Appeal by defendant from judgments entered 30 October 2003 by
Judge William Z. Wood, Jr. in Forsyth County Superior Court. Heard
in the Court of Appeals 26 January 2006.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Leonard G. Green, for the State.
Carlton, Rhodes & Carlton, by Gary C. Rhodes, for defendant-
Defendant Larry Tyrone Wilson appeals from his convictions for
assault on a female, malicious conduct by a prisoner, and habitual
misdemeanor assault ("HMA") and his sentencing as a habitual felon.
On appeal, defendant argues that the trial court erred by admitting
into evidence the victim's statements to police and a videotape
showing defendant's behavior after his arrest, by denying his
motion to dismiss the charges, by sentencing him for HMA, and by
committing a variety of other sentencing errors. Because we are
unable to adequately review defendant's arguments pertaining to his
HMA conviction based on the current record, we remand to the trialcourt for further proceedings on that issue. With respect to the
rest of defendant's trial, however, we find no prejudicial error.
The State's evidence at trial tended to show the following
facts. In the early morning hours of 3 July 2003, Lieutenant
Wilson Weaver of the Winston-Salem Police Department responded to
a call regarding an assault in progress at a rooming house.
Lieutenant Weaver observed a woman, Stacy Marie Coles, walking
rapidly away from defendant, who was trying to catch up with her.
Ms. Coles appeared to be frightened.
Lieutenant Weaver concluded he had located the people involved
in the assault and called for assistance. While waiting for
additional officers, Lieutenant Weaver asked defendant what was
going on, and defendant responded that he and Ms. Coles had been
having "a little argument." Ms. Coles stayed about 30 feet away
during this exchange, and Lieutenant Weaver did not speak to her.
Corporal Carl McClaney was the first officer to arrive in
response to Lieutenant Weaver's call for assistance. After parking
his patrol vehicle, Corporal McClaney approached Ms. Coles, who
still appeared frightened. Ms. Coles said in a loud voice that
everything was fine and that defendant had done nothing wrong.
Immediately afterward, however, Ms. Coles whispered to Corporal
McClaney that "she was terrified of [defendant] and needed to get
away." Ms. Coles then quietly explained that defendant had
assaulted her and showed Corporal McClaney several scratches on her
neck. Corporal Lesa Butner and Officer Brian Raber then arrived at
the scene and arrested defendant. After defendant was placed in
the rear of Officer Raber's patrol vehicle, Corporal Butner went to
speak with Ms. Coles. At that point, defendant turned sideways in
the rear of the patrol car, elevated both his feet, and kicked out
the right-side rear window.
The officers opened the rear doors of the patrol car, and
Officer Ralph Mason pulled defendant _ kicking and screaming _ out
by his shoulders and laid him on the sidewalk. After defendant
spit in Officer Mason's face, the officers applied a "spit sock,"
which was described at trial as a "netting material that goes over
the head to attempt to stop saliva from being spit out." The spit
sock was not completely effective, as defendant soon succeeded in
spitting into the faces of both Officer Mason and Officer David
Defendant continued to be, according to the officers,
"extremely combative." As the officers moved defendant into the
rear of Officer Walsh's car, defendant stated: "You can't hold me
down. I'll kick another window out," and "You don't have
[(expletive omitted)] on me because she'll deny everything. She'll
say nothing happened." Officer Walsh took defendant to the
detention facility where a videotape of defendant's arrival showed
him in the midst of a raging monologue.
After Officer Walsh left the scene with defendant, Officer
Raber spoke with Ms. Coles, whose jaw was swollen and neck
reddened. Ms. Coles explained that she had returned home that day,and defendant had choked her unconscious while they were outside.
She woke up inside, where defendant appeared to be calming down,
but, after she refused his invitation to take a walk, he again
became enraged and began choking her. Before Ms. Coles lost
consciousness for a second time, defendant dragged her down the
front steps of the house and back outside. After Ms. Coles
finished describing what had happened, Corporal Butner accompanied
her into an ambulance where photographs were taken of her injuries.
