An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
NORTH CAROLINA COURT OF APPEALS
Filed: 5 July 2006
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA,
Nos. 04 CRS 57426, 35977
PARIS LAMONT STEPHENS,
Appeal by Defendant from judgment entered 10 May 2005 by Judge
Lindsay R. Davis, Jr., in Superior Court, Forsyth County. Heard in
the Court of Appeals 9 May 2006.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Karen Ousley Boyer, Assistant Attorney General, for the State.
Anne Bleyman, for defendant-appellant.
Section 15A-401(b)(1) of the North Carolina General Statutes
permits an officer to arrest without a warrant any person the
officer has probable cause to believe has committed a criminal
offense in the officer's presence.
(See footnote 1)
Defendant argues that the
trial court erred by not finding probable cause based on the
offense for which he was arrested, consuming alcohol where the
business did not have an on-premise consumption permit. Because
there was objective probable cause to arrest Defendant for
attempting to flee from an officer, we uphold the trial court's
conclusions of law.
The evidence presented at trial tended to show that on 15 June
2004, Officer R.J. Paul, a detective assigned to the Winston-Salem
Police Department's vice and narcotics unit, observed Michael
Rayvon Williams, who had an outstanding warrant for his arrest, and
Defendant Paris Lamont Stephens sitting in the parking lot of a gas
station in a known drug area. Officers J.D. McCready and C.N.
Kiser assisted Officer Paul in taking Williams into custody.
Because Officer Paul knew Defendant possibly had outstanding
warrants, due to his arrests in this known high drug sales area and
being around Mr. Williams who has a past drug arrest, he advised
Officers McCready and Kiser to speak with Defendant regarding what
he was doing in the area, and ask Defendant to consent to search of
Officers McCready and Kiser approached Defendant, who was
sitting in a chair with an open beer in a plastic bag on the ground
between his feet. Officer Kiser asked Defendant whether the bottle
was open. Defendant responded that the beer did not belong to him
and that he had just sat down in the chair. Officer McCready
asked Defendant whether he had any identification, and Defendant
refused to provide identification.
Defendant asked the officers why they were messing with him
since he hadn't done anything wrong. Defendant stood up and
began to look around as if he was looking for a route to escape.
Defendant continued scanning the area, looking over the officers'
shoulders, to the sides and avoiding eye contact. Based on theofficers' training and experience, they knew Defendant was looking
for an avenue of escape and that he was going to eventually
Defendant suddenly took off running around the left side of
the officers toward the road. The uniformed officers chased
Defendant and ordered him to stop. After running about fifteen or
twenty feet, the officers caught Defendant. Defendant was placed
under arrest for consuming an alcoholic beverage where the business
did not have an on-premises consumption permit, in violation of
section 18B-300(b) of the North Carolina General Statutes.
Officer Paul conducted a search of Defendant incident to the
arrest. He found approximately twenty packaged dime bags of
marijuana and a larger sandwich bag of loose marijuana in
Defendant's pockets. The total weight of the marijuana seized from
Defendant was 30.3 grams.
Defendant was charged with felony possession of marijuana with
the intent to sell and deliver and consumption of a malt beverage
on premises with an off-premises permit. On 8 November 2004, a
grand jury issued two separate indictments charging Defendant with
possession with intent to sell and deliver marijuana and with being
an habitual felon.
On 10 May 2005, a jury returned a verdict finding Defendant
guilty of possession with intent to sell and deliver marijuana.
The State then presented evidence to show that Defendant was an
habitual felon, and the jury returned a guilty verdict. Defendant
was sentenced as an habitual felon for the possession with intentto sell and deliver marijuana to a term of eighty-four to 110
On appeal to this Court, Defendant contends the trial court
erred by: (I) denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as
a result of his arrest, (II) finding that there was probable cause
to arrest Defendant, (III) denying his motion to dismiss the charge
of possession with intent to sell and deliver, and (IV) denying his
motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of the evidence.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result of his arrest.
