IN RE: R.S.C. Alamance County
No. 03 J 254
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Newton G. Pritchett, Jr., for the State.
Sofie W. Hosford for juvenile-appellant.
CALABRIA, Judge.
R.S.C. (“the juvenile”) appeals from a disposition and
commitment order on the grounds that the trial court improperly
denied his motion to dismiss, committed reversible error by
committing him to detention pending appeal without making written
findings required by statute, and abused its discretion in ordering
a level three disposition. We affirm.
On 3 November 2003, the juvenile was adjudicated delinquent
for misdemeanor breaking and entering and larceny. He was also
adjudicated delinquent for possession of cocaine on 4 December
2003. The district court imposed a Level 2 disposition and placed
the juvenile on probation for twelve months on 18 March 2004. As
conditions of his probation, the juvenile was required to “remain
on good behavior” and “not violate any laws.” See N.C. Gen. Stat.§ 7B-2510(a)(1), (2) (2004). However, in a delinquency petition
dated 10 June 2004, the juvenile was charged with resisting,
delaying, and obstructing a police officer in the performance of
his official duties. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-223 (2004).
Consequently, on 15 June 2004, the juvenile's court counselor filed
a motion for review alleging he had violated the conditions of his
probation by committing the offense.
The district court held a hearing on the petition and motion
for review on 22 July 2004. The State presented evidence showing
that at approximately 2:45 a.m. on 30 April 2004, Burlington Police
Officer Josh Jones (“Jones”) observed a car “r[u]n off the road to
the left with all four wheels off the road” while making a right
turn off of Chapel Hill Road onto Trail Two. Jones activated his
blue lights to initiate a traffic stop. When the car sped away, he
activated his siren. The car ran a stop sign and turned left onto
Trail Eight. Jones pursued the car on Trail Eight across Mebane
Street until it passed through a T-shaped intersection and into the
yard of a residence on Malone Street. The car slowed down after
striking some bushes, at which point the driver and three
passengers exited the vehicle and ran, ignoring Jones's repeated
commands to stop. The empty vehicle continued moving until it
collided with the house. Jones chased the driver and apprehended
him approximately 300 yards from the accident scene. The juvenile
and the two other passengers, who fled in the opposite direction,
were caught by another officer on Chapel Hill Road.
The district court found that the juvenile resisted, delayed,and obstructed Jones by running from Jones as he pursued the
recklessly driven car, as alleged in the juvenile petition and
motion for review. Upon concluding that the juvenile had violated
his probation and was delinquent in committing this offense, the
court imposed a Level 3 disposition and ordered the juvenile
committed to a youth development center. The juvenile appeals.
In his first argument on appeal, the juvenile argues that the
district court improperly denied his motion to dismiss because
“[a]n individual may resist an illegal arrest[,]” and his flight
from Jones was insufficient to show “that [he] resisted, delayed,
and obstructed Jones in the discharge of lawful duties.” When
reviewing a motion to dismiss, we view “the evidence in the light
most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of all
reasonable inferences.” State v. Morgan, 359 N.C. 131, 161, 604
S.E.2d 886, 904 (2004) (citations omitted). If we find
“substantial evidence exists to support each essential element of
the crime charged and that [the juvenile] was the perpetrator, it
[was] proper for the trial court to [have denied] the motion.” Id.
(citations omitted). “Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.” Pruitt v. Powers, 128 N.C. App. 586, 588, 495
S.E.2d 743, 747 (1998) (citations and quotations omitted).
In the interest of his own safety, a police officer is
entitled to briefly detain the passengers of a vehicle during a
traffic stop. State v. Shearin, __ N.C. App. __, __, 612 S.E.2d
371, 378 (2005). “Although [the juvenile] had not been observedviolating any laws at the time of the stop, it is not unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution to
detain a passenger when a vehicle has been stopped due to a traffic
violation committed by the driver of the car.” State v.
