IN RE:
A.G.,
a minor child
and
J.G.,
a minor child
Lee County
Nos. 03-J-23; 03-J-24
Richard Croutharmel, for respondent-appellant mother.
Terry W. Alford, for respondent-appellant father.
Beverly D. Basden, P.C., by Beverly D. Basden, for Lee County
Department of Social Services, petitioner-appellees.
Nelson Mullins Riley & Scarborough, by Christopher M. Kindel,
for Guardian ad Litem Maite Lamberri-Wilson, petitioner-
appellees.
JACKSON, Judge.
Respondent mother is the parent of two minor children, A.G.
and J.G. Respondent father is the parent of A.G. On 26 March
2003, the Lee County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) received
a report that A.G. and J.G.'s home was unsanitary and that the
children came to school dirty with unclean clothes. At the time of
the report, A.G. was six years old and J.G. was eleven years old.
DSS investigated the report on 28 March 2003 and found thechildren's home to be filthy, with cockroaches crawling throughout
the kitchen, and dirty dishes, trash, and dirty clothes throughout
the house. DSS informed respondents that the home needed to be
cleaned up within three days. The family failed to comply with the
recommendations, and DSS remained involved with the family in
attempts to remedy the living conditions. While visiting the home
on 8 April 2003, a DSS social worker and a Sanford Building
Inspector identified several fire hazards in the home and found a
thick layer of raw sewage in the backyard. Respondent mother
corrected the fire hazards, but failed to correct the problem
leading to the raw sewage leakage.
On 11 April 2003, DSS substantiated the case for neglect for
injurious environment. DSS worked with respondents throughout
April 2003, and respondents placed the children in relatives' homes
while attempting to remedy the situation. At one point respondent
mother and her children went to a shelter, but later were asked to
leave due to respondent mother's failing to follow the rules.
While working with the family, DSS learned that respondent mother
previously had been receiving daily treatments of Methadone for a
prior addiction to painkillers. DSS ordered respondent mother to
take a drug test, which she initially refused to do. On 29 April
2003, a plumber was sent to respondents' home to inspect its
condition, and he determined the conditions of the backyard were
unsafe for the workers to perform necessary work. At this point
there was no electricity or water in the home. Respondent mother
was unable to obtain subsidized housing due to a prior felonyconviction, and respondent father submitted an application for
subsidized housing, and awaited a determination.
On 30 April 2003, A.G. and J.G. were removed from respondents'
care and placed in a foster home in the custody of DSS. The
children were adjudicated as neglected as to all parents on 9
September 2003.
(See footnote 1)
At the adjudication, the court found that both
parents had been asked to complete parenting classes, provide safe
and affordable housing, and that respondent mother had been asked
to remain drug free and submit to random drug testing. Both
respondents failed to comply with the plan, and respondent mother
tested positive for prescription drugs for which she was unable to
produce a prescription on 15 September 2003 .
At a review hearing on 23 September 2003, the court admitted
into evidence reports from DSS and the children's guardian ad
litem, and found that the parents had made no reasonable efforts to
comply with the plan. The court found that it would be in the
children's best interests for DSS to be relieved of reunification
efforts with respect to respondents. At a 21 October 2003
permanency planning hearing, the court ordered the permanent plan
for the children to be adoption.
Motions to terminate respondents' parental rights as to both
children were filed on 12 December 2003. The trial court found
grounds to terminate respondent mother's parental rights on thebasis of neglect, pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes,
section 7B-1111(a)(1), and dependency, pursuant to North Carolina
General Statutes, section 7B-1111(a)(6). The trial court found
grounds to terminate respondent father's parental rights on the
basis of failure to pay child support, pursuant to North Carolina
General Statutes, section 7B-1111(a)(3), failure to provide
substantial financial support or consistent care, pursuant to North
Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-1111(a)(5d), and dependency,
pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-1111(a)(6).
The trial court determined it was in the best interests of the
minor children to terminate respondents' parental rights. The
order terminating both respondents' parental rights was filed on 9
June 2004, following four days of hearings. From this order,
respondents appeal.
Respondent mother first asserts the trial court erred in
failing to appoint a guardian ad litem for her after petitioner DSS
alleged dependency in its termination of parental rights petition.
She argues that by accepting into evidence the testimony and
evidence regarding her history of drug use and opinions regarding
the condition of her home, the trial court should have recognized
that she had a mental illness and thus, sua sponte, appointed a
guardian ad litem to represent her.