Specifically, Defendant contends the trial court's determination
that probable cause existed with respect to N.C. Gen. Stat. . 14-
223 (2005) was not sufficient to support its order because the
trial court did not conclude that there was probable cause to
arrest him based on N.C. Gen. Stat. . 18B-300(b) (2005), the
violation for which he was, in fact, arrested and charged.
Defendant argues that because the arrest was unlawful, the trial
court should have granted his motion to suppress the evidence
obtained incident to the unlawful arrest. We disagree.
This Court's review of a denial of a motion to suppress is
limited to determining whether the trial court's findings of fact
are supported by competent evidence, in which case they are binding
on appeal, and whether the findings of fact in turn support the
conclusions of law. State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d
618, 619 (1982). If the trial court's conclusions of law aresupported by its factual findings, this Court will not disturb
those conclusions on appeal. State v. Logner, 148 N.C. App. 135,
138, 557 S.E.2d 191, 193-94 (2001).
Here, Defendant did not challenge on appeal the trial court's
findings of fact. Thus, our review is limited to whether the
trial court's findings of fact, which are presumed to be supported
by competent evidence, support its conclusions of law and
judgment. State v. Downing, 169 N.C. App. 790, 794, 613 S.E.2d
35, 38 (2005) (citation omitted). Therefore, the sole question for
our consideration is whether these conclusions of law are supported
by the undisputed findings of fact and are legally correct. State
v. Coplen, 138 N.C. App. 48, 52, 530 S.E.2d 313, 317, cert. denied,
352 N.C. 677, 545 S.E.2d 438 (2000).
A warrantless arrest is lawful if based upon probable cause,
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 174, 93 L. Ed. 1879, 1889-
90 (1949); State v. Phillips, 300 N.C. 678, 683-84, 268 S.E.2d 452,
456 (1980), and permitted by state law. State v. Wooten, 34 N.C.
App. 85, 88, 237 S.E.2d 301, 304 (1977). Section 15A-401(b)(1) of
the North Carolina General Statutes permits an officer to arrest
without a warrant any person the officer has probable cause to
believe has committed a criminal offense in the officer's presence.
N.C. Gen. Stat. . 15A-401(b)(1); Brooks, 337 N.C. at 145, 446
S.E.2d at 588; Trapp, 110 N.C. App. at 587, 430 S.E.2d at 486. The
facts to establish probable cause must be sufficient to justify the
issuance of an arrest warrant even though one has not beenrequested prior to the arrest. See Phillips, 300 N.C. at 684, 268
S.E.2d at 456.
In Brinegar, the United States Supreme Court discussed the
concept of probable cause, stating:
[p]robabilities . . . are not technical; they
are the factual and practical considerations
of everyday life on which reasonable and
prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The
standard of proof is accordingly correlative
to what must be proved. . . . Probable cause
exists where the facts and circumstances
within [the officers'] knowledge, and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information,
[are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that
an offense has been or is being committed.
338 U.S. at 175-76, 93 L. Ed. at 1890 (internal quotations and
citation omitted). In State v. Zuniga, 312 N.C. 251, 322 S.E.2d
140 (1984), the North Carolina Supreme Court explained that
while a reviewing court must, of necessity
view the action of the law enforcement officer
in retrospect, our role is not to import to
the officer what in our judgment, as legal
technicians, might have been a prudent course
of action; but rather our role is to determine
whether the officer has acted as a man of
reasonable caution who, in good faith and
based upon practical consideration of everyday
life, believed the suspect committed the crime
for which he was later charged.
Id. at 262, 322 S.E.2d at 147 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
To determine whether probable cause existed to arrest, a court
may consider the following non-exclusive factors:
(1) the time of day; (2) the defendant's
suspicious behavior; (3) flight from the
officer or the area; and (4) the officer's
knowledge of defendant's past criminal
State v. Mills, 104 N.C. App. 724, 729, 411 S.E.2d 193, 196 (1991)
(internal citations omitted). Moreover, information given by one
officer to another is reasonably reliable information to provide
probable cause. State v. Thomas, 127 N.C. App. 431, 433, 492
S.E.2d 41, 42 (1997) (citations omitted).
