STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Halifax County
Nos. 01 CRS 56407
TIMOTHY WAYNE MILLS, 02 CRS 1758
Defendant.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Ebony J. Pittman, for the State.
Gilda C. Rodriguez, for defendant-appellant.
HUDSON, Judge.
On 4 December 2002, defendant Timothy Wayne Mills was
convicted of felony child abuse and taking indecent liberties with
a child, and sentenced to 36 to 53 months in prison for the child
abuse charge and 24 to 36 months for the indecent liberties with a
child charge, to be served consecutively. Defendant's sentences
were suspended and he was placed on probation for 60 months. On 9
February 2005, a probation violation report was filed against
defendant for having knives in his possession. After a hearing,
the court found that defendant had willfully violated his probation
and revoked defendant's probation. Defendant appeals. We affirm.
At the hearing, defendant and his probation officer, Michael
Reynolds (“Reynolds”), testified, and the following is a summary ofthe testimony. On 9 February 2005, defendant arrived at his
community service work site, placing a bag of his personal
belongings in a shed approximately one quarter mile from the
location where he was working. When asked that day what was in the
bag, defendant stated that the bag contained tattoo tools and
knives. Defendant's supervisor at the work site called probation
officers, claiming that defendant was threatening to harm himself
with weapons in his possession. Ms. Mahala Burch, the probation
officer on duty when the call came in, called Intensive Officer
Rodney Robertson and a Halifax County deputy. Defendant was
arrested and Reynolds met him at the county jail. Defendant stated
that he had received the knives as payment for tattoo work he
performed, and that he had not returned home to place the knives in
his collectible display. Defendant stated that he did not plan to
harm himself, and no mental health professional evaluated him.
Defendant argues that the evidence was insufficient to find
that he had violated a condition of his probation. We do not
agree.
This Court has discussed the rules applicable to a probation
revocation proceeding:
Probation is an act of grace by the State to
one convicted of a crime. It is a matter of
discretion with the trial court. The matter
is not governed by the rules of a criminal
trial. Consequently, a jury is not required
as defendant contends nor must the proof of
violation be beyond a reasonable doubt. The
evidence need be such that reasonably
satisfies the trial judge in the exercise of
his sound discretion that the defendant has
violated a valid condition on which the
sentence was suspended. Because of this andalso because it is a matter which a judge
hears and not a jury, the rules of evidence
need not be strictly enforced.
State v. Freeman, 47 N.C. App. 171, 175, 266 S.E.2d 723, 725, disc.
review denied, 301 N.C. 99, 273 S.E.2d 304 (1980).
Defendant first contends that the evidence against him was
insufficient because the testimony against him was uncorroborated
hearsay evidence, citing State v. Pratt, 21 N.C. App. 538, 540-41,
204 S.E.2d 906, 907-8 (1974) for the proposition that a probation
may not be revoked based solely on hearsay. The State presented
testimony from Reynolds about his review of a probation violation
report prepared by another probation officer present at the scene
of the incident and about Reynolds' own discussions with defendant
following his arrest. In addition, defendant himself testified
that he brought a bag containing two knives to the community
service work site. Thus, even were the rules of evidence to fully
apply in his hearing, the State presented non-hearsay evidence
sufficient to support his probation violation.
Defendant also contends that the knives he had in his bag were
not deadly weapons in violation of the condition of probation.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269 provides that
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person
willfully and intentionally to carry concealed
about his person any bowie knife, dirk,
dagger, slung shot, loaded cane, metallic
knuckles, razor, shurikin, stun gun, or other
deadly weapon of like kind, except when the
person is on the person's own premises.
***
(d) This section does not apply to an ordinary
pocket knife carried in a closed position. Asused in this section, 'ordinary pocket knife'
means a small knife, designed for carrying in
a pocket or purse, that has its cutting edge
and point entirely enclosed by its handle, and
that may not be opened by a throwing,
explosive, or spring action.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-269 (2005). Defendant admits that the knives
he carried were not “ordinary pocket knives” as described in sub-
section (d); rather defendant describes them as “collectible
knives.” Defendant testified that he knew he was not allowed to
possess deadly weapons, but he did not believe the knives fell into
that category since he only intended to display them in his
collection. However, it is the nature of the weapons, not the
possessor's intent, which determines their classification pursuant
to the statute. On these facts, we do not conclude that the trial
court erred in revoking defendant's probation. Defendant's
assignment of error is overruled.
Affirmed.
Judges HUNTER and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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