HY-TECH CONSTRUCTION, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v
.
Wake County
No. 04 CVS 388
WAKE COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION,
Defendant.
Safran Law Offices, by Perry R. Safran and Brian J. Schoolman,
for plaintiff-appellant.
Tharrington Smith, L.L.P., by Rod Malone and Kara Grice Acree,
for defendant-appellee.
HUDSON, Judge.
Plaintiff Hy-Tech Construction, Inc., (Hy-Tech) submitted a
sealed bid to defendant Wake County Board of Education (BOE) for
a school renovation project. After the BOE awarded the contract to
the second lowest bidder, Hy-Tech filed a complaint alleging
violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-129 and violation of due process
and equal protection against the BOE on 12 January 2004. The BOE
moved for summary judgment, which motion the court granted on 21
April 2005. Hy-Tech appeals. As discussed below, we affirm.
Hy-Tech is a North Carolina corporation licensed as a general
contractor. In 2003, the BOE solicited bids for construction work
at Daniels Middle School (the project). Hy-Tech submitted a bidto serve as the single prime contractor of Phase I of the project.
Although Hy-Tech's was the lowest bid submitted, Ken Fuller, the
director of the construction management department for the Wake
County school system notified Hy-Tech that his staff did not intend
to recommend Hy-Tech be awarded the contract. Fuller invited Hy-
Tech to submit a written response to his statement of intent to
award the contract to the second-lowest bidder. Hy-Tech responded
by letter, disputing the various allegations of deficiencies made
against. Representatives from the BOE met with those from Hy-Tech
on 2 October 2003 to discuss the matter. On 8 October 2003, the
construction staff issued its recommendation that Hy-Tech not be
awarded the project due to its documented poor performance on
previous contracts. The BOE followed this recommendation and
awarded the contract to the second-lowest bidder.
The previous contract on which the BOE based its decision
involved Hy-Tech's construction of a football stadium at Middle
Creek High School (Middle Creek). Hy-Tech took an extra four
months to complete the Middle Creek project and required an
additional $200,000 to address subsurface conditions. Hy-Tech
contends that these delays and problems were caused by bad weather
and by unexpected and undisclosed subsurface conditions.
Hy-Tech argues that the court erred in granting summary
judgment against it. We disagree.
Hy-Tech contends that the court employed the wrong standard in
determining whether the BOE was entitled to summary judgment. The
proper standard of review on appeal from summary judgment is: whether any genuine issue of material fact
exists and whether the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. A
defendant may show entitlement to summary
judgment by (1) proving that an essential
element of the plaintiff's case is
non-existent, or (2) showing through discovery
that the plaintiff cannot produce evidence to
support an essential element of his or her
claim, or (3) showing that the plaintiff
cannot surmount an affirmative defense. Once
the party seeking summary judgment makes the
required showing, the burden shifts to the
nonmoving party to produce a forecast of
evidence demonstrating specific facts, as
opposed to allegations, showing that he can at
least establish a prima facie case at trial.
Hoffman v. Great Am. Alliance Ins. Co., 166 N.C. App. 422, 425-26,
601 S.E.2d 908, 911 (2004) (internal citations and quotations
omitted). The evidence presented must be viewed in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Bruce-Terminix Co. V. Zurich
Ins. Co., 130 N.C. App. 729, 733, 504 S.E.2d 574, 577 (1998).
The court's order states that
1. The applicable standard for Plaintiff's
claims requires a showing that the Board
engaged in fraud, corruption, abuse of
discretion or any other improper motive, see
Kinsey Contracting Co. v. Fayetteville, 106
N.C. App. 383, 384, 416 S.E.2d 607, 609
(1992).
2. The Plaintiff cannot meet its burden of
proving its claim that the Board engaged in
fraud, corruption, abuse of discretion or any
other improper motive . . .
The court's order reflects its conclusion that the BOE showed
through discovery that Hy-Tech cannot produce evidence to support
an essential element of its claim. Hoffman, 166 N.C. App. at 425-
26, 601 S.E.2d at 911. This showing by the BOE shifted the burden
to Hy-Tech to produce a forecast of evidence demonstratingspecific facts, as opposed to allegations, showing that [it] can at
least establish a prima facie case at trial. Id. at 426, 601
S.E.2d at 911. In its second paragraph, the court concluded that
Hy-Tech had failed to produce the required evidence. The trial
court applied the correct legal standard here and we overrule this
assignment of error.
Hy-Tech also contends that, in the light most favorable to it,
genuine issues of material fact remained, particularly concerning
whether the BOE exceeded its discretion and acted in bad faith in
deciding not to award the contract to Hy-Tech. The procedure for
awarding public contracts is prescribed by statute. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 143-129 states that the public entity shall award the
contract to the lowest responsible bidder or bidders, taking into
consideration quality, performance and the time specified in the
proposals for the performance of the contract. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
143-129(b) (2003). The statute also discusses grounds for
rejecting a bid:
Proposals may be rejected for any reason
determined by the board or governing body to
be in the best interest of the unit. However,
the proposal shall not be rejected for the
purpose of evading the provisions of this
Article.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-129(b) (2003). In reviewing the decision
of a local government to award a public contract '[i]t is a general
rule that officers of a municipal corporation, in the letting of
municipal contracts, perform not merely ministerial duties but
duties of a judicial and discretionary nature, and that courts, in
the absence of fraud or a palpable abuse of discretion, have nopower to control their action.' Kinsey Contracting Co. v.
Fayetteville, 106 N.C. App. 383, 384, 416 S.E.2d 607, 608, disc.
review denied, (1992) (quoting Mullen v. Town of Louisburg, 225
N.C. 53, 60, 33 S.E.2d 484, 488-89 (1945) (citations omitted)).
Hy-Tech argues that the BOE acted in bad faith by failing to
disclose critical information to Hy-Tech during the Middle Creek
project and then using Hy-Tech's problems on that project as the
basis to deny it the contract for Daniels. Hy-Tech must show
genuine issues of material fact about whether the BOE's decision
was based on fraud, corruption, abuse of discretion or other
improper motive. Hy-Tech alleged that the BOE lacked justification
to award the Daniels project to the second-lowest bidder and
wrongfully rejected Hy-Tech's bid arbitrarily and capriciously.
Mr. Fuller's affidavit states that the construction staff was
concerned due to Hy-Tech's inadequate performance on the Middle
Creek Project. After citing the failure to meet completion
deadlines on the Middle Creek project, Mr. Fuller notes the Daniels
project is more complex than Middle Creek because it involves
proximity to students (i.e. interior renovations as opposed to
constructing a football stadium).
Hy-Tech's principal states in his affidavit that the BOE
provided incorrect information about the condition of the Middle
Creek site. Specifically, he states that the site was not
undeveloped, but instead had subsurface debris indicating that it
had been used as a construction dump site, and that these
conditions necessitated additional work and time to complete theproject. Mr. Hyatt also disputes Mr. Fuller's allegations about
problems encountered on the Middle Creek project, such as whether
Hy-Tech intentionally stopped work, or refused to negotiate with
the owner or architect.
The forecast of evidence shows that the parties disagree about
numerous circumstances surrounding Middle Creek project and Hy-
Tech's performance, as well as about the BOE's actions and
decision-making process in the Daniels project bidding. However,
these issues do not prevent the Board from rejecting a bid for any
reason determined . . . to be in the best interest of the unit and
do not create an issue of fact as to bad faith or evading the
purpose of the statute. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-129(b) (2006).
Thus, the trial court correctly determined that summary judgment
was proper here.
Affirmed.
Judges HUNTER and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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