is disagreement between the
parties that time spent waiting or traveling to the job site was
compensable. Job applications completed by plaintiffs do not
indicate plaintiffs would receive compensation for the time they
spent waiting to work or traveling to a job site. The evidencealso shows plaintiffs were free to do as they wished prior to
receiving a job assignment and afterward, even while waiting for
defendants' van to transport them.
The recent cases of
Whitehead v. Sparrow Enter., 167 N.C. App.
178, 605 S.E.2d 234 (2004) and
Hyman v. Efficiency, Inc., 167 N.C.
App. 134, 605 S.E.2d 254 (2004) address whether such waiting to
work time is compensable under the law. In both cases, this Court
considered class action claims by day laborers against their
temporary agency employers alleging violations of the NCWHA based
on the withholding of wages for transportation and failure to
compensate for waiting and travel time. Pursuant to the Portal to
Portal Act (PPA), 29 U.S.C. § 254, employers must compensate
employees for time spent waiting and traveling only when it is part
of a principal activity or for “those duties integral and
indispensable to the employer's business, . . . but not if it is a
preliminary or postliminary activity.”
Whitehead, 167 N.C. App. at
189, 605 S.E.2d at 241 (citations omitted);
Hyman, 167 N.C. App. at
145, 605 S.E.2d at 262 (citations omitted).
Two factors should be considered in determining whether an
employee's waiting time is compensable under the PPA: (a) “whether
the time spent is predominantly to benefit the employer and
integral to the job;” and (b) whether the employee “is able to use
the time for their own personal activities.”
Whitehead, 167 N.C.
App. at 190, 605 S.E.2d at 241-42. As this Court stated:
The class members' time spent waiting directly
correlates to their choice of transportation.
They are free to spend that time as they wish.
It is neither beneficial nor indispensable todefendant's business. We decline to extend
“hours worked” to include the class members'
waiting time prior to arrival at the job site
and at the end of the day.
Id. As in
Whitehead and
Hyman, defendants hire individuals on a
daily basis based upon their customers' demands on that particular
day. These individuals receive assignments only if work is
available that day. After an employee receives a job ticket, the
individual can choose to ride the company transportation van to the
job site or utilize a private or public alternative means of
transportation to the job site. Individuals have free time while
they wait to ride in defendants' transportation van. Any employee
who chose to use defendants' van for transportation to the job site
remained at defendants' office to hear their name called for the
van similar to the
Whitehead plaintiffs.
See Whitehead, 167 N.C.
App. at 190, 605 S.E.2d at 242. The employer in
Whitehead, as
here, encouraged those employees with “repeat tickets” to show up
one hour before their transportation time if they were using the
employer's van.
Id. at 188, 605 S.E.2d at 240. Here, defendants
made the purchase or rental of protective clothing and equipment
available to employees if customers required the employees to be
equipped with such gear and the employees did not possess their own
protective equipment. Additionally, defendants would not hire an
employee on any given day unless the employee took and passed a
breathalyzer exam as a condition of employment. The waiting time
for the breathalyzer results in this case was not “predominantly
for the benefit of the employer” and plaintiffs were able to usethe waiting time “for their own personal activities.”
Whitehead,
167 N.C. App. at 190, 605 S.E.2d at 241-42.
Time spent traveling to work is only compensable under the PPA
and NCWHA if it is a principal activity of the employee.
Whitehead, 167 N.C. App. at 191, 605 S.E.2d at 242. Specifically,
the PPA does not require employers to pay employees for the
following activities:
(1) walking, riding, or traveling to and from
the actual place of performance of the
principal activity or activities which such
employee is employed to perform, and (2)
activities which are preliminary to or
postliminary to said principal activity or
activities, which occur either prior to the
time on any particular workday at which such
employee commences or subsequent to the time
on any particular workday at which he ceases,
such principal activity or activities.
29 U.S.C. § 254(a). In
Whitehead, this Court considered three
factors: “(1) whether workers were required to meet at the
defendant's office before going to the job site; (2) whether
workers performed labor before going to the job site; and (3)
whether workers picked up and carried tools to the job site.”
Whitehead, 167 N.C. App. at 191-92, 605 S.E.2d at 242-43 (citation
omitted). In applying these factors, the Court found that:
First, defendant does not require employees to
report at its office at a certain time.
Rather, it established the policy for laborers
to follow if they were interested in seeking
employment from defendant on a daily basis.
Second, the [workers] do not perform any work
either at defendant's office, or in transit to
the job sites.
Id. The Court then addressed the third factor (i.e., whether
workers picked up and carried tools to the job site) and found that
the hard hats, gloves, and boots workers received from the employer
were not “specialized equipment” and, therefore, the receipt of
this type of general protective equipment does not make travel time
compensable under 29 C.F.R. § 785.38 or the PPA.