In this case, the trial court judge found that the officers
had probable cause to arrest Defendant based on the following
findings of fact, which are presumed correct and supported by
On June 15, 2004 officers of the Winston-Salem
Police Department were serving criminal
process in the vicinity of Glenn and Greenway
within the City; in the process of doing so
they observed the Defendant sitting outside of
the Bi-Lo gas station at that intersection.
Officer Paul of the Winston-Salem Police
Department informed Officers McCready and
Kiser that the Defendant may have warrants
outstanding, and that he had previously been
arrested on drug related charges.
The vicinity of Glenn and Greenway is an area
of incidents of high drug related illegal
Officers McCready and Kiser approached the
Defendant and observed a can of beer in a
plastic bag at his feet; they asked the
Defendant for identification; the defendant
did not produce identification, but stood and
appeared to be looking for a way to leave.
Suddenly the Defendant ran but was apprehended
by Officers McCready and Kiser within ten to
fifteen feet. The Defendant was arrested at
that time for violation of General Statutes
The Defendant was searched at the scene
following that arrest. The search produced
from his person approximately twenty dime bags
and one larger bag of marijuana.
Subsequently, the Defendant was charged with
felony possession with intent to sell or
Based on the totality of the circumstances, the trial judge
concluded as a matter of law that:
One, Officers McCready and Kiser were carrying
out the duties of their office when they
approached the Defendant and inquired about
Two, it is not necessary that the Defendant be
arrested for the commission of the offense for
which probable cause exists.
Three, probable cause exists that by
attempting to flee the Defendant violated GS
Four, his arrest was supported by probable
cause, and the search incident to that arrest
Five, evidence discovered pursuant to the
search was not unlawfully seized.
Defendant contends the trial court's determination that
probable cause existed with respect to N.C. Gen. Stat. . 14-223 was
not sufficient to support its order because the trial court did not
conclude that there was probable cause to arrest him under N.C.
Gen. Stat. . 18B-300(b), the violation for which he was, in fact,
arrested and charged.
In Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 152, 160 L. Ed.2d 537,
544 (2004), the United States Supreme Court held that a warrantless
arrest by a law officer is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
if, given the facts known to the officer, there is probable cause
to believe that a crime has been or is being committed. Id. The
Devenpeck Court reasoned: [o]ur cases make clear that an arresting
officer's state of mind (except for the facts
that he knows) is irrelevant to the existence
of probable cause. See Whren v. United
States, 517 U.S. 806, 812-813, 135 L. Ed. 2d
89, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (1996) (reviewing cases);
Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 149 L. Ed.
2d 994, 121 S. Ct. 1876 (2001) (per curiam).
That is to say, his subjective reason for
making the arrest need not be the criminal
offense as to which the known facts provide
probable cause. As we have repeatedly
explained, 'the fact that the officer does not
have the state of mind which is hypothecated
by the reasons which provide the legal
justification for the officer's action does
not invalidate the action taken as long as the
circumstances, viewed objectively, justify
that action.' Whren, supra, at 813, 135 L. Ed.
2d 89, 116 S. Ct. 1769 (quoting Scott v.
United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138, 56 L. Ed. 2d
168, 98 S. Ct. 1717 (1978)). '[T]he Fourth
Amendment's concern with 'reasonableness'
allows certain actions to be taken in certain
circumstances, whatever the subjective
intent.' Whren, supra, at 814, 135 L. Ed. 2d
89, 116 S. Ct. 1769. '[E]venhanded law
enforcement is best achieved by the
application of objective standards of conduct,
rather than standards that depend upon the
subjective state of mind of the officer.'
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138, 110
L. Ed. 2d 112, 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990).
Id. at 153, 160 L. Ed. 2d at 545 (emphasis in original).
