STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Davidson County
Nos. 02 CRS 60739-41
MICHAEL EUGENE BOWDEN, 03 CRS
51511-13
Defendant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Anita LeVeaux, for the State.
J. Clark Fischer, for defendant-appellant.
HUDSON, Judge.
In April 2003, the grand jury indicted defendant on multiple
counts of first-degree statutory sexual offense. On 1 March 2004,
the jury returned guilty verdicts against defendant on all counts.
Defendant appeals. We conclude that there was no error.
The evidence tends to show the following facts. S.H., who was
fifteen at the time of trial, was born in 1988. Defendant married
S.H.'s paternal grandmother when S.H. was about six years old.
S.H. testified that around this time, when he was visiting his
grandmother, after his grandmother left the house, defendant calledhim into a room, told him to take his clothes off, and then
defendant performed oral sex on him.
Around 1995, after S.H. went
to live with his grandmother and defendant, additional similar
incidents occurred. In addition to performing oral sex on S.H.,
defendant also had S.H. perform oral sex on him and had S.H. taste
his ejaculate. S.H. testified that defendant also masturbated in
front of him and instructed him to lie on his side on the bed,
where defendant would engage in anal intercourse with him. S.H.
testified that he asked defendant to stop, but he did not and told
S.H. not to tell anyone. Defendant also told S.H. that if he told
anyone, defendant would stop being his grandfather. S.H. testified
that he was afraid of defendant, even though defendant never
threatened him with physical harm. After awhile, a pattern
developed whereby, until about 2002,
such sexual acts would occur
every time S.H.'s grandmother left the house. S.H. also testified
that during a cub scout camping trip when he was seven or eight, he
was in a tent with defendant and his cousin, C.B., and when S.H.
refused to perform oral sex on defendant, defendant asked C.B., who
acquiesced, and S.H. saw C.B. perform oral sex on defendant.
Defendant argues that the trial court committed prejudicial
error when it allowed C.B. to testify, over defense objection, that
he was also sexually abused by defendant. Defendant contends that
this testimony was inadmissible character evidence under both Rule404 (b) and Rule 403. We disagree.
Generally, evidence of other crimes or acts is not admissible
to prove character or propensity to commit similar acts. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404(b) (2004). It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake,
entrapment or accident. Id. Our Supreme Court has stated that:
Rule 404(b) . . . is a clear general rule of
inclusion of relevant evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts by a defendant, subject
to but one exception requiring its exclusion
if its only probative value is to show that
the defendant has the propensity or
disposition to commit an offense of the nature
of the crime charged.
State v. Golphin, 352 N.C. 364, 443, 533 S.E.2d 168, 222 (2000),
cert. denied, 532 U.S. 931, 149 L.Ed.2d 305 (2001) (emphasis in
original).
Although such evidence may tend to show a defendant's
propensity to commit a certain type of act or wrong, it is
admissible under Rule 404(b) so long as it is relevant for some
other purpose than to show propensity. State v. Frazier, 344 N.C.
611, 615, 476 S.E.2d 297, 299 (1996). Additionally, our courts
have been markedly liberal in admitting evidence of similar sexual
offenses, pursuant to Rule 404(b). State v. Brothers, 151 N.C.
App. 71, 76, 564 S.E.2d 603, 607 (2002), appeal dismissed and disc.
review denied, 356 N.C. 681, 577 S.E.2d 895 (2003) (internalquotation marks omitted). In order for such evidence to be
admissible, it must be sufficiently similar and close in time.
Frazier at 616, 476 S.E.2d at 300.
Here, during trial, the court held a voir dire hearing
regarding the State's proposed 404(b) evidence: testimony by C.B.,
S.H.'s cousin and defendant's nephew, of similar sexual abuse by
defendant
. The court ruled that such evidence was admissible to
show a common scheme or plan to perpetrate sexual acts upon young
boys, to show the identity of the perpetrator of the acts upon the
young boys, and to show the motive and opportunity of the defendant
to perpetrate these acts. C.B. then testified that he went to live
with defendant in 1999 and that when he was home alone with
defendant, defendant would call him into his room, tell him to
undress, perform oral sex on C.B., have C.B. perform oral sex on
him, and would ejaculate in C.B.'s mouth. C.B. also testified that
defendant would have him lie on his side on the bed, where
defendant would engage in anal intercourse with C.B., and defendant
would then have C.B. perform anal intercourse on him. C.B. stated
that he was afraid of defendant and that defendant had whooped
him before. C.B. testified that he did not recall the incident
during the cub scout camping trip that S.H. testified about.
