STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Buncombe County
Nos. 00 CRS 9120-21,
ELLIOT ARNAZ MOORE 00 CRS 53714-15
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Laura J. Gendy for the State.
Jon W. Myers for defendant-appellant.
ELMORE, Judge.
On 4 January 2001 defendant pled guilty to second degree
kidnapping and breaking or entering.
Defendant's sentence was
suspended and he was placed on supervised probation for thirty
months.
On 28 August 2002 a probation violation report was filed
alleging that defendant had failed to comply with the terms of his
probation. Specifically, the report alleged that defendant: (1)
was in arrears of the monetary obligation of his probation; (2)
failed to show proof that he had passed his General Education
Development Test or received a high school diploma within the
specified time frame; (3) failed to maintain employment; (4) failedto receive a substance abuse assessment; and (5) had been charged
with sell/delivery of crack cocaine. On the same day, an order for
defendant's arrest was issued. The order listed the Greene County
Detention Center in Greenville, Tennessee, as defendant's address.
On 9 September 2002 defendant began serving a sentence for a
conviction on drug charges in Tennessee.
Defendant was paroled
from his Tennessee conviction on 17 November 2004. Defendant was
served with the North Carolina order for arrest on the same day.
On 9 December 2004 a probation violation hearing was held in
Buncombe County Superior Court. Defendant admitted the allegations
in the violation report. Defendant's probation was revoked and his
suspended sentence activated.
Defendant appeals.
Defendant argues
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
revoke his probation after the expiration of his probationary
period.
Defendant contends that the State failed to comply with
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(f).
We agree.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1344(f) (2005) provides that:
The court may revoke probation after the
expiration of the period of probation if:
(1) Before the expiration of the period of
probation the State has filed a written motion
with the clerk indicating its intent to
conduct a revocation hearing; and
(2) The court finds that the State has made
reasonable effort to notify the probationer
and to conduct the hearing earlier.
Id. Here, the trial court conducted a hearing on 9 December 2004,
after the expiration of defendant's period of probation had
expired.
Pursuant to State v. Camp, 299 N.C. 524, 528, 263 S.E.2d592, 594-95 (1980), in order to revoke the defendant's probation
after his probationary period has expired, the trial court must
make findings that the State had made reasonable effort . . . to
conduct the hearing earlier. Id. at 528, 263 S.E.2d at 595; see
also State v. Hall, 160 N.C. App. 593, 586 S.E.2d 561 (2003).
Here, however, the trial court did not make any findings, and there
is no evidence in the record to support a finding that the State
made a reasonable effort to conduct the hearing earlier.
Accordingly, pursuant to Camp and Hall, we conclude that
jurisdiction was lost by the lapse of time and the court had no
power to enter a revocation judgment against defendant. Hall, 160
N.C. App. at 594, 586 S.E.2d at 561 (quoting Camp, 299 N.C. at 528,
263 S.E.2d at 595). Accordingly, the judgment appealed from is
arrested.
Judgment arrested.
Judges McCULLOUGH and TYSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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