Respondent mother specifically argues that evidence presented
regarding her drug abuse, and the court's findings of fact,
indicate that the court and DSS felt that her inability to care for
her children primarily was a result of her drug abuse. She alsoargues that the court should have recognized that her testimony
itself was a result of mental illness. Respondent mother argues
that any individual who cannot keep a house clean enough to live
in, and who feels that a house with roaches, trash, holes in the
floor, and raw sewage in the yard is not as dirty as DSS would have
the court believe, obviously must have some sort of mental illness.
In North Carolina, a trial court may terminate a parent's
parental rights if
the parent is incapable of providing for the
proper care and supervision of the juvenile,
such that the juvenile is a dependent juvenile
. . . and that there is a reasonable
probability that such incapability will
continue for the foreseeable future.
Incapability . . . may be the result of
substance abuse, mental retardation, mental
illness, organic brain syndrome, or any other
cause or condition that renders the parent
unable or unavailable to parent the juvenile
and the parent lacks an appropriate
alternative child care arrangement
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(6) (2004). Our statutes also provide
that a parent shall have a guardian ad litem appointed for them
[w]here it is alleged that a parent's rights
should be terminated pursuant to [North
Carolina General Statutes, section]
7B-1111(6), and the incapability to provide
proper care and supervision pursuant to that
provision is the result of substance abuse, .
. . mental illness, . . . or another similar
cause or condition.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1101(1) (2004) (emphasis added). In In re
T.W., this court held that in determining when a guardian ad litem
should be appointed for a parent, “'it is the use of the term
“incapable” which triggers the requirement of [North Carolina
General Statutes, section] 7B-1101 for the appointment of aguardian ad litem.'” In re T.W., __ N.C. App. __, __, 617 S.E.2d
702, 705-06 (2005) (quoting In re B.M., 168 N.C. App. 350, 357, 607
S.E.2d 698, 703 (2005)). In a case in which a guardian ad litem
should have been appointed, a trial court's failure to appoint one
“'requires reversal of the order terminating parental rights,
remand for appointment of a guardian ad litem, and a new trial.'”
Id. at __, 617 S.E.2d at 706 (quoting In re B.M., 168 N.C. App. at
357, 607 S.E.2d at 702).
We previously have held that a guardian ad litem is required
to be appointed for a parent only when it is alleged in the
petition that the termination is based upon dependency that is the
result of substance abuse, mental retardation, mental illness,
organic brain syndrome, or other similar cause or condition. In re
J.D., 164 N.C. App. 176, 605 S.E.2d 643, disc. review denied, 358
N.C. 732, 601 S.E.2d 531 (2004); In re Estes, 157 N.C. App. 513,
579 S.E.2d 496, disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 459, 585 S.E.2d 390
(2003). We also have held that even though a petition or a
termination order may not specifically reference North Carolina
General Statutes, section 7B-1101(6), when the trial court allows
evidence to be presented regarding the parent's mental illness and
substance abuse, and the adverse effect on the parent's ability to
care for their children, the parent may be entitled to have a
guardian ad litem appointed. In re T.W., __ N.C. App. at __, 617
S.E.2d at 706; In re B.M., 168 N.C. App. at 358-59, 607 S.E.2d at
704. In the instant case, DSS's motions for termination of the
parental rights stated that
The parents are incapable of providing for the
proper care and supervision of the minor
[children], such that the [children are]
dependent juvenile[s] within the meaning of
G.S. 7B-101, and that there is a reasonable
probability that such incapacity will continue
for the foreseeable future. Neither parent
has established a residence for the minor
[children]. Neither parent has maintained the
same residence for a significant period of
time since the removal of the [children] from
the home.
DSS's motions made no statement that respondent mother's parental
rights should be terminated based on her drug history or present
mental condition, or that she was incapable of caring for her
children as a result of drug abuse or mental illness. Further, at
no point during the hearings did respondent mother request a
guardian ad litem or present evidence showing that she had any type
of mental illness. Cf. In re T.W., __ N.C. App. at __, 617 S.E.2d
at 706 (respondent specifically petitioned the trial court for
appointment of guardian ad litem based upon her mental illness, and
the trial court erred in not appointing one when it considered her
mental illness as a factor in deciding to terminate her parental
rights).