Thus, based on the Supreme Court's reasoning in Devenpeck, the
trial judge in this case was not required to conclude that there
was probable cause to arrest Defendant based on his violation of
N.C. Gen. Stat. 18B-300(b) simply because that was the resulting
arrest and offense charged. The trial judge found that the
officers were lawfully discharging a duty of their office when they
asked Defendant to identify himself, he refused to identify
himself, ran and was then arrested by the officers. Based on thesefindings of fact, the trial judge properly focused on the factors
that objectively established probable cause and concluded there was
probable cause to arrest Defendant for resisting, delaying or
obstructing a police officer in violation of section 14-223 of the
North Carolina General Statutes. See N.C. Gen. Stat. . 14-223. It
is irrelevant that Defendant was ultimately charged and arrested
for violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. . 18B-300(b) since there was
objective probable cause to arrest Defendant for violating N.C.
Gen. Stat. . 14-223.
Defendant next argues that flight from a police officer,
standing alone, does not constitute probable cause. Analogous to
this case, in State v. Swift
, 105 N.C. App. 550, 414 S.E.2d 65
two police officers investigated a complaint about persons
drinking beer in a store parking lot. Id.
at 551, 414 S.E.2d at
66. When the officers entered the parking lot, the defendant
exited a car from the driver's side and placed a beer down beside
the car. Id.
One of the officers approached the defendant and
asked for a driver's license. The defendant said that he did not
have one and fled. The officers pursued the defendant, caught him,
and arrested him for resisting an officer under section 14-223 of
the North Carolina General Statutes. Id.
at 551-52, 414 S.E.2d at
court concluded that because [t]he officers
observed defendant emerge from the car and place a beer down on the
ground and the parking lot only had an off-premises license foralcohol, the officers had reasonable suspicion to believe that
the defendant had committed a misdemeanor in violation of section
at 555, 414 S.E.2d at 68. The Swift
[b]ecause the investigatory stop was legal,
defendant did not have a right to resist. His
subsequent flight from a lawful investigatory
stop contributed to probable cause that
defendant was in violation of both N.C.G.S. .
18B-300(b) as well as . 14-223. With probable
cause, the officers were entitled to arrest
defendant for resisting an officer.
Similarly, in this case, the trial judge's findings of fact
reveal that the trial judge considered not only Defendant's flight,
but also the officers' knowledge that Defendant may have had
outstanding warrants for his arrest, had been arrested for drug
related crimes, was sitting in a high crime area known for drug
sales with a can of beer between his feet, refused to identify
himself, immediately exhibited signs of agitation and evasiveness,
and ran from the officers before an arrest was attempted.
Flight is a strong indicia of mens rea, and when coupled with
other relevant facts or the specific knowledge on the part of the
arresting officer relating the subject to the evidence of the
crime, it may properly be considered in assessing probable cause.
Williams, 32 N.C. App. at 208, 231 S.E.2d at 284. (citation
omitted). Because the trial court did not base its conclusion
solely on the fact that Defendant fled the officers, we conclude
that the trial judge properly concluded that the officers had
probable cause to arrest Defendant for resisting, delaying orobstructing a police officer in violation of section 14-223 of the
North Carolina General Statutes. See N.C. Gen. Stat. . 14-223.
As it relates to Officer Paul's search of Defendant, it is
well-established under North Carolina law that an officer may
conduct a search without a warrant incident to a lawful arrest.
Zuniga, 312 N.C. at 258, 322 S.E.2d at 144 (A search without a
search warrant may be made incident to a lawful arrest[.]); State
v. Norman, 100 N.C. App. 660, 663, 397 S.E.2d 647, 649 (1990)
(Both the North Carolina Constitution and the United States
Constitution allow a search incident to a lawful arrest[.]
(citation omitted)), appeal dismissed and disc. review denied, 328
N.C. 273, 400 S.E.2d 459 (1991); State v. Mills, 104 N.C. App. 724,
728, 411 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1991) (An officer may conduct a
warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest[.] (citation
omitted)). Because the trial judge in this case determined the
officers had probable cause to arrest Defendant for violation of
N.C. Gen. Stat. . 14-223, and, therefore, Defendant's arrest was
lawful, the trial judge properly concluded that the search incident
to Defendant's arrest was lawful. Accordingly, we find no error in
the trial judge's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress and the
admission of the marijuana seized from Defendant as evidence in his
trial for possession with intent to sell and deliver.
