IN THE MATTER OF:
A.N.J., A.J.T.J.,
R.J.M., E.J.M.
New Hanover County
No. 03 J 483-486
Susan J. Hall, for respondent-appellant.
Regina Floyd-Davis, for guardian ad Litem-appellee.
STEELMAN, Judge.
New Hanover County Department of Social Services filed a
petition to terminate respondent's parental rights to her minor
children, A.N.J., A.J.T.J., R.J.M., E.J.M. (children), on 4
December 2003. On 28 April 2004, the trial court terminated
respondent's parental rights. Respondent filed two written notices
of appeal, the first one on 7 May 2004, or ten days after the
termination hearing, and the second on 9 December 2004, or one day
after the written order was filed.
The 6 May 2004 notice of intent to appeal stated: “ Counsel for
the Respondent-Mother notifies opposing counsel that the statutes
direct that an order terminating parental rights be reduced to
writing, signed and entered no later than 30 days from thecompletion of the hearing.” (Bold in original). However, the trial
court did not reduce this order to writing and file it until 8
December 2004, over seven months after the termination hearing.
In her second argument, respondent contends that the trial
court committed error by failing to file its written order within
the 30 day period mandated by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2004)
(See footnote 1)
.
We agree.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (emphasis added) states:
Should the court determine that any one or
more of the conditions authorizing a
termination of the parental rights of a parent
exist, the court shall issue an order
terminating the parental rights of such parent
with respect to the juvenile unless the court
shall further determine that the best
interests of the juvenile require that the
parental rights of the parent not be
terminated. Any order shall be reduced to
writing, signed, and entered no later than 30
days following the completion of the
termination of parental rights hearing.
In order for respondent to obtain a new trial based on the
trial court's failure to file the order terminating his parental
rights in a timely fashion, he must show prejudice. In re P.L.P.,
__ N.C. App. __, __, 618 S.E.2d 241, 245 (2005); In re J.L.K., 165
N.C. App. 311, 316, 598 S.E.2d 387, 391 (2004), rev. denied, 359
N.C. 68, 604 S.E.2d 314 (2004). This Court has been more likely to
find prejudice as the length of the delay increases, In re L.E.B.,
169 N.C. App. 375, 610 S.E.2d 424, discretionary appeal denied, 359N.C. 632, 616 S.E.2d 538 (2005); In re T.L.T., __ N.C. App. __, 612
S.E.2d 436 (2005).
In the instant case, respondent was prevented from filing an
appeal for over seven months. Respondent's right to supervised
visitation with her children was revoked following the termination
hearing. These identical facts were found by this Court in T.L.T.
to constitute prejudice and to require reversal. Based on the
binding precedent of this Court, we hold that the trial court erred
by failing to enter its termination order within the prescribed
time period. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court order and
remand the case for a new trial.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge McGEE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***