In the instant case, the motion to terminate parental rights
neither alleged respondent mother was incapable of caring for her
minor children due to mental illness or substance abuse, nor cited
North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-1111(a)(6). With
respect to respondent mother, the motion alleged grounds for
termination based upon neglect, failure to pay a portion of thecost of care for the children, and dependency. However, none of
the allegations in the motion tended to show that respondent was
incapable of providing care for the children based on mental
illness or substance abuse. While the trial court did allow
evidence to be presented regarding the mother's drug history, we do
not find that the evidence of her drug history and the children's
neglect or dependency “were so intertwined at times as to make
separation of the two virtually, if not, impossible.” In re J.D.,
164 N.C. App. at 182, 605 S.E.2d at 646. Therefore, the trial
court did not err by failing to appoint a guardian ad litem for
respondent for the hearing associated with the motion to terminate
parental rights. See, In re O.C., __ N.C. App. __, 615 S.E.2d 391,
disc. review denied, __ N.C.__, __ S.E.2d __ (2005).
Because the petition to terminate respondent mother's parental
rights did not allege that the children were dependent due to her
inability to care for the children as a result of substance abuse,
mental illness, or some other debilitating condition, we hold the
trial court was not required to appoint a guardian ad litem. See,
id. at __, 615 S.E.2d at 394.
Respondents next argue the trial court committed reversible
error by taking the children's testimony in-chambers and by denying
respondent father an opportunity to question the children. The
trial court questioned the children in-chambers, and permitted
respondents' attorneys to be present but not to question the
children. Following the questioning in-chambers, the trial courtbriefly summarized for the record the substance of the children's
testimony, and stated
COURT: Let the record reflect that the
Court did not allow any counsel,
although they all were present, to
ask any questions. The Court was
the only one who asked questions of
the children.
Counsel for respondents requested the opportunity to ask questions
of the children but were prohibited from doing so and did not
receive answers to the questions they would have posed had they
been afforded the opportunity. There is no indication that counsel
for respondents proposed specific questions for the children to the
Court prior to the in camera questioning.
Our courts consistently have held that in a civil action, such
as a termination of parental rights hearing, a party has a “'right
to be present, to testify, and to confront witnesses subject to
“due limitations.”'” In re D.R., __ N.C. App. __, __, 616 S.E.2d
300, 303 (2005) (quoting In re Faircloth, 153 N.C. App. 565, 573,
571 S.E.2d 65, 71 (2002)). Cases involving children often involve
particularly sensitive issues, and our courts have recognized that
in many instances it may be helpful for the
court to talk to the child whose welfare is so
vitally affected by the decision, yet the
tradition of our courts is that their hearings
shall be open. . . .
Without doubt the court may question a
child in open court in a custody proceeding
but it can do so privately only by consent of
the parties.
Raper v. Berrier, 246 N.C. 193, 195, 97 S.E.2d 782, 784 (1957)
(emphasis added); see Cox v. Cox, 133 N.C. App. 221, 227, 515S.E.2d 61, 66 (1999). The presence of parties' counsel during an
in-chambers interview of a child “eliminates any prejudice to [the
parties] that might have occurred had [the parties'] attorneys not
been present in the trial judge's chambers.” Cox, 133 N.C. App. at
227, 515 S.E.2d at 66. “The attorneys' presence adequately
protects the parties' rights and interests.” Id.
In order for respondents to prevail on this issue on appeal,
they “must not only show error, but also that the error is material
and prejudicial, amounting to a denial of a substantial right and
that a different result would have likely ensued.” Cook v.
Southern Bonded, Inc., 82 N.C. App. 277, 281, 346 S.E.2d 168, 171
(1986) (citing Sisson v. Royster, 228 N.C. 298, 301, 45 S.E.2d 351,
354 (1947)); see also In re Parker, 90 N.C. App. 423, 432, 368
S.E.2d 879, 885 (1988) (applying principle in juvenile case). In
the instant case, respondents have failed to demonstrate that they
were prejudiced in any manner by the trial court's refusal to
permit their attorneys to question the children.
Respondents liken their case to that in Cook v. Cook, 5 N.C.
App. 652, 169 S.E.2d 29 (1969), in which the trial court, over the
parties' objection, examined the children in-chambers with the
parties' attorneys present. This Court held that the trial court
erred in hearing the children's testimony in camera over the
parties' objection. This Court explained that “'[w]ithout doubt
the court may question a child in open court in a custody
proceeding but it can do so privately only by consent of theparties.'” Id. at 654, 169 S.E.2d at 31 (quoting Raper, 246 N.C.
at 195, 97 S.E.2d at 784).