On 4 August 2003, defendant was indicted for first degree
kidnapping, assault on a female, HMA, and two counts of malicious
conduct by a prisoner. Defendant was separately indicted as having
achieved the status of a habitual felon. The State ultimately
dismissed the charge of first degree kidnapping. On 30 October
2003, a jury found defendant guilty of assault on a female and both
counts of malicious conduct by a prisoner. Defendant pled guilty
to being a habitual felon. The record on appeal does not contain
any specific resolution of the HMA charge, whether by stipulation
The trial court sentenced defendant within the presumptive
range to 107 to 138 months imprisonment for assault on a female and
HMA. The trial court then sentenced defendant as a habitual felon
to a consecutive sentence within the presumptive range of 151 to
191 months imprisonment for both malicious conduct by a prisoner
convictions. Defendant timely appealed to this Court.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred by admitting
the testimony of Officer Raber, Corporal McClaney, and Corporal
Butner regarding Ms. Coles' statements at the scene. Specifically,
defendant contends: (1) that Ms. Coles' statements were hearsay,
and, therefore, inadmissible as substantive evidence; (2) to the
extent the statements were admitted as only non-substantive
corroborative testimony, the trial court erred by allowing Officer
Raber and Corporal McClaney to testify prior to Ms. Coles; and (3)
that the trial court erred in failing to adequately instruct the
jury, with respect to this testimony, as to the distinctions
between substantive, corroborative, and impeachment evidence.
Regarding Corporal McClaney's testimony that Ms. Coles
whispered she was terrified of defendant and needed to get away, a
statement that is otherwise hearsay is nevertheless admissible if
it is "[a] statement of the declarant's then existing state of
mind, emotion, sensation, or physical condition . . . ." N.C.R.
Evid. 803(3). Our Supreme Court has previously held that
statements of fear and terror by a victim regarding her assailant
fall within the scope of this hearsay exception, and, consequently,
Ms. Coles' statements regarding her then existing state of mind
were properly admitted. See State v. Locklear
, 320 N.C. 754, 759-
60, 360 S.E.2d 682, 685 (1987) (statements by rape victim to
medical personal that she was "afraid" and "scared" of rapist
admissible under N.C.R. Evid. 803(3)). With respect to (1) Officer Raber's testimony that Ms. Coles
said she had been choked into unconsciousness and dragged outside,
(2) Corporal McClaney's testimony that Ms. Coles said she had been
assaulted, and (3) Corporal Butner's testimony regarding Ms. Coles'
descriptions of her injuries, even if these statements would
otherwise be hearsay, a "prior consistent statement of a witness is
admissible to corroborate the testimony of the witness . . . ."
State v. Jones
, 329 N.C. 254, 257, 404 S.E.2d 835, 836 (1991).
"'In order to be admissible as corroborative evidence, a witness'
prior consistent statements merely must tend to add weight or
credibility to the witness' testimony. Further, it is well
established that such corroborative evidence may contain new or
additional facts when it tends to strengthen and add credibility to
the testimony which it corroborates.'" State v. Walters
, 357 N.C.
68, 89, 588 S.E.2d 344, 356 (quoting State v. Farmer
, 333 N.C. 172,
192, 424 S.E.2d 120, 131 (1993)), cert. denied
, 540 U.S. 971, 157
L. Ed. 2d 320, 124 S. Ct. 442 (2003).
Here, Ms. Coles testified at trial that the photographs taken
at the scene accurately showed bruises on her chest, neck, and
back. Ms. Coles also testified that defendant gave her the bruise
on her chest, that the bruise on her back was from their "little
tussle," and that the bruise on her neck was from defendant
"grabbing [her] neck." The officers' testimony, therefore,
corroborated Ms. Coles' account of her physical altercation with
defendant and was admissible as offering evidence of prior
consistent statements. The fact that Officer Raber and CorporalMcClaney testified prior to Ms. Coles' testimony at trial is of no
consequence. See State v. Joyce
, 97 N.C. App. 464, 470, 389 S.E.2d
136, 140 (holding that whether corroborative statements are
admitted before or after testimony they corroborate is "immaterial"
because trial court has discretion regarding order of evidence),
disc. review denied
, 326 N.C. 803, 393 S.E.2d 902 (1990).