Id. at 192-93,
605 S.E.2d at 243. As a result, the temporary workers' travel time
from the employer's office to the “actual place of performance” was
held to be noncompensable, essentially being “an extended
home-to-work-and-back commute.”
Id. at 191-93, 605 S.E.2d at
242-43 (citations omitted).
Our Court of Appeals analysis of the Portal to Portal Act in
Whitehead and
Hyman was not altered by the more recent US Supreme
court decision in
IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 163 L. Ed. 2d
288 (2005). In
Alvarez, the Court held that time spent by
employees donning (putting on) and doffing (removing) protective
gear and clothing, as well as time spent walking to and from the
protective gear changing area was compensable and therefore not
excluded from coverage under the Fair Labor Standards Act by the
Portal to Portal Act. However, the time spent waiting to don
protective gear was not a principal activity and therefore was
excluded under the FLSA.
Alvarez, 546 U.S. at ___, 163 L. Ed. 2d
at 294.
In the instant case, plaintiffs were not required by
defendants to don or doff specialized protective gear and clothing
at the defendants' offices, but rather had safety equipment madeavailable to them for certain job sites and as rented by the
individual on an as needed basis. No specialized safety equipment
or tools were utilized on the jobs offered by defendants; rather,
the only equipment picked up and carried to job sites is general
safety equipment such as boots, gloves, and eye goggles, depending
upon the particular job assignment.
North Carolina General Statute, Section 95-25.8 allows an
employer to take wage deductions if: (1) the employer obtains
written authorization from the employee in the form specified by
North Carolina law; or (2) the deduction is one which is otherwise
permitted under state or federal law.
See N.C.G.S. § 95-25.8
(2003). Two types of written authorizations are permitted:
a. When the amount or rate of the proposed
deduction is known and agreed upon in advance,
the authorization shall specify the dollar
amount or percentage of wages which shall be
deducted from one or more paychecks, provided
that if the deduction is for the convenience
of the employee, the employee shall be given a
reasonable opportunity to withdraw the
authorization;
b. When the amount of the proposed deduction
is not known and agreed upon in advance, the
authorization need not specify a dollar amount
which can be deducted from one or more
paychecks, provided that the employee receives
advance notice of the specific amount of any
proposed deduction and is given a reasonable
opportunity to withdraw the authorization
before the deduction is made.
Id.;
see also 13 N.C.A.C. 12.0305 (further providing that a wage -
deduction authorization must: (1) be written; (2) be signed by the
employee on or before the payday for the pay period for which the
deduction is being made; (3) show the date of the signing by theemployee; (4) state the reason for the deduction; and (5) if it is
a specific authorization, state the specific dollar amount of the
deduction).
In the present case, plaintiffs Leverette and Clark signed two
initial wage deduction authorizations: “Voluntary Payroll Deduction
for Van Use” and “Voluntary Payroll Deduction for Safety
Equipment.” The form authorizing deductions for safety equipment
states:
I,________ , do hereby voluntarily authorize
BATTS to deduct from my paycheck $ 1.00 for
gloves, $1.50 for Safety Glasses, and $12.00
for boots if I direct BATT'S [sic] to issue
these safety related items to me. I understand
that these safety related items will be mine
and that I will not have to return this
equipment to BATT'S [sic]. I further
understand and acknowledge that the prices
charged for these safety related items may
change and do hereby authorize my payroll
deductions for these charges.
Defendants' van transportation and safety equipment authorization
forms clearly comply with the requirements of the NCWHA and
associated regulations as they were: (1) in writing; (2) signed
prior to the time of the deduction; (3) dated; (4) state the reason
for the deduction, and (5) state the amount of the proposed
deductions for the transportation and for each item of safety
equipment.
See 13 N.C.A.C. 12.0305;
Whitehead, 167 N.C. App. at
184-85, 605 S.E.2d at 238-39;
Hyman, 167 N.C. App. at 139, 605
S.E.2d at 258.
Plaintiffs argue that (a) plaintiffs did not know they had the
right to the withdraw these authorization forms; (b) the amount
stated in the authorization forms was incorrect; and (c) defendants did not give three days' advance notice of their intent
to make a transportation deduction. However, plaintiffs were able
to withdraw the authorization forms on a daily basis. Plaintiffs
were not required to ride in the transportation van, and could
choose at any time prior to getting on the van to take an alternate
mode of transportation to the job site. In that instance, no
transportation deduction was taken from that day's wages.
