JAMES LEROY WALLACE,
Employee,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. N.C. Industrial Commission
I.C. No. 815708
BECON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY,
Employer,
and
THE SOUTH CAROLINA INSURANCE
GUARANTY ASSOCIATION (formerly
RELIANCE NATIONAL INSURANCE
COMPANY)
Carrier,
Defendant-Appellants,
and
HARBERT YEARGIN,
Employer,
Defendant-Appellees
and
LIBERTY MUTUAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Carrier,
Defendant-Appellees
Wallace & Graham, by Edward L. Pauley and Cathy A. Williams,
for plaintiff-appellee.
Hedrick Eatman Gardner & Kincheloe, L.L.P., by C. J. Childers,
for Becon Construction Company and the South Carolina
Insurance Company (formerly Reliance National Insurance
Company), defendant-appellants.
Morris York Williams Surles & Barringer, L.L.P., by John F.
Morris and Christopher B. Rawls, for Harbert Yeargin and
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, defendant-appellees.
JACKSON, Judge.
James L. Wallace (plaintiff) worked in the construction and
maintenance field as a welder and pipe fitter for most of his adult
life. For the last twenty-two years of his career, he worked with
Harbert Yeargin (defendant-appellee), which became Becon
Construction Company in 1997 (Becon). Plaintiff worked for Becon
from 31 March until 11 August 1997. At all times while plaintiff
was employed with both Harbert Yeargin and Becon, his work included
removing and replacing insulation around pipes, removing asbestos,
and working during plant shutdowns when he and others performed
maintenance at the plant. Plaintiff and other employees of Becon
testified that they knew what asbestos looked like, and that they
were exposed to it on a regular basis during their employment with
both employers.
In July 1997, plaintiff began coughing up blood and consulted
a pulmonologist. A bronchoscopy was performed and the biopsy
revealed plaintiff had lung cancer. On 12 August 1997, plaintiff
underwent a right thoracotomy and right pneumonectomy. The lung
tissue removed from plaintiff's lungs was examined and he was
diagnosed as having large cell carcinoma of the lung with the
presence of asbestos bodies. Following his surgery, plaintiffreturned home, where he has remained under the constant care of his
wife and adult daughter. Since his diagnosis, he has been unable
to work due to his medical condition. During the years after his
initial surgery in 1997, plaintiff had a recurrence of his cancer
and was diagnosed with herpes zoster, or shingles.
On 27 February 1998, plaintiff filed a Form 18B with the North
Carolina Industrial Commission, alleging asbestos exposure
resulting in lung cancer and asbestosis. His claim was heard
before a Deputy Commissioner, and in an Opinion and Award filed 31
March 2003, the Deputy Commissioner denied plaintiff's claim.
Plaintiff appealed the decision to the full Commission.
The full Commission's Opinion and Award, filed 28 October
2004, reversed the decision of the Deputy Commissioner. The full
Commission found that plaintiff had acquired asbestos-linked lung
cancer, which was due to causes and conditions characteristic of
and peculiar to his employment, and at the time of his last
exposure to the conditions that significantly contributed to his
development of his compensable occupational disease, he was
employed by Becon. Plaintiff was awarded temporary total
disability compensation. In addition, Becon's insurance company
was ordered to pay all of plaintiff's medical expenses incurred as
a result of his compensable occupational disease, plaintiff's wife
was to be compensated for her attendant care services, and Becon
was ordered to pay reasonable attorney's fees to plaintiff's
counsel. From this order, Becon and its insurance company, theSouth Carolina Insurance Guaranty Association, (collectively
defendant-appellants) appeal.
Defendant-appellants raise two arguments on appeal: (1) the
Industrial Commission erred in finding that plaintiff suffers from
a compensable occupational disease; and (2) the Industrial
Commission erred in finding that plaintiff was last injuriously
exposed during his employment with Becon. We do not reach the
merits of defendant-appellants' arguments. Defendant-appellants
failed to comply with the North Carolina Rules of Appellate
Procedure, therefore we dismiss defendant-appellants' appeal. The
Rules of Appellate Procedure are mandatory, and must be
consistently applied; otherwise, the Rules become meaningless, and
an appellee is left without notice of the basis upon which an
appellate court might rule. Viar v. N.C. Dep't. of Transp., 359
N.C. 400, 402, 610 S.E.2d 360, 361 (per curiam), reh'g denied, 359
N.C. 643, 617 S.E.2d 662 (2005). '[F]ailure to follow these rules
will subject an appeal to dismissal.' Consol. Elec. Distribs.,
Inc. v. Dorsey, __ N.C. App. __, __, 613 S.E.2d 518, 520 (2005)
(quoting Steingress v. Steingress, 350 N.C. 64, 65, 511 S.E.2d 298,
299 (1999)).
Rule 28(b)(6) of our Rules of Appellate Procedure, as written
at the time defendant-appellants submitted their brief to this
court, required an appellant's brief to contain an argument section
that included:
the contentions of the appellant with respect
to each question presented. Each question
shall be separately stated. Immediately
following each question shall be a referenceto the assignments of error pertinent to the
question, identified by their numbers and by
the pages at which they appear in the printed
record on appeal. Assignments of error not
set out in the appellant's brief, or in
support of which no reason or argument is
stated or authority cited, will be taken as
abandoned.