Finally, regarding defendant's argument that the trial court
erred by failing to adequately instruct the jury as to the
distinctions between substantive, corroborative, and impeachment
evidence, "[t]he admission of evidence which is relevant and
competent for a limited purpose will not be held error in the
absence of a request by the defendant for a limiting instruction.
Such an instruction is not required unless specifically
by counsel." State v. Stager
, 329 N.C. 278, 309, 406 S.E.2d 876,
894 (1991) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendant did not request such an instruction at trial and,
therefore, it was not error for the trial court to fail to provide
one. These assignments of error are overruled.
Defendant next challenges the trial court's decision to admit
the statements he made while being placed into the rear of Officer
Walsh's patrol car and the tape of defendant's conduct at the
detention center. Specifically, defendant contends these
statements were inadmissible hearsay, violated his Miranda
and should have been excluded under N.C.R. Evid. 403. With respect to defendant's hearsay arguments, it is well-
established that "[a] statement is admissible as an exception to
the hearsay rule if it is offered against a party and . . . is . .
. his own statement . . . ." N.C.R. Evid. 801(d). The admission
of defendant's own statements to the officers did not, therefore,
violate the prohibition on hearsay found in N.C.R. Evid. 802. See
State v. Felton
, 330 N.C. 619, 637, 412 S.E.2d 344, 355 (1992)
(holding defendant's statement to detectives was admissible against
him "because it fell within the exception to the hearsay rule for
admissions of a party opponent").
As for defendant's contention that these statements should
have been excluded under Miranda v. Arizona
, 384 U.S. 436, 16 L.
Ed. 2d 694, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), it is well-settled that Miranda
warnings are only required during custodial interrogation. State
, 284 N.C. 212, 216, 200 S.E.2d 3, 7 (1973). Even
assuming that defendant was in custody when these statements were
made, defendant points to no evidence _ and makes no argument _
indicating that the statements were elicited pursuant to
interrogation. See State v. Brewington
, 352 N.C. 489, 503, 532
S.E.2d 496, 504 (2000) (Interrogation includes "'[a]ny words or
actions on the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are
reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the
suspect.'" (quoting Rhode Island v. Innis
, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 64
L. Ed. 2d 297, 308, 100 S. Ct. 1682, 1689-90 (1980))), cert.
, 531 U.S. 1165, 148 L. Ed. 2d 992, 121 S. Ct. 1126 (2001). Indeed, all the evidence suggests defendant's statements were
spontaneous and volunteered, and, accordingly, Miranda
require their exclusion. 384 U.S. at 478, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 726, 86
S. Ct. at 1630 ("Volunteered statements of any kind are not barred
by the Fifth Amendment and their admissibility is not affected by
our holding today.").
Finally, regarding defendant's argument that any probative
value was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, a trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence
under N.C.R. Evid. 403 will not be overturned on appeal absent an
abuse of discretion. State v. Campbell
, 359 N.C. 644, 673, 617
S.E.2d 1, 19 (2005), cert. denied
, __ U.S. __, 164 L. Ed. 2d 523,
126 S. Ct. 1773 (2006). "Abuse of discretion results where the
court's ruling is manifestly unsupported by reason or is so
arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoned
decision." State v. Hennis
, 323 N.C. 279, 285, 372 S.E.2d 523, 527
Defendant was on trial for an assault and two charges of
malicious conduct by a prisoner. The trial court admitted
defendant's statements while entering Officer Walsh's patrol car
that he would "kick another window out" and that the police did not
have anything "on [him] because [Ms. Coles would] deny everything"
because they showed defendant was conscious of his own guilt. The
trial court admitted the videotape because it illustrated
defendant's knowing and willful combativeness. Significantly,
defendant argues on appeal with respect to the malicious conductcharges that he did not act knowingly or willfully _ a contention
strongly rebutted by the videotape. The evidence was, therefore,
highly probative and any prejudice derives primarily from the very
relevance of the evidence. Consequently, we cannot conclude that
the admission of these statements was "manifestly unsupported by
Defendant next argues that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to dismiss the assault on a female charge and both
malicious conduct by a prisoner charges for insufficient evidence.
In ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, the trial court must
determine whether the State presented substantial evidence (1) of
each essential element of the offense and (2) of the defendant's
being the perpetrator. State v. Robinson
, 355 N.C. 320, 336, 561
S.E.2d 245, 255, cert. denied
, 537 U.S. 1006, 154 L. Ed. 2d 404,
123 S. Ct. 488 (2002). "'Substantial evidence is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.'" State v. Matias
, 354 N.C. 549, 552, 556 S.E.2d
269, 270 (2001) (quoting State v. Brown
, 310 N.C. 563, 566, 313
S.E.2d 585, 587 (1984)). When considering the issue of substantial
evidence in assessing a motion to dismiss, the trial court must
view all of the evidence presented "in the light most favorable to
the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable
inference and resolving any contradictions in its favor." State v.
, 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994), cert. denied
515 U.S. 1135, 132 L. Ed. 2d 818, 115 S. Ct. 2565 (1995). The elements of assault on a female are "(1) an assault, (2)
upon a female person, (3) by a male person (4) who is at least
eighteen years old." State v. Herring
, 322 N.C. 733, 743, 370
S.E.2d 363, 370 (1988). Defendant contests only the first element,
arguing that, although the evidence indicates that he "grabbed" Ms.
Coles, "[p]hysical contact under these circumstances was
insufficient to support an assault charge."
"Assault on a female may be proven by finding either an
assault on or a battery of the victim. Assault is defined as an
intentional attempt, by violence, to do injury to the person of
another. Battery is an assault whereby any force is applied,
directly or indirectly, to the person of another." State v. West
146 N.C. App. 741, 743, 554 S.E.2d 837, 839-40 (2001) (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted). Here, Ms. Coles testified
that the photographs taken at the scene accurately showed the
bruises on her chest and back that defendant's conduct caused and
that the bruise on her neck originated when defendant grabbed her.
Construed in the light most favorable to the State, a rational
juror could have concluded this was sufficient evidence that
defendant battered Ms. Coles. Defendant cites no authority _ and
we know of none _ supporting his position that "tussl[ing]" and
grabbing a female hard enough to cause bruising is insufficient to
constitute an assault on a female.
With respect to the malicious conduct by a prisoner charges:
There are five essential elements required to
prove a defendant's guilt of the offense of
malicious conduct by a prisoner:
(1) the defendant threw, emitted, or caused to
be used as a projectile a bodily fluid or
excrement at the victim;
(2) the victim was a State or local government
(3) the victim was in the performance of his
or her State or local government duties at the
time the fluid or excrement was released;
(4) the defendant acted knowingly and
(5) the defendant was in the custody of . . .
[a] law enforcement officer . . . .
State v. Robertson
, 161 N.C. App. 288, 292-93, 587 S.E.2d 902, 905
(2003); see also
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-258.4(a) (2005) (defining
malicious conduct by a prisoner). Defendant contests only the
fourth element, arguing that "[t]he State failed to meet its burden
to prove that Defendant's expectorating was a proximate result of
knowing and willful behavior rather than an involuntary reaction to
the force and restraint executed against him . . . ."
"'Knowledge is a mental state that may be proved by offering
circumstantial evidence to prove a contemporaneous state of mind.'"
State v. Crouse
, 169 N.C. App. 382, 389, 610 S.E.2d 454, 459
(quoting State v. Bogle
, 324 N.C. 190, 195, 376 S.E.2d 745, 748
(1989)), disc. review denied
, 359 N.C. 637, 616 S.E.2d 923 (2005).
"Likewise, the willfulness of a defendant's conduct may be inferred
from the circumstances surrounding the crime." Id.
Here, the State presented evidence that, during his arrest,
defendant was "very combative," "spit directly into [Officer
Mason's] left eye," that "[s]o much saliva covered [Officer
Mason's] face, it was coming off the side of [his] face," thatdefendant "rock[ed] back and forth" as he spit at Officer Mason,
that defendant was "spitting at the officers," and that defendant
"spit directly in the face of Officer Mason and Officer Walsh."