Similarly, no employee was required to rent or purchase safety
equipment, as each could either provide his own equipment or
decline any job ticket on which equipment was required. The
employee elected at the start of each day on which he chose to work
whether to authorize defendants to take any wage deductions.
Furthermore, the authorization forms signed by the employees
clearly stated that the amount of the transportation and equipment
charges may change. Notice of any variance in the amount of the
transportation deduction was provided, in accordance with the law
and prior to the taking of any increased wage deduction, by posting
signs in defendants' office and in the transportation vans
themselves, which plaintiffs had seen. Similarly, notice of any
increase in equipment charges was provided in the form of signs
posted at defendants' office location. Furthermore, defendants'
forms were in compliance with N.C.G.S. § 95-25.8 and 13 N.C.A.C.
12.0305 when taking transportation deductions from plaintiffs'
wages since both state and federal law allow an employer to deduct
from an employee's wage, without written authorization, the
reasonable cost “of furnishing [an] employee with board, lodging,or other facilities.”
(See footnote 2)
See 13 N.C.A.C. 12.0301 (a) and .0301 (d);
29 U.S.C. § 203(m); 29 C.F.R. § 531.32(a). Because the van
transportation provided by defendants is essentially home-to-work
travel not compensable under the FLSA or NCWHA as “hours worked,”
and not “an incident of and necessary to the employment,” it
constitutes “other facilities.”
Id.;
see N.C.G.S. § 95-25.8(1); 29
C.F.R. § 531.32(a).
Plaintiffs would contend the requirement of a breathalyzer
examination as a condition of employment is a “continuous use”
under
Alvarez.
See Alvarez 546 U.S. at ___, 163 L. Ed. 2d at 305
(holding time spent waiting to doff protective gear is compensable
because it occurs between the first and last principal activities
of the day; however, time waiting to don the gear is a preliminary
activity excluded from compensation because the Court was “not
persuaded that such waiting -- which in this case is two steps
removed from the productive activity . . . -- is 'integral and
indispensable' to a 'principal activity' that identifies the time
when the continuous workday begins.”). However, submission to a
breathalyzer exam is not an activity which plaintiffs were hired to
perform and is a pre-condition to employment. If the individual
failed the breathalyzer exam they were not hired to work for that
day. Further, defendants did not require potential employees toarrive at their offices at any particular time. Defendants'
offices generally opened their doors at 5:30 a.m. and began
assigning job tickets to individuals as soon as customers requested
workers. Individuals did not perform any work at defendants'
office locations or while they are being transported to job sites
in the transportation van. On these facts, the trial court did not
err in concluding “waiting time” and “travel time” were not
compensable. In addition
, the trial court properly determined the
meaning of “hours worked,” as plaintiffs are not entitled to
compensation for waiting for transportation to the job site, to put
on protective equipment and to take a breathalyzer exam. As there
is no genuine issue of material fact as to wage deductions, the
trial court properly granted defendants' motion for summary
judgment. These assignments of error are overruled.
III
[3] Plaintiffs next argue the trial court erred in determining
there was no genuine issue of material fact that Labor Works
International, L.L.C., Labor Works Source-Raleigh, L.L.C., Labor
Works Source-Durham, L.L.C. and Labor Works Source-Greensboro,
L.L.C. were not part of an “enterprise” under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 95-
25.2(18) and granting summary judgment in their favor. Plaintiff
Clark contends the trial court erred in granting summary judgment
in favor of the corporate defendants other than Batts because the
trial court failed to consider all of these entities an
“enterprise” within the meaning of the NCWHA. We disagree.
Each plaintiff was temporarily employed by the Labor Works
location in Raleigh, North Carolina. No plaintiff was everemployed at any other Labor Works Source location. Fore's
deposition testimony as to each of the limited liability companies
ultimately depositing their funds into an account maintained by
Labor Works International, L.L.C. does not give rise to an issue of
fact as to whether these entities engage in related activities
performed through a unified operation, or common control, for a
common business purpose as required by FLSA.
See Murray v.
R.E.A.C.H., 908 F. Supp. 337 (W.D.N.C. 1995) (holding the
“operation of business in one county in Western North Carolina does
not arise out of and is not connected with a commercial transaction
which substantially affects interstate commerce. . . . Therefore,
the Court finds that the Defendant is not engaged in a business
enterprise covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act.”). Claims
against the remaining corporate defendants (Labor Works
International, L.L.C., Labor Works Source-Greensboro, L.L.C., and
Labor Works Source-Durham, L.L.C.) were properly dismissed. This
assignment of error is overruled. For the foregoing reasons, we
need not reach the merits of defendants' cross-appeal.
Affirm.
Judges MCGEE and ELMORE concur.
Footnote: 1