IN THE MATTER OF: B. J. Rutherford County &nbs
p;
No. 03 J 106
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Caroline Farmer, for the State.
Moshera H. Mohamed, for defendant-appellant.
WYNN, Judge.
Under North Carolina General Statute section 7B-2702(c), a
juvenile court may “require that the parent [of the juvenile]
undergo . . . evaluation . . . directed toward remedying behaviors
or conditions that led to or contributed to the juvenile's
adjudication[.]” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2702(c) (2004). In this
case, the juvenile's father argues that the trial court failed to
make findings of fact to support its order requiring him to undergo
a substance abuse assessment. We agree with the father's
contention and therefore reverse that part of the trial court's
order requiring the father to undergo substance abuse assessment.
The State presented evidence to show that on 18 October 2003,
the juvenile offender in this matter drove through a license check
without a driver's license. When the police officer asked the
juvenile why he was driving the car without a driver's license, thejuvenile responded, “because [he] wanted to.” The juvenile also
told the police officer that his father did not know he had the
car. The juvenile had previously been cited for driving without a
driver's license on 30 July 2003.
A Juvenile Summons and a Notice of Hearing was served on the
juvenile and the juvenile's father on 3 November 2003, and a
dispositional hearing was held in District Court, Rutherford County
on 22 December 2003. At the hearing, the juvenile stated through
his counsel that his uncle was riding with him when he was stopped
on 30 July, and that his brother was riding with him when he was
stopped on 18 October. The trial judge asked the juvenile whether
the juvenile's uncle or brother had been drinking prior to the
juvenile driving on either occasion, and the juvenile responded,
“No.”
The juvenile's father was present at the dispositional
hearing. The trial judge stated that she remembered the juvenile's
father appearing before the court previously relating to a driving
under the influence charge. When the trial judge asked the
juvenile's father about the prior court appearance, the juvenile's
father, who spoke and understood limited English, responded through
an interpreter that he did not understand the charges in that case
but that he did have to pay money because he had been involved in
a car accident.
The juvenile admitted to two occasions of operating a motor
vehicle without a license and was sentenced to one year supervised
probation and sixty-five hours of community service. In asupplemental dispositional order entered 22 December 2003, the
trial judge ordered the juvenile's father to attend parenting
classes, obtain a substance abuse assessment, and secure all
vehicle keys to prevent the juvenile from gaining possession of
them. The juvenile's father appeals to this Court under North
Carolina General Statute section 7B-2604(a) from that part of the
trial court's order requiring him to obtain a substance abuse
assessment. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2604(a) (2004) (stating “[a]n
appeal may be taken by the juvenile, the juvenile's parent,
guardian, or custodian, a county, or the State.”).
On appeal, the juvenile's father argues there were no findings
of fact or appropriate conclusions of law to support that portion
of the trial court's order requiring him to obtain a substance
abuse assessment. We agree.
Here, the trial court's order requiring the juvenile's father
to obtain a substance abuse assessment is a statutorily permissible
disposition under North Carolina General Statute section 7B-2702(c)
(stating that “the court may determine whether the best interests
of the juvenile require that the parent undergo . . . evaluation .
. . directed toward remedying behaviors or conditions that led to
or contributed to the juvenile's adjudication[.]”) N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-2702(c). However, the trial court's order does not contain
any findings of fact or conclusions of law to support this
disposition. We can only discern from the parties' briefs on
appeal and the trial transcript that the basis of this portion of
the trial court's order is the trial judge's recollection of aprevious court appearance by the juvenile's father regarding an
alleged driving under the influence charge. The following exchange
occurred between the trial judge and the juvenile's counsel at the
dispositional hearing:
BY THE COURT: I don't believe that. I've got
a good memory. And if I had to guess, I would
say the reason [the juvenile] was driving is
because somebody was drinking and was not able
to drive.
BY MR. SPARROW: That's not the information I
had, Your Honor. The information that I had
was that this was an occasion of the juvenile
taking the car away without the ---
BY THE COURT: Well, I'm not saying that the
father had anything to do with that. But ---
BY MR. SPARROW: And as far as we know, there
is no history of alcohol or drug use.
BY THE COURT: Not with him, but ---
Based on these comments, the trial judge did not believe that the
father's drinking was related to the juvenile's driving without a
license. Moreover, the predisposition report relating to the
juvenile, which the trial court incorporated by reference in its 22
December 2003 order, finds that “No family member (including
siblings) has been convicted/adjudicated for criminal acts.”
Because the trial court's dispositional order contains no findings
of fact or conclusions of law to support the trial court's order
for the juvenile's father to obtain a substance abuse assessment,
and there is no evidence in the record to support such an order, we
vacate that portion of the trial court's order requiring the
juvenile's father to obtain a substance abuse assessment. Vacated in part.
Judges STEELMAN and LEWIS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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