This is sufficient evidence from which a rational juror could
conclude that defendant knowingly and willfully spit on the
officers. Compare id.
at 389, 610 S.E.2d at 459 (finding
sufficient evidence of knowing and willful element of malicious
conduct by a prisoner where defendant "expressed dissatisfaction
with the officers grabbing her hands, and that she drew her breath,
puckered her mouth, collected saliva, and then spit"). This
assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next argues that the State needed to provide a
separate habitual felon indictment, ancillary to each felony
charge, before defendant could be sentenced on each felony as a
habitual felon. As noted by defendant, however, this position was
rejected by our Supreme Court in State v. Patton
, 342 N.C. 633,
635, 466 S.E.2d 708, 709 (1996), where the Court concluded that "a
separate habitual felon indictment is not required for each
substantive felony indictment."
Defendant nevertheless attempts to argue that the transcript
demonstrates that the plea colloquy in which defendant pled guilty
to attaining habitual felon status "failed to accurately apprise
Defendant that the informed consequences of his plea would expose
him to these consecutive habitual felon sentences . . . ."
Defendant's assignment of error did not, however, raise this issue,but rather states that the trial court erred only by "imposing
consecutive habitual felon sentences based upon one habitual felon
indictment." "[T]he scope of review on appeal is confined to a
consideration of those assignments of error set out in the record
on appeal . . . ." N.C.R. App. P. 10(a). Consequently, we decline
to consider the issue beyond defendant's assignment of error,
which, pursuant to our Supreme Court's holding in Patton
Defendant next contends that his HMA indictment was invalid
because one of the listed predicate offenses is a 1998 conviction
for assault on a female that, according to defendant, occurred
before he was 18 years of age and was, therefore, "invalid."
Unquestionably, to be guilty of an assault on a female, a defendant
must be at least 18. Herring
, 322 N.C. at 743, 370 S.E.2d at 370.
Defendant is, however, making an impermissible collateral attack
upon a conviction that occurred nearly a decade ago and has not
been overturned. See State v. Stafford
, 114 N.C. App. 101, 103,
440 S.E.2d 846, 847 (holding defendant could not collaterally
attack prior convictions for driving while impaired while appealing
new conviction for habitual impaired driving), appeal dismissed and
disc. review denied
, 336 N.C. 614, 447 S.E.2d 410 (1994); State v.
, 12 N.C. App. 676, 678, 184 S.E.2d 409, 410 (1971)
("Questioning the validity of the original judgment where sentence
was suspended on appeal from an order activating the sentence is,we believe, an impermissible collateral attack."). Accordingly,
this assignment of error is overruled.
Defendant next argues that his sentence for HMA must be
vacated because he did not stipulate to the required predicate
offenses, and the State offered no evidence of them at trial. In
State v. Burch
, 160 N.C. App. 394, 397, 585 S.E.2d 461, 463 (2003),
this Court held that a defendant charged with HMA must, in
accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-928(c) (2005), be arraigned
as to the HMA charge after commencement of the trial and before the
close of the State's case, in order to give the defendant an
"opportunity to admit the prior convictions which are an element of
the offense and prevent the State from presenting evidence of these
convictions before the jury." If, however, "the defendant fails to
admit the prior convictions, then the State may present evidence of
them to the jury as an element of the habitual crime." Burch
N.C. App. at 397, 585 S.E.2d at 463.
, this Court vacated the defendant's HMA conviction
when the defendant had not been arraigned under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
15A-928(c) _ and, therefore, had not stipulated to the prior
convictions _ and the State had presented no evidence regarding the
prior convictions during the trial. Burch
, 160 N.C. App. at 399,
585 S.E.2d at 464. The Court concluded that in the absence of
either an arraignment and a stipulation prior to the close of the
State's case, the defendant's motion to dismiss the HMA charge
should have been granted as "[t]he State failed to present evidenceof an essential element of the offense of [HMA]," namely, the
defendant's prior convictions. Id.
In this case, the record as submitted to this Court contains
neither a stipulation by defendant nor evidence presented by the
State regarding the required predicate convictions. This omission
may, however, be the result of a problem with the transcription of
the proceedings, since it is apparent from the opening pages of the
transcript that some of the pretrial proceedings went either
unrecorded or untranscribed. Indeed, the court's first question
for the State's attorney on the first page of the transcript is
simply, "Is there anything else?"
(See footnote 1)
At sentencing, both the court and the parties appeared to
believe that HMA was a foregone conclusion even though the
transcript contains nothing addressing HMA prior to sentencing:
THE COURT: So on the assault on a female,
which is elevated to habitual misdemeanor
which then goes up to habitual felon,
for that count he would be a Level IV?
MS. TOOMES [Defense Counsel]: That's
correct, Your Honor.
MR. HALL [State's Attorney]: That's
correct, Your Honor.
(Emphasis added.) This colloquy does not, however, explain what
occurred during the trial regarding the HMA charge. We are unable to conclusively determine from the record on
appeal whether defendant validly stipulated, prior to the close of
the State's evidence, to the existence of his prior convictions.
Consequently, we must remand to the trial court for a determination
whether defendant entered a stipulation in accordance with Burch
See also State v. Jernigan
, 118 N.C. App. 240, 243-44, 455 S.E.2d
163, 166 (1995) (trial court's failure to arraign under N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-928(c) and State's failure to present evidence of
defendant's prior convictions did not constitute reversible error
when defendant had stipulated to the existence of the prior
convictions before trial).
Defendant next argues that, during sentencing, the trial court
erroneously determined his prior record level because the State
failed to meet its burden of establishing defendant's prior
convictions. Under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(f)(1) (2005),
however, prior convictions may be proven by "[s]tipulation of the
parties." The State presented to the trial court a sentencing
worksheet that defense counsel inspected. Defense counsel then
asserted various objections to that worksheet. The court adopted
all but one of defense counsel's suggested corrections. The court
then summarized: "So we're dealing with one Class C, Level IV, and
two Class C, Level V's?" The prosecutor stated, "That's correct,"
and defense counsel made no objection.
This colloquy is sufficient to establish that defendant
stipulated to the accuracy of the worksheet, as modified by thetrial judge pursuant to defense counsel's objections. See State v.
, 151 N.C. App. 499, 506, 565 S.E.2d 738, 743 (2002)
(concluding defense counsel's statement that he had no objections
to State's worksheet could "reasonably be construed as a
stipulation by defendant that he had been convicted of the charges
listed on the worksheet"). Because of this stipulation, we further
find defendant's remaining arguments as to his prior record level
unpersuasive. Defendant's assignments of error relating to the
calculation of his prior record level are, therefore, overruled.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred under
Blakely v. Washington
, 542 U.S. 296, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403, 124 S. Ct.
2531 (2004), when, pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1340.14(b)(6),
it added one point to defendant's prior record level because of his
prior conviction for assault on a female. Defendant contends this
improperly increased his sentence based upon facts not submitted to
a jury. This Court has previously held, however, that the
determination of a defendant's prior record level is not a question
for the jury:
Determining a defendant's prior record
involves a complicated calculation of rules
and statutory applications[.] This
calculation is a mixed question of law and
fact. The 'fact' is the fact of the
conviction, which under Blakely
is not a
question for a jury. The law is the proper
application of the law to the fact of [a]
defendant's criminal record . . . .
State v. Hanton
, ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 623 S.E.2d 600, 604 (2006)
(alterations in original) (internal citations and quotation marksomitted). The impact of defendant's prior conviction for an
assault on a female does not require the resolution of disputed
facts but, rather, "involves statutory interpretation, which is a
question of law." Id.
at ___, 623 S.E.2d at 604. This assignment
of error is, therefore, overruled.
Finally, defendant asserts that his sentence as a habitual
felon, based upon his conviction of HMA, constitutes cruel and
unusual punishment and has subjected him to double jeopardy.
"Because defendant did not raise these constitutional issues at
trial, he has failed to preserve them for appellate review and they
are waived." State v. Chapman
, 359 N.C. 328, 366, 611 S.E.2d 794,
822 (2005). We, therefore, decline to consider this issue.
No error in part; remanded in part.
Judges HUDSON and TYSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).