STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Guilford County
No. 03 CRS 98188-89
JAVIS LEE MARTIN,
Defendant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General John F. Maddrey, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate
Defender Charlesena Elliott Walker, for defendant-appellant.
HUDSON, Judge.
At the 1 November 2004 criminal session, a jury convicted
defendant Javis Lee Martin of first-degree murder and second-degree
kidnaping. The court sentenced defendant to a term of life in
prison without parole on the murder charge and 34 to 50 months on
the kidnapping charge. Defendant appeals. For the reasons
discussed below, we conclude defendant received a fair trial free
from error.
Brenda Green (“Ms. Green”) lived in an apartment with her
daughter, Jane, and Jane's two-year old daughter. Ms. Green's son
Jeremy occasionally spent nights at the apartment. Defendant had
briefly lived with Jane, with whom he had a romantic relationship. Jane ended the relationship and moved back to her mother's home.
On 17 August 2003, defendant approached Jane as she stood on the
street talking with neighbors and asked her to walk with him. Once
out of the neighbors' view, defendant pulled out a knife and forced
Jane into a nearby park where he began to remove her clothes. When
Jane said she had to use the restroom, defendant stopped and took
her to a nearby Harris Teeter grocery store. Once inside, Jane
sought help from store employees and defendant fled. Jane reported
the incident to police. The same night, defendant came to Ms.
Green's apartment and asked Jane to come outside, but she refused.
On the evening of 20 August 2003, Ms. Green and her friend,
Marvin Hill (“Mr. Hill”), heard a knocking on a downstairs bedroom
door. Ms. Green called out, asking who was there, and opened the
door, but saw no one. After she shut the door, Ms. Green heard a
gunshot, a thump and sounds on the stairs. Defendant entered the
bedroom, waving a gun and asking “where is she? Where's that
baby?” Ms. Green told defendant that “she” was not there and the
baby was with her. Defendant cursed Ms. Green and forced her
upstairs, threatening to shoot her if she told anyone what had
happened. At the top of the stairs, she saw Mr. Hill lying on the
floor with a gunshot wound to the head. As Ms. Green called
emergency medical services, defendant ran out the door. In the
hospital, Mr. Hill's condition improved, but after he refused a
lung treatment on 17 September, Mr. Hill died. Defendant first argues that the court erred in sustaining the
State's objection to Ms. Green's proposed testimony about pending
criminal charges against her son. We do not agree.
Defendant planned to cross-examine Ms. Green about pending
criminal charges against her son Jeremy, arguing that this would
show Ms. Green's bias, in that she would seek to please the State
with her testimony. Following voir dire, the court sustained the
State's objection to this line of questioning on grounds that any
probative value of the testimony was outweighed by the likelihood
of jury confusion. The court noted that the proposed testimony
concerned a third party who rarely stayed at his mother's
apartment. Defendant contends that the court's ruling violated his
right of confrontation.
Cross-examination of an opposing witness for
the purpose of showing his bias or interest is
a substantial legal right. Jurors are to
consider evidence of any prejudice in
determining the witness' credibility.
State v. Jacobs, __ N.C. App. __, __, 616 S.E.2d 306, 312 (2005)
(internal quotation marks omitted). A defendant may cross-examine
a witness on “particular facts having a logical tendency to show
that the witness is biased against him or his cause, or that the
witness is interested adversely to him in the outcome of the
litigation.” State v. Hart, 239 N.C. 709, 711, 80 S.E.2d 901, 902
(1954). This right is not unlimited, however, and the trial court
“has discretion to ban unduly repetitious and argumentative
questions, as well as inquiry into matters of tenuous relevance.” State v. Hatcher, 136 N.C. App. 524, 526, 524 S.E.2d 815, 816
(2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The trial judge may and should rule out
immaterial, irrelevant, and incompetent
matter.” State v. Stanfield, 292 N.C. 357,
362, 233 S.E.2d 574, 578 (1977). On appeal,
the trial court's decision to limit
cross-examination is reviewed for abuse of
discretion, and “rulings in controlling cross
examination will not be disturbed unless it is
shown that the verdict was improperly
influenced.” Hatcher, 136 N.C. App. at 526,
524 S.E.2d at 816.
Jacobs, __ N.C. App. at __, 616 S.E.2d at 312.
Defendant cites cases in which appellate courts found
reversible error when the court refused to allow cross-examination
of witnesses about charges pending against the witnesses
themselves. See Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 39 L.Ed.2d 347
(1974); State v. Prevatte, 346 N.C. 162, 484 S.E.2d 377 (1997). He
cites no case involving charges pending against a third-party, as
here, and we have found none. We overrule this assignment of
error.
Defendant next argues that the court erred in sustaining the
State's objections to Ms. Green's testimony about her son's prior
convictions. We disagree.