Defendant admits that the testimony of S.H. and C.B. was
similar, but contends that several differences rendered thetestimony inadmissible. As to the camping incident, C.B. stated
that he had no recollection of it, while S.H. testified about it in
detail. C.B. stated that he was afraid of defendant and that he
had whooped C.B. before, while S.H. stated that defendant had
never physically harmed him. S.H. stated that defendant was
normally dressed when he called him into his room, while C.B.
stated that defendant was usually already naked when he called him
in. C.B. described anal intercourse in signficantly greater detail
than S.H. and described complaining of the pain and defendant
ignoring the complaints.
Defendant cites State v. White in support of his argument that
the acts related by the two boys were so dissimilar as to render
the testimony inadmissible. 135 N.C. App. 349, 520 S.E.2d 70
(1999). In White, defendant was charged with raping a nine-year-
old neighbor at knife-point, and the Court concluded that evidence
that the defendant had performed cunnilingus on a four-year-old
girl was improperly admitted under Rule 404(b). Id. at 353, 520
S.E.2d
at 74. The Court explained:
Except for the fact that both incidents
involve young females who were allegedly
assaulted in their own homes, there are few
points of similarity. In the case involving
R[.]S[.], defendant is accused of breaking
into her home during the daytime at a time
when she was alone; and having forcible
vaginal intercourse with her by means of a
weapon, threats, and his superior physicalstrength. There was also evidence that the
sexual act included penetration; the victim,
R[.]S[.], who was nine years old at the time,
was upset and crying hysterically in the
aftermath of the incident. In the later
incident involving Dominique, the act
allegedly occurred at night, at a time the
four-year-old child's caretaker was present in
the home; defendant was in the child's home by
permission, watching television; there was no
evidence of the use of a deadly weapon or
threats to Dominique; the sexual act alleged
was cunnilingus; the child did not mention the
act after it occurred, and was apparently
laughing and happy when her caretaker saw her
after the alleged incident . . . .
Id
. The Court went on to State that, [w]hen the features of the
. . . act offered under Rule 404(b) are dissimilar from those of
the offense with which the defendant is currently charged, such
evidence lacks probative value. Id. at 354, 520 S.E.2d
at 73
.
However, we conclude that here the similarities are sufficient to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 404(b).
Here, the evidence showed that both victims were relatives of
the defendant, were about the same age, and were sexually assaulted
when defendant was alone with them while they were in his custody
or care. Defendant would instruct both boys to take off their
clothes and would perform oral sex on them and have them perform
oral sex on him. Defendant masturbated in front of both boys and
would also have both boys taste or swallow his ejaculate.
Defendant told both boys to lie on their side on his bed and wouldengage in anal intercourse with them and he directed them to
perform anal sex on him. Both boys reported being scared of
defendant and did not report the abuse until later when they were
physically away from him. Thus, unlike White, where the Court
found few similarities between the acts, here there are numerous
similarities. The variations noted by defendant are not
differences like those in White, and are far outweighed by the
similarities. It is not necessary that the similarities between
the two situations rise to the level of the unique and bizarre.
State v. Aldridge, 139 N.C. App. 706, 714, 534 S.E.2d 629, 635,
disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 269, 546 S.E.2d 114 (2000). We
conclude that the evidence was properly admitted to show a common
scheme or plan under Rule 404(b).
Defendant also argues that even if the evidence was properly
admitted under Rule 404(b), it should have been excluded under Rule
403. Rule 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 403 (2004). It is
well-established that this determination is within the sound
discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., State v. Williamson, 146
N.C. App. 325, 334, 553 S.E.2d 54, 61 (2001). Because defendant
has failed to show an abuse of discretion, we overrule this
assignment of error. No error.
Judges STEELMAN and JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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