The body of the argument shall contain
citations of the authorities upon which the
appellant relies.
N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6), 2005 Ann. R. (N.C.) 175, 303 (emphasis
added). In the argument section of defendant-appellants' brief,
they properly set out two questions for our review, followed by the
appropriate assignments of error and references to pages in the
record. However, the body of each of defendant-appellants'
arguments fails to contain citations of the authorities upon which
the appellant relies. N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6).
Defendant-appellants' first argument states the Commission
erred in finding that plaintiff suffered from a compensable
occupational disease. Defendant-appellants do cite to two cases
regarding the Commission's obligation to make definitive findings
to determine the critical issues raised by the evidence, Harrell
v. Stevens & Co., 45 N.C. App. 197, 205, 262 S.E.2d 830, 835, disc.
review denied, 300 N.C. 196, 269 S.E.2d 623 (1980), and the
Commission's obligation to indicate that it has consider[ed] and
evaluate[d] all of the evidence, Lineback v. Wake County Bd. of
Comm'rs, 126 N.C. App. 678, 680, 486 S.E.2d 252, 254 (1997),
however neither of these cases support defendant-appellants'
argument. The body of defendant-appellants' argument regarding
this question consists of nothing more than a recitation of thetestimony and evidence presented by the various medical experts.
The cases cited do not point this Court to any specific case or
statute supporting defendant-appellants' argument that the
Commission erred in finding that plaintiff suffered from a
compensable occupational disease.
In fact, the first argument presented by defendant-appellants
asks this Court to weigh the evidence and determine the credibility
of the medical experts. In reviewing a case on appeal, this Court
'does not have the right to weigh the evidence and decide the
issue on the basis of its weight. The Court's duty goes no further
than to determine whether the record contains any evidence tending
to support the finding.' McGee v. N.C. Dep't of Revenue, 135 N.C.
App. 319, 324, 520 S.E.2d 84, 87 (1999) (quoting Anderson v.
Construction Co., 265 N.C. 431, 434, 144 S.E.2d 272, 274 (1965));
see also, Vaughn v. Insulating Servs., 165 N.C. App. 469, 472, 598
S.E.2d 629, 631, disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 75, 605 S.E.2d 150
(2004). In addition, this Court is not to judge the credibility of
a witness or the weight to be given to his testimony, as this is a
duty of the Commission alone. Vaughn, 165 N.C. App. at 472, 598
S.E.2d at 631. Therefore, it is not our place to weigh the
credibility of the experts who presented evidence in plaintiff's
case, nor may we rely on the testimony of one expert over that of
another. Our role is simply to determine whether there is
competent evidence in the record on appeal to support the
Commission's findings of fact. As defendant-appellants have failedto cite to legal authority which supports their argument, this
assignment of error is dismissed.
Defendant-appellants' second argument, without citation to any
supporting authority, states that the Commission erred in finding
that plaintiff was last injuriously exposed to harmful asbestos
during the four months he was employed by Becon. Defendant-
appellants reference regulations of the Federal Occupational Safety
and Health Administration (OSHA) and recommendations of the
National Institute of Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH),
however defendant-appellants failed to provide any citation to
these regulations and recommendations, and they failed to direct
this Court to the applicable sections of the regulations. In their
brief, defendant-appellants mention the words OSHA threshold limit
value, but fail to cite to the specific OSHA regulation and fail
to inform this Court what the actual OSHA permissible exposure
limits are. Defendant-appellants also state that [t]he National
Institute of Occupational Safety and Health set the standard for
exposure at .1 fiber per milliliter of air[,] however again,
defendant-appellants have failed to cite to the specific NIOSH
recommendations upon which defendant-appellants rely in making this
statement. In addition, defendant-appellants have failed to show
how these referenced regulations and recommendations are made
applicable to North Carolina employers.
Defendant-appellants argue that air sampling surveys done from
1989 through 1998 in the facility in which plaintiff worked show
the asbestos exposure levels were not above those permitted by OSHAregulations, and thus plaintiff could not have been exposed to
asbestos during his employment with Becon. Defendant-appellants
also argue that even if plaintiff had been exposed to asbestos
during this time, his exposure could not have aggravated his lung
cancer or alleged asbestosis.
Defendant-appellants' arguments do not present this Court with
new issues, for which no authority exists. Therefore, defendant-
appellants' brief should have included citations to relevant legal
authorities upon which their arguments are based. As defendant-
appellants have failed to cite to any legal authority upon which
their arguments rely, these assignments of error are deemed
abandoned, and defendant-appellants' appeal is dismissed. N.C. R.
App. P. 28(b)(6); Consol. Elec. Distribs., __ N.C. App. at __, 613
S.E.2d at 520.
Appeal dismissed.
Judges TYSON and SMITH concur.
Report per Rule 30 (e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***