The present case is distinguishable from Cook, in that neither
party objected to the trial court's questioning of the children in
camera. Furthermore, counsel for both parties were present during
the in camera questioning, thus distinguishing this case from
Raper, 246 N.C. 193, 97 S.E.2d 784 (holding the trial court erred
because counsel was not present when it questioned the children in-
chambers). Respondents merely objected to the trial court's
refusal to allow the attorneys to question the children during the
in camera hearing. This issue was not raised or addressed in Cook,
thus Cook is not controlling with respect to the instant case.
Based on the facts of the case before us, we hold the
reasoning applied in Cox, to be dispositive. In Cox, counsel
objected to the trial court's decision to interview the children
in-chambers and specifically suggested that the judge question the
children in the courtroom, but close court for their testimony.
Id. at 227, 515 S.E.2d at 66. The trial court denied the request,
but allowed both parties' attorneys to be present in-chambers for
the questioning. Id. On appeal, we held that even though the
trial court erred in interviewing the children in camera over the
parties' objection, such error did not constitute reversible error
per se. Id. at 227, 515 S.E.2d at 66. Rather, we required the
appellant to demonstrate how she was prejudiced as a result of the
in camera questioning. Id. We held that the presence of the
parties' attorneys during the in camera questioning “eliminate[d]any prejudice to defendant that might have occurred had defendant's
attorneys not been present in the trial judge's chambers[,]” and
thus the parties' rights and interests were adequately protected.
Id.
We recognize that Cox is distinguishable from the instant case
in that the attorneys in Cox were not seeking to question the
children in-chambers, but rather to have the judge question them in
open court. However, the holding in Cox ultimately relies on
defense counsel's failure to demonstrate how the client was
prejudiced as a result of the in camera questioning. See id. In
the case sub judice, respondents do not attempt to show how they
were prejudiced as a result of the trial court's refusal to allow
the attorneys to question the children or how the outcome would
have been different had they been allowed to do so. Thus, as
respondents have failed to demonstrate prejudice, we hold
respondents' argument on this issue to be without merit.
Respondent mother next argues the trial court lacked
sufficient evidence and findings of fact to support the termination
of her parental rights based upon neglect and dependency. In
addition, both respondents argue that the trial court's conclusions
of law were not supported by competent evidence or findings of
fact, and thus the trial court abused its discretion in terminating
their parental rights.
A termination of parental rights proceeding consists of two
stages: the adjudicatory stage and the dispositional stage. In re
Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 610, 543 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2001). During the adjudicatory stage, the petitioner (DSS in this case)
has the burden of proving by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
that a statutory ground for termination exists. Id. North Carolina
General Statutes, section 7B-1111 (2004) sets forth the grounds for
termination of parental rights. “This Court reviews the
adjudicatory phase to determine whether the trial court's findings
of fact are supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence,
and, if so, whether these findings in turn support the trial
court's conclusions of law.” In re Mills, 152 N.C. App. 1, 6, 567
S.E.2d 166, 169 (2002). Findings of fact which are supported by
competent evidence are binding on appeal, even where contradictory
evidence may exist. Id.
If the trial court finds that one or more grounds for
termination exists, the process then moves to the disposition stage
in which the trial court must determine whether it is in the best
interests of the child to terminate the parental rights. In re
Pierce, 356 N.C. 68, 75, 565 S.E.2d 81, 86 (2002). “The standard
for review in termination of parental rights cases is whether the
court's 'findings of fact are based upon clear, cogent and
convincing evidence' and whether the 'findings support the
conclusions of law.'” In re Huff, 140 N.C. App. 288, 291, 536
S.E.2d 838, 840 (2000) (quoting In re Allred, 122 N.C. App. 561,
565, 471 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1996)), disc. review denied, 353 N.C. 374,
547 S.E.2d 9 (2001).
North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-1111 provides
that: (a) The court may terminate the parental
rights upon a finding of one or more of the
following:
(1) The parent has abused or neglected the
juvenile. The juvenile shall be deemed to
be abused or neglected if the court finds
the juvenile to be an abused juvenile
within the meaning of G.S. 7B-101 or a
neglected juvenile within the meaning of
G.S. 7B-101.
. . . .
