IN THE MATTER OF:
S.C.B.
Mecklenburg County
No. 05 J 293
Attorney General Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney
General Dorothy Powers, for the State.
Don Willey, for juvenile-appellant.
JACKSON, Judge.
On 4 January 2005, S.C.B. (“juvenile”) was a passenger in a
vehicle which allegedly had sideswiped another