IN RE: P.L.M.E. Gaston County
No. 01 J 346
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
June Ferrell, for the State.
David Childers for juvenile-appellant.
CALABRIA, Judge.
P.L.M.E. (“juvenile”) appeals from orders entered 18 October
2004 revoking her probation and imposing a Level Three disposition
committing her to the Department of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention for placement in a Youth Development Center
for an indefinite term not exceeding six months. We find no error.
Juvenile was adjudicated delinquent on 14 October 2002 for
committing the offenses of assault with a deadly weapon, injury to
real property and injury to personal property and was placed on
probation for twelve months. The conditions of her probation were
to attend school regularly, cooperate with any placement, comply
with any recommendations for counseling and/or treatment, and not
violate any laws.
A motion for review filed 23 February 2004 charged juvenilewith violating the conditions of her probation “on or about the
time period between August 18, 2004 to January 21, 2004 . . . by
being absent or suspended from school[.]” The motion further
alleged that “on January 22, 2004 and February 11, 2004 she
violated conditions of probation by being discharged from the
Shining Star Group Home and BWC Group Home because of her non
compliant behavior.”
In a delinquency petition filed in Mecklenburg County District
Court on 4 February 2004, juvenile was charged with assaulting a
government officer on 9 December 2003. On 24 February 2004,
juvenile admitted to the allegation in the petition and the cause
was transferred to Gaston County for disposition. A second motion
for review filed in Gaston County District Court on 22 April 2004
charged juvenile with breaching the probationary condition of “not
violating any laws” by committing the 9 December 2003 assault on a
government officer.
After a hearing on the two motions for review, the court
entered a “Juvenile Order” with the following findings of fact:
That on or about November 24, 2003, the
juvenile was suspended from school for ten
days . . . for poor behavior, that being in
violation of her probation of July 14, 2003[;]
and on January 18, 2004 the juvenile was
suspended . . . for three days for poor
behavior in violation of the probationary
disposition of July 14, 2003.
Further, [she] was discharged from Shining
Star Group Home . . . due to non-compliant
behavior on or about January 22, 2004 in
violation of the terms of her probation “that
she cooperate with placement as arranged
through Pathways Mental Health” in that that
placement was arranged and she was placedthere through Pathways Mental Health.
The Court further finds that the juvenile
violated that same term and condition of her
probation by being discharged from the BWC
Group Home . . . for non-compliant behavior on
February 11, 2004, that also being a placement
arranged by and through Pathways Mental
Health.
The Court finds beyond a reasonable doubt,
based upon the above findings that she
violated the terms and conditions of her
probation entered on July 14, 2003.
Regarding the allegation in the motion for review filed 22 April
2004, the court found that juvenile “admitted voluntarily pursuant
to a Transcript of Admission in Mecklenburg County on February 24,
2004 to [a]ssault on a [g]overnment [o]fficial occurring on
December 9, 2003,” and further found “beyond a reasonable doubt
that the adjudication for [a]ssault on a [g]overnment [o]fficial on
February 24, 2004 violates her probation.”
In its accompanying “Disposition and Commitment Order,” the
court reiterated that it had, “beyond a reasonable doubt, found
[juvenile] in willful violation of the terms and conditions of her
probation entered July 14, 2003.” Juvenile appeals.
Juvenile argues the trial court failed to make sufficient
findings of fact on the issue of the willfulness of her probation
violations, particularly in light of her evidence that her
“psychiatric and emotional conditions negated willfulness.” Dr.
Steve Strezlecki (“Dr. Strezlecki”) performed a psychological
evaluation on juvenile on 8 March 2004, where juvenile “indicated
. . .that she had bipolar disorder.” Dr. Strezlecki found
“evidence of unusual [and] bizarre[] psychotic-like thinking,” aswell as “evidence of hypervigilance [and] paranoia,” which led
juvenile to interpret environmental stimuli “differently from what
other people may interpret.” Juvenile demonstrated further
difficulty responding to emotional stressors, leaving her “less
likely to act in a rational manner” when placed “under distress.”
As to intellectual ability, however, Dr. Strezlecki found juvenile
to have “almost exactly average thinking skills.” In fact, on
cross examination, Dr. Strezlecki explained that, although “someone
with a psychotic thinking pattern might be less likely to behave
rationally,” such a person “would be fully capable of behaving
rationally.”
Under the Juvenile Code, probation violation hearings are
informal dispositional proceedings. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-2501(b) (2004). To support revocation, “all that is required is
that there be competent evidence reasonably sufficient to satisfy
the judge in the exercise of a sound judicial discretion that the
defendant had, without lawful excuse, willfully violated a valid
condition of probation.” In re O'Neal, 160 N.C. App. 409, 412, 585
S.E.2d 478, 481 (quoting State v. Pratt, 21 N.C. App. 538, 540, 204
S.E.2d 906, 907 (1974)), disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 657, 590
S.E.2d 270 (2003) (emphasis added). Moreover, to revoke probation
the court need “only find by a preponderance of the evidence that
a juvenile has violated the conditions of his probation under N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-2510(e).” O'Neal, 160 N.C. App. at 412-13, 585
S.E.2d at 481. Once the State establishes such a probationary
violation, the juvenile bears the burden of demonstrating a lack ofwillfulness or a lawful excuse. See State v. Crouch, 74 N.C. App.
565, 567, 328 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1985) (citing State v. Young, 21
N.C. App. 316, 320, 204 S.E.2d 185, 187 (1974)). If the juvenile
cannot carry this burden, evidence of failure to comply may justify
a finding that the violation was willful or without lawful excuse.
Id.
The district court's findings were more than adequate to
support its revocation order. Although juvenile presented expert
testimony regarding her distorted thinking as well as her
difficulty managing emotional responses to stress, she adduced no
evidence of an inability to: (1) behave in school, (2) comply with
the rules of her group home placements, or (3) refrain from
assaulting a police officer. Likewise, she offered no evidence of
a lawful excuse for her actions. Indeed, the district court noted
that juvenile had previously admitted to delinquency under a
petition charging her with the assault on the officer. The trial
court expressly found
[T]here is a transcript of admissions . . .
signed by the juvenile herself and her
attorney in Mecklenburg County, in which she
admitted to willfully violating the terms and
conditions of North Carolina General State [§]
14-33(c)(4), that is, assault on an official
or government employee. . . . The evidence
before the Court is that...was willful[]. The
evidence before the court is that all the
allegations were willful.
Thus, in terms of her probationary transgressions, juvenile failed
to illustrate either a lack of willfulness or lawful excuse. The
court carefully assessed Dr. Strezlecki's testimony as it bore uponthe willfulness of juvenile's probationary violations and
determined that revocation of probation was in order. This
determination was made under a more rigorous than necessary “beyond
a reasonable doubt” standard. We hold the trial court did not
abuse its discretion and overrule this assignment of error.
The record on appeal contains additional assignments of error
not addressed by juvenile in her brief to this Court. Pursuant to
N.C.R. App. P. 28(b)(6)(2005), we deem them abandoned.
Affirmed.
Judges WYNN and JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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