(3) The juvenile has been placed in the
custody of a county department of social
services, a licensed child-placing
agency, a child-caring institution, or a
foster home, and the parent, for a
continuous period of six months next
preceding the filing of the petition or
motion, has willfully failed for such
period to pay a reasonable portion of the
cost of care for the juvenile although
physically and financially able to do so.
. . . .
(5) The father of a juvenile born out of
wedlock has not, prior to the filing of a
petition or motion to terminate parental
rights:
. . . .
d. Provided substantial financial
support or consistent care with
respect to the juvenile and
mother.
(6) That the parent is incapable of providing
for the proper care and supervision of
the juvenile, such that the juvenile is a
dependent juvenile within the meaning of
G.S. 7B-101, and that there is a
reasonable probability that such
incapability will continue for the
foreseeable future. Incapability under
this subdivision may be the result of
substance abuse, mental retardation,
mental illness, organic brain syndrome,
or any other cause or condition thatrenders the parent unable or unavailable
to parent the juvenile and the parent
lacks an appropriate alternative child
care arrangement.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 (2004). A “neglected juvenile,” as set
forth in North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-1111(a)(1), is
defined as
A juvenile who does not receive
proper care, supervision, or
discipline from the juvenile's
parent, guardian, custodian, or
caretaker; or who has been
abandoned; or who is not provided
necessary medical care; or who is
not provided necessary remedial
care; or who lives in an environment
injurious to the juvenile's welfare;
or who has been placed for care or
adoption in violation of law.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (2004). “A finding of neglect
sufficient to terminate parental rights must be based on evidence
showing neglect at the time of the termination proceeding.” In re
Young, 346 N.C. 244, 248, 485 S.E.2d 612, 615 (1997) (citation
omitted).
Once a petitioner has met its burden of proving that at least
one of the statutory grounds to terminate parental rights exists,
the trial court then moves to the disposition phase and must
consider whether termination is in the best interests of the child.
In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. at 610, 543 S.E.2d at 908. A
court's finding of one statutory ground for termination, if
supported by competent evidence, will support an order for
termination of parental rights. In re Nolen, 117 N.C. App. 693,
700, 453 S.E.2d 220, 225 (1995). The trial court's decision toterminate parental rights is reviewed by an abuse of discretion
standard. In re Brim, 139 N.C. App. 733, 745, 535 S.E.2d 367, 374
(2000).
In the instant case, the trial court made numerous findings of
fact concerning respondents' failure to comply with DSS' plans,
failure to provide a safe and stable home, and failure to provide
financially for their children. The court made its findings of
fact after hearing testimony from respondents, DSS workers, the
father of one of respondent mother's other children, the children's
teachers, the foster parents, respondent father's employer, and the
children's guardian ad litem. The court also admitted into
evidence respondents' case plans, various photographs of the
children, respondent father's acknowledgment of paternity, and the
guardian ad litem's report which had been prepared for the
termination hearing. Based upon this evidence, the court made
numerous findings of fact, including:
23. Both Mr. Turner and Kathryn [G] were
asked by Lee County Department of Social
Services to find suitable housing for the
children and take parenting classes.
Because of the admission of prescription
drug abuse, Ms. [G] was required to take
a drug test. Although she did not at
first comply, she did finally take the
test which came back positive. She
refused to take any additional tests.
. . . .
36. Neither Ms. [G] nor Mr. Turner has
established any residence on their own
since the children were removed in April
2003. Mr. Turner has lived with various
relatives and at this time is living in a
truck beside of James' Fish House. Mr.
Turner has applied for subsidized housingbut has not yet received an apartment.
Each time he appeared in court for the
last several sessions he has indicated
that he would be moving in immediately,
but never has been able to move in to a
home. . . .
37. Ms. [G] never obtained any stable
residence until January 30, 2004 when she
married Tommy Roy [B]. He lives in a
trailer that is paid for on family land.
Ms. [G] testified that he has a life
estate in the land where the trailer is
placed. This home only has two bedrooms
and Ms. [G] stated that each child could
have a bedroom and she and her husband
would sleep on the couch. Ms. [G]
testified that the house was clean but
did not produce any pictures.
38. Neither Kathyrn [G] nor John Turner
attended any parenting classes.
. . . .
45. The Court finds that John Turner . . .
and Kathryn [G] all resided in the
residence . . . at the time that the home
was found to be unlivable. None of the
parents made a significant effort to
correct the problems at the house or to
provide other suitable housing.