In his next argument on appeal, Defendant contends the trial
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of
possession with intent to sell and deliver marijuana on the groundthat there was insufficient evidence of intent to sell and deliver.
Defendant's argument is without merit.
To withstand a motion to dismiss based on the sufficiency of
the evidence, the State must present substantial evidence of (1)
each essential element of the charged offense and (2) the defendant
being the perpetrator. State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526
S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000). Substantial evidence is defined as such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to
support a conclusion. State v. Butler, 356 N.C. 141, 145, 567
S.E.2d 137, 139 (2002); State v. Blake, 319 N.C. 599, 604, 356
S.E.2d 352, 355 (1987). The court must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of
all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the evidence.
Fritsch, 351 N.C. at 378-79, 526 S.E.2d at 455.
To convict a defendant of marijuana possession with intent to
sell or deliver, the State must prove the following elements: 1)
knowing; 2) possession; 3) of marijuana; 4) with the intent to sell
or deliver. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(1) (2005); see also State
v. Carr, 145 N.C. App. 335, 341, 549 S.E.2d 897, 902 (2001); State
v. Fletcher, 92 N.C. App. 50, 55, 373 S.E.2d 681, 685 (1988).
Defendant asserts on appeal that the amount of the marijuana,
approximately 30.3 grams, recovered from his pants pockets does not
raise a presumption that the marijuana was possessed for sale and
delivery. In viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to
the State, and giving the State the benefit of every reasonable
inference supported by that evidence, we conclude that there issufficient evidence to establish that Defendant possessed the
controlled substance of marijuana with the intent to sell or
We find this Court's decision in State v. Williams, 71 N.C.
App. 136, 321 S.E.2d 561 (1984), instructive. In Williams, the
defendant possessed 27.6 grams of marijuana, which is a misdemeanor
pursuant to section 90-95(d) of the North Carolina General
Statutes. Id. at 139, 321 S.E.2d at 564. The defendant argued
that this small amount of marijuana was insufficient to raise a
presumption that the marijuana was possessed for sale and delivery,
a felony. This Court rejected the defendant's argument,
Defendant's argument would be persuasive
except for the evidence of how the 27.6 grams
of marijuana was packaged. The evidence at
trial showed that the marijuana in question
was packaged in seventeen separate, small
brown envelopes known in street terminology as
nickel or dime bags. Nickel or dime bags
are the units in which small amounts of
marijuana are generally sold for five or ten
dollars. The method of packaging a controlled
substance, as well as the amount of the
substance, may constitute evidence from which
a jury can infer an intent to distribute.
State v. Baxter, 285 N.C. 735, 208 S.E. 2d 696
(1974); see also State v. Casey, 59 N.C. App.
99, 296 S.E. 2d 473 (1982). While it is true
that there was no direct evidence that
defendant possessed the 27.6 grams of
marijuana for sale and delivery, the
circumstances of the packaging could be
considered by the jury in finding defendant
guilty of the felony offense. See State v.
Childers, 41 N.C. App. 729, 255 S.E. 2d 654,
cert. denied, 298 N.C. 302, 259 S.E. 2d 916
Id. at 139-40, 321 S.E.2d at 564. Likewise, in this case, the record reveals that Defendant
possessed 30.3 grams of marijuana that was packaged in twenty
separate dime bags and one larger sandwich bag, less than one and
a half ounces, a Class 1 misdemeanor under section 90-95(d) of the
North Carolina General Statutes. At trial, the officers testified
that dime bags are slang for approximately $10.00 worth of
marijuana and that drug dealers in the ordinary course of business
package marijuana in dime bags.
Once the court decides that a reasonable inference of
[Defendant's] guilt may be drawn from the circumstances, then it is
for the jury to decide whether the facts, taken singly or in
combination, satisfy it beyond a reasonable doubt that [Defendant]
is actually guilty. Fritsch, 351 N.C. at 379, 526 S.E.2d at 455.
Based on this Court's decision in Williams, this method of
packaging the marijuana was sufficient evidence for a jury to infer
Defendant's intent to distribute marijuana and, therefore, find him
guilty of a felony offense. Accordingly, the trial judge properly
denied Defendant's motion to dismiss for insufficiency of the
evidence and Defendant's assignment of error is, therefore,
In his final argument on appeal, Defendant contends the trial
court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the habitual felon
indictment. Defendant's argument is without merit.
Our habitual felon statute is the result of a deliberate
policy choice by the legislature that those who repeatedly commitfelonious criminal offenses should be segregated from the rest of
society for an extended period of time. State v. Quick
, 170 N.C.
App. 166, 170, 611 S.E.2d 864, 866-67 (2005) (quoting State v.
76 N.C. App. 638, 640, 334 S.E.2d 107, 108 (1985)). In
this case, the jury found Defendant guilty of being an habitual
felon based on the following underlying felony guilty pleas: (1)
possession of cocaine on 17 February 1991; (2) habitual misdemeanor
assault on 10 April 1998; and (3) possession with intent to
manufacture, sell and deliver marijuana on 21 April 2000.
trial judge then adjudged Defendant an habitual felon to be
sentenced as a Class C felon, and sentenced Defendant in the
presumptive range to a minimum of eighty-four and a maximum of 110
In 2004, the General Assembly amended section 14-33.2 of the
North Carolina General Statutes, entitled Habitual Misdemeanor
Assault, to state in pertinent part: A conviction under this
section shall not be used as a prior conviction for any other
habitual offense statute. N.C. Gen. Stat. . 14-33.2 (2005). The
legislature specifically stated in Session Law 2004-186, section
10.2, which relates to the amended section 14-33.2, that
[t]his part is effective December 1, 2004, and
applies to offenses committed on or after that
date. Prosecutions for offenses committed
before the effective date of this part are not
abated or affected by this part, and the
statutory provisions that would be applicable
but for this part remain applicable to those
2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 186, section 10.2.
Without citing any authority to support his argument,
Defendant contends that because the General Assembly amended the
habitual felon statute to exclude habitual misdemeanor assault
convictions to support habitual indictments after 1 December 2004,
use of his habitual misdemeanor assault conviction as an underlying
felony violated the rule of leniency and fundamental fairness.
However, [w]here the language of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, there is no room for judicial construction and the
courts must construe the statute using its plain meaning. Burgess
v. Your House of Raleigh, Inc.
, 326 N.C. 205, 209, 388 S.E.2d 134,
136 (1990) (citation omitted). The record reveals that Defendant
pled guilty on 1 December 1998 to habitual misdemeanor assault, a
felony that was committed on 10 April 1998.
Defendant was indicted
on 8 November 2004 as an habitual felon with an offense date of 15
The trial court, therefore, properly dismissed
Defendant's motion to dismiss the habitual felon indictment.
Defendant further argues that North Carolina's Habitual Felon
Act is cruel and unusual punishment. We need not further
consider Defendant's argument because this Court specifically
rejected it in Quick
, 170 N.C. App. at 170, 611 S.E.2d at 866. See
also State v. Garcia
__ N.C. App. __, __, 621 S.E.2d 292,
(2005) (holding that sentence of a term of 133 to 167 months
imposed on defendant based on his status as a habitual felon was
not cruel and unusual punishment). Accordingly, we reject this
assignment of error as barred by binding precedents. See In re
, 324 N.C. 373, 384, 379 S.E.2d 30, 37 (1989) (Wherea panel of the Court of Appeals has decided the same issue, albeit
in a different case, a subsequent panel of the same court is bound
by that precedent, unless it has been overturned by a higher
Judges GEER and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
N.C. Gen. Stat. . 15A-401(b)(1) (2005); State v. Brooks,
337 N.C. 132, 145, 446 S.E.2d 579, 588 (1994); State v. Trapp
110 N.C. App. 584, 587, 430 S.E.2d 484, 486 (1993).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***