Defendant contended that he took a gun to Ms. Green's
apartment out of fear that Jeremy might harm him, rather than out
of an intent to terrorize the Green family. As in the first issue,
the court ruled that testimony about Jeremy's prior convictions was
of limited probative value which was outweighed by the likelihood
of confusing the jury. The jury did hear from Ms. Green that herson had “a history of violence.” However, defendant produced no
evidence that he expected to encounter Jeremy at the apartment the
night of the shooting. Nor did defendant indicate that he was
aware of Jeremy's convictions.
The North Carolina Supreme Court has held that Rule 403
analysis is proper in excluding relevant testimony even where a
victim and her family members had threatened a defendant's life.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion by excluding evidence of the
alleged threats in this case. Since defendant
was not relying upon self-defense or other
legal provocation as a defense, the trial
court reasonably could have concluded that the
admission of the proffered evidence would have
substantially prejudiced the State and would
have served only to delay the proceedings, to
inflame the jury, or to confuse the issues.
Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in excluding this evidence, and we
reject this assignment of error.
State v. Macon, 346 N.C. 109, 115-16, 484 S.E.2d 538, 542 (1997).
We therefore hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in excluding evidence of the prior convictions.
Defendant also argues that he is entitled to a new trial
because the court engaged in improper conduct toward defendant and
his counsel. We disagree.
Defendant contends that the court conveyed exasperation and
disrespect in its comments, and thereby revealed its opinion about
defendant's guilt. The standard for reviewing such comments is
well-established:
It is well established by our case law and
statutory enactments that it is improper for a
trial judge to express in the presence of the
jury his opinion upon any issue to be decidedby the jury or to indicate in any manner his
opinion as to the weight of the evidence or
the credibility of any evidence properly
before the jury. Even so, every such
impropriety by the trial judge does not result
in prejudicial error. Whether the judge's
comments, questions or actions constitute
reversible error is a question to be
considered in light of the factors and
circumstances disclosed by the record, the
burden of showing prejudice being upon the
defendant. Thus, in a criminal case it is
only when the jury may reasonably infer from
the evidence before it that the trial judge's
action intimated an opinion as to a factual
issue, the defendant's guilt, the weight of
the evidence or a witness's credibility that
prejudicial error results. In this connection
it is well settled that it is the duty of the
trial judge to supervise and control the
course of a trial so as to insure justice to
all parties. In so doing the court may
question a witness in order to clarify
confusing or contradictory testimony.
State v. Blackstock, 314 N.C. 232, 236, 333 S.E.2d 245, 248 (1985)
(internal citations omitted). However, “[i]t is the right and
duty, however, of the trial judge to control examination and
cross-examination of witnesses. The trial judge may also ask a
witness questions for the purpose of clarifying testimony.” State
v. Alverson, 91 N.C. App. 577, 579, 372 S.E.2d 729, 730 (1988)
(internal citations omitted). Our review of the comments by the
trial judge reveal that the court's comments were directed at both
the State and defense. In addition, defendant does not show how he
was prejudiced by the comments of the trial judge. The evidence of
defendant's guilt was strong and defendant does not persuade us
that the court's comments, considering the circumstances,
prejudiced the jury's verdict. Defendant also contends that evidence about the incident
between himself and Jane Green on 17 August constituted
impermissible character evidence under Rule 404(b) and that any
probative value was outweighed by its prejudicial effect. We do
not agree. The State argues that the evidence was relevant to show
why defendant went to apartment on the night of the shooting.
Following voir dire, the court allowed the evidence.
Rule 404(b) provides, in pertinent part:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show that he acted in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof
of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of
mistake, entrapment or accident.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule 404 (2005). The Supreme Court has
held that “Rule 404(b) state[s] a clear general rule of inclusion
of relevant evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts by a
defendant, subject to but one exception requiring its exclusion if
its only probative value is to show that the defendant has the
propensity or disposition to commit an offense of the nature of the
crime charged.” State v. Coffey, 326 N.C. 268, 278-79, 389 S.E.2d
48, 54 (1990) (emphasis in original). “Thus, even though evidence
may tend to show other crimes, wrongs, or acts by the defendant and
his propensity to commit them, it is admissible under Rule 404(b)”
so long as the evidence is also relevant for some other purpose.
Id. at 279, 389 S.E.2d at 54 (internal citation omitted).
Under Rule 403, relevant evidence may be excluded where any
“probative value is substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice,confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8C-1, Rule
403 (2003). “Whether or not to exclude evidence under this rule is
a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, reversible
only upon a showing that the ruling was arbitrary and unsupported
by reason.” State v. Abraham, 338 N.C. 315, 352, 451 S.E.2d 131,
151 (1994).
Here, the State introduced this evidence for the purpose of
showing defendant's motive for going to the Adams apartment, a
purpose permitted under Rule 404(b). The court did not abuse its
discretion in determining that the probative value of this evidence
outweighed its potentially prejudicial effect. We overrule this
assignment of error.
No error.
Judges TYSON and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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