. . . .
48. The Court finds that throughout the prior
orders it was found that Kathryn [G] and
John Turner were not complying with the
requests of [DSS].
49. The Court finds that the testimony of
Kathryn [G] was not credible as it
relates to the cleanliness of [J.G.] or
the house. The Court finds that Kathryn
[G] has never provided suitable housing
for the children since they entered the
custody of [DSS].
50. The Court finds that both Kathyrn [G] and
John Turner saw nothing wrong with living
in the house with the children in the
condition described by [DSS]. . . .
51. There is a great likelihood that the
conditions in which the children were
forced to live with roaches, filth and
lack of attention would continue if the
children were returned to either parent
because neither admits that there was
anything wrong with the way they were
living.
52. There is a great likelihood that the
conditions in which the children were
forced to live without adequate housing
would continue if the children were
returned to either parent because no
parent has established suitable housing
on their own since the children were
taken from their care.
. . . .
61. The Court finds as a fact that grounds
for termination of parental rights of
respondent mother exist in that the
mother has neglected the children
resulting in their removal as defined in
[N.C. Gen. Stat. §] 7B-101 and that the
circumstances that necessitated the
juvenile's removal has [sic] not been
corrected . . . .
62. The Court finds as a fact that grounds
for termination of parental rights of
respondent father of [A.G.], John Turner,
exist in that the father has failed to
pay a reasonable portion for care for the
child, [A.G.], although financially and
physically able to do so. The Court
further finds that the father of the
juvenile [A.G.] has not provided
substantial financial support or
consistent care with respect to the
juvenile. . . .
. . . .
64. The Court finds that reasonable efforts
have not been made by Kathryn [G] [or]
John Turner . . . to accomplish
reunification.
. . . .
66. The Court finds that in the best interest
of the juveniles that the respondent
mother's parental rights be terminated as
to both juveniles and that respondent
father, John Turner's parental rights be
terminated as to [A.G.] . . . .
Because there is competent evidence in the record to support all of
the trial court's findings of fact, we hold that there was no error
with respect to the sufficiency or competency of the evidence upon
which the findings are based, and therefore the trial court's
findings of fact are conclusive on appeal.
Throughout the hearing, the trial court heard testimony and
evidence tending to show that respondent mother failed not only to
provide proper care for her children, but that she also failed to
establish a suitable, safe and stable home, and she did not comply
with any of the requests made by DSS. Based on the evidence
presented to the trial court, we hold the court's findings of fact
concerning respondent mother were supported by clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence. We also hold there was sufficient evidence
from which the trial court could find the children were neglected
as to their mother, within the meaning of North Carolina General
Statutes, section 7B-101(15), thus supporting the trial court's
order to terminate her parental rights pursuant to North Carolina
General Statutes, section 7B-1111(a)(1).
With respect to respondent father, the court heard evidence
regarding his failure to maintain stable housing, and his failure
to pay any portion of the costs of care for A.G. while she was in
the custody of DSS. Based upon the evidence presented to the trial
court, we hold the court's findings of fact were supported byclear, cogent, and convincing evidence. We also hold there was
sufficient evidence from which the trial court could find that A.G.
was dependent as to her father, within the meaning of North
Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-101(9), thus supporting the
trial court's order to terminate his parental rights pursuant to
North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-1111(a)(6). We further
hold that there was sufficient evidence to support the trial
court's termination of his parental rights pursuant to North
Carolina General Statutes, sections 7B-1111(a)(3) and (5)d, in that
evidence was presented showing that respondent father was employed
throughout the year in which A.G. was in DSS' custody and that he
failed to pay any costs of her care until just prior to the
termination hearing.
After making its findings of fact, the trial court concluded
as a matter of law, that based on its findings of fact, it would be
in the best interest of the children that respondents' parental
rights be terminated. As the trial court's findings of fact are
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, and they are
sufficient to establish that at least one statutory ground for
termination of parental rights exists as to each respondent, we
therefore hold the trial court properly ordered the termination of
respondents' parental rights. Further, as the trial court properly
reviewed all of the evidence and testimony presented before it, and
determined that it would be in the children's best interest that
respondents' parental rights be terminated, we hold the trial courtdid not abuse its discretion in ordering the termination of
respondents' parental rights.
Affirmed.
Judges HUDSON and STEELMAN concur.
Report per Rule 30 (e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***