Brewington, __ N.C. App. __, __, 612 S.E.2d 648, 653 (2005) (citing
Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415, 137 L. Ed. 2d 41, 48
(1997)). Moreover, an officer may undertake a brief investigatory
stop of an individual if he has a reasonable suspicion, based upon
objective facts, “that criminal activity may be afoot[.]” State v.
Pearson, 348 N.C. 272, 275, 498 S.E.2d 599, 600 (1998). “Flight
from a lawful investigatory stop may provide probable cause to
arrest an individual” for resisting, delaying, or obstructing an
officer's performance of his official duties, in violation of N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-223. State v. Swift, 105 N.C. App. 550, 554, 414
S.E.2d 65, 68 (1992) (citation omitted).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State,
Jones had valid grounds to detain the juvenile pursuant to the
traffic stop and to undertake a brief investigatory stop of the
juvenile based on a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
Because Jones had valid grounds to detain the juvenile and
substantial evidence showed the juvenile fled, the district court
properly denied the juvenile's motion to dismiss the charges that
he resisted, delayed, and obstructed Jones in the discharge of his
lawful duties. Jones was on patrol alone in the middle of the
night when he attempted to stop a recklessly driven car and was
confronted with a driver willing to take extreme evasive action toavoid capture. The occupants' flight from the moving car
interfered with Jones's pursuit of the car and driver, leaving
three persons at large and unaccounted for in dangerous conditions.
Rather than performing a routine traffic stop, Jones was forced to
contend with four unknown suspects, including the juvenile, who
fled from a blue light and siren, ran from a moving car, and
ignored his commands to stop. These circumstances presented Jones
with both legitimate safety concerns and a reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in
denying the juvenile's motion, and we reject this assignment of
error.
The juvenile next claims the trial court erred by imposing a
Level Three disposition because the juvenile “did not have the four
prior juvenile offenses required to qualify for a Level Three
disposition upon an adjudication of delinquency for committing a
minor offense[.]” Contrary to the juvenile's assertion, the
relevant provisions of the Juvenile Code authorized the district
court's entry of a Level Three disposition in response to the
juvenile's probation violation. The juvenile was placed on
probation as a condition of a Level Two disposition after his
adjudication of delinquency for felonious possession of cocaine, a
serious offense under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2508(f) (2004). After
adjudicating the juvenile's probation violation, the district court
was permitted “to order a new disposition at the next higher level
on the disposition chart in G.S. 7B-2508[,]” i.e., a Level Three
disposition. N.C. Gen. Stat. 7B-2510(e) (2004). The juvenile alsoavers that the district court abused its discretion in imposing a
Level Three disposition. Because the trial court's disposition was
not “so arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a
reasoned decision,” In re J.B., __ N.C. App. __, __, 616 S.E.2d
385, 387 (2005), we find no abuse of discretion.
The juvenile next claims the district court erroneously denied
him release on appeal under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2605 (2004)
without entering findings of fact to support the denial. Section
7B-2605 of the Juvenile Code provides as follows:
Pending disposition of an appeal, the release
of the juvenile, with or without conditions,
should issue in every case unless the court
orders otherwise. For compelling reasons
which must be stated in writing, the court may
enter a temporary order affecting the custody
or placement of the juvenile as the court
finds to be in the best interests of the
juvenile or the State.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2605 (2004). Here, the court simply stated in
its appellate entries that “[r]elease of the juvenile pursuant to
G.S. 7B-2605 is denied” without the required findings to support
its order. This is clearly insufficient under the requirements of
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2605. However, this error did not prejudice
the juvenile. The disposition order finding the juvenile violated
his probation and ordering him to be held pending appeal was the
same commitment he would have received. We hold the court's error
was without prejudice. In re Lineberry, 154 N.C. App. 246, 256,
572 S.E.2d 229, 236 (2002). See In re Bullabough, 89 N.C. App.
171, 184, 365 S.E.2d 642, 649 (1988). We, therefore, reject this
assignment of error. The record on appeal contains additional assignments of error
not addressed by the juvenile in his brief to this Court. Pursuant
to N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2005), we deem them abandoned.
Affirmed.
Judges WYNN and JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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