IN THE MATTER OF: Mecklenburg County
B.W.
No. 04 J 1200
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Timothy W. Jones, for the State.
Moshera H. Mohamed for respondent appellant.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
On 1 November 2004, a juvenile petition was filed alleging
that respondent had committed the offense of possession of stolen
property
. On 12 January 2005, respondent was adjudicated a
delinquent juvenile. A disposition order was entered placing
respondent on probation for nine months and requiring him to pay
restitution
.
Respondent appeals.
At trial, the State adduced the following evidence: On 1
November 2004, Officer D.E. Neeley of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Police Department was in his car in the Boulevard Homes area of
Charlotte, North Carolina. Officer Neeley drove past an unoccupied,
dark blue Honda Accord parked on the wrong side of the road.
Officer Neeley ran the tag and got an alert that the car was
reported stolen. Officer Neeley turned around and drove backtowards the car. When he came back to it, two individuals were
sitting in the car. The respondent was sitting in the driver's
seat behind the wheel with the car off. Officer Neeley detained
both individuals, confirmed that the vehicle was stolen, and
arrested them both.
Following his arrest, respondent signed the following
statement:
An unknown dude came up. We got in the Honda
Accord, the car. There is a store across the
street from Captain D's. We went there and
then went to Boulevard Homes to see some
girls. We were standing on the porch, and I
went and sat inside this bluish-green Honda
Accord. The car had a popped ignition. The
unknown dude started it with a flat-head
screwdriver. While I was sitting in the car,
the police pulled up.
At trial, respondent testified that he never drove the
vehicle, and he only saw it for the first time earlier in the day
on 1 November 2004. Respondent further testified that he did not
realize it was a stolen car while riding around in it. Respondent
claimed he was sitting in the car to get out of the heat.
Respondent argues that there was insufficient evidence to
sustain the adjudication. Respondent asserts that there is no
evidence that he possessed the vehicle or acted with a dishonest
purpose.
After careful review of the record, briefs and contentions of
the parties, we affirm.
This Court has stated:
In reviewing a challenge to the
sufficiency of evidence, it is not our duty to
weigh the evidence, but to determine whether
there was substantial evidence to support theadjudication, viewing the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, and giving
it the benefit of all reasonable inferences.
In re Heil, 145 N.C. App. 24, 29, 550 S.E.2d 815, 819 (2001).
In the case sub judice, the petition alleged that respondent
was delinquent for possession of stolen property pursuant to N.C.
Gen. Stat. §
14-71.1 (2005). “Felonious possession of stolen goods
requires evidence of: (i) possession of personal property; (ii)
valued at greater than $ 1,000; (iii) which has been stolen; (iv)
the possessor knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that
the property is stolen; and (v) the possessor acts with a dishonest
purpose.” State v. King, 158 N.C. App. 60, 66, 580 S.E.2d 89, 94,
disc. review denied, 357 N.C. 509, 588 S.E.2d 376 (2003); see N.C.
Gen. Stat. §
14-71.1 (2005).
Respondent challenges the sufficiency
of the evidence as to the last two elements.
This Court has stated that “[a] defendant charged with
possession of stolen property under G.S. 14-71.1 . . . may be
convicted if the State produces sufficient evidence that defendant
possessed stolen property (i.e. a vehicle), which he knew or had
reason to believe had been stolen or taken.” State v. Lofton, 66
N.C. App. 79, 83, 310 S.E.2d 633, 635-36 (1984).
In the case sub
judice, the evidence presented by the State tended to show that
respondent was found in the driver's seat of a stolen vehicle. The
car's fan was on, and the car could only be started with a
screwdriver because the ignition had been popped. Respondent
admitted in his statement to police that he had been driven around
in the vehicle earlier in the day by an “unknown dude” and thisperson had started the ignition with a screwdriver. Because
respondent knew that the ignition could only be started with a
screwdriver, a reasonable person could infer that petitioner had
reason to believe the vehicle was stolen. Furthermore, respondent's
position in the driver's seat of the vehicle with the fan running
gave him possession and control of the vehicle. See, e.g., State v.
McCabe, 85 N.C. App. 500, 355 S.E.2d 186 (1987), where this Court
held that sitting behind the steering wheel of a car was sufficient
evidence to show defendant had control of the vehicle).
Our Supreme Court has further stated that
the “dishonest purpose” element of the crime
of possession of stolen property can be met by
a showing that the possessor acted with an
intent to aid the thief, receiver, or
possessor of stolen property. The fact that
the defendant does not intend to profit
personally by his action is immaterial. It is
sufficient if he intends to assist another
wrongdoer in permanently depriving the true
owner of his property.
State v. Parker, 316 N.C. 295, 305-06, 341 S.E.2d 555, 561 (1986).
We conclude that respondent's knowledge that the vehicle was
stolen, as well as his admission that he had been driven to the
spot where the vehicle was found in his possession, is sufficient
evidence that respondent intended to continue to deprive the true
owner of his vehicle, and thus acted with a dishonest purpose.
In a juvenile adjudication hearing where the trial court is
the trier of fact, “the court is empowered to assign weight to the
evidence presented at the trial as it deems appropriate.” In re
Oghenekevebe, 123 N.C. App. 434, 439, 473 S.E.2d 393, 397 (1996). “In this situation, the trial judge acts as both judge and jury,
thus resolving any conflicts in the evidence.” Id. Thus,
respondent's testimony disavowing or explaining his statement goes
to the weight and not the sufficiency of the evidence.
Accordingly, in the light most favorable to the State, we conclude
there was sufficient evidence that respondent possessed stolen
property.
We finally note that the adjudication and disposition orders
state that petitioner was delinquent for receiving stolen property.
However, it is clear from the petition and hearing transcript that
petitioner was found delinquent for possession of stolen goods
.
Accordingly, the adjudication and disposition orders are remanded
for correction of these clerical errors.
Affirmed; remanded for correction of a clerical error
.
Judges TYSON and ELMORE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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