An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Proced ure.

NO. COA05-467


Filed: 17 January 2006

IN THE MATTER OF:                             Alamance County
J.S.B.                                     No. 01 J 94

    Appeal by juvenile from adjudication and disposition orders entered 17 September 2004 by Judge Jim Roberson in Alamance County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 9 January 2006.

    Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Lori A. Kroll, for the State.

    Lynne Rupp for respondent appellant.

    McCULLOUGH, Judge.

     On 22 June 2004, respondent was charged with being a delinquent juvenile in that he committed the offense of injury to real property. Specifically, it was alleged that respondent had spray painted gang graffiti and caused property damage estimated at $1500.00. On 15 July 2004, pursuant to a plea agreement, respondent admitted to the allegations in the petition. On 17 September 2004, a disposition order was entered and respondent was placed on probation for six months and ordered to pay $500.00 in restitution. Respondent appeals.
     Respondent first argues that the trial court erred by accepting his admission without conducting the full inquiry required under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2407(a) (2003). Respondent contends that the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2407(a) aremandatory and thus the adjudication must be set aside. We agree.
     Our Supreme Court stated in In re T.E.F., 359 N.C. 570, 614 S.E.2d 296 (2005), that
            [w]hen a juvenile wishes to admit allegations of criminal wrongdoing, the court must determine that the admissions are knowing and voluntary, “a product of informed choice.” N.C.G.S. § 7B-2407(a) has codified various elements that constitute “informed choice.” Thereunder, the trial court must “inform” the juvenile of four basic rights and make “determinations” regarding two others.

In re T.E.F. 359 N.C. 570, 576-77 , 614 S.E.2d 296, 300 (2005) (citations omitted). N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2407(a) states that:
            (a) The court may accept an admission from a juvenile only after first addressing the juvenile personally and:

                    (1)    Informing the juvenile that the juvenile has a right to remain silent and that any statement the juvenile makes may be used against the juvenile;

            (2)             Determining that the juvenile understands the nature of the charge;

            (3)             Informing the juvenile that the juvenile has a right to deny the allegations;

            (4)            Informing the juvenile that by the juvenile's admissions the juvenile waives the juvenile's right to be confronted by the witnesses against the juvenile;

            (5)            Determining that the juvenile is satisfied with the juvenile's representation; and

            (6)            Informing the juvenile of the most restrictive disposition on the charge.
In the instant case, the trial court failed to comply with all of the requirements of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2407(a), instead only asking respondent if he was satisfied with his counsel's legal services. The State contends that the trial court properly relied upon the transcript of admission, combined with the juvenile's testimony, when accepting the admission. However, the fact that much of the examination required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2407(a) was contained in the written plea agreement is not sufficient to satisfy the statute. In analyzing Section 7B-2407(a), our Supreme Court rejected adoption of a “totality of the circumstances test,” stating that
        increased care must be taken to ensure complete understanding by juveniles regarding the consequences of admitting their guilt. At a very minimum, this requires asking a juvenile each of the six specifically mandated questions listed in N.C.G.S. § 7B-2407(a).

In re T.E.F., 359 N.C. at 576 , 614 S.E.2d at 299 . Therefore, in accordance with In re T.E.F., the adjudication is reversed and remanded.
    Because resolution of respondent's first argument is dispositive of his appeal, consideration of his remaining argument is moot.
    Reversed and remanded.
    Judges TYSON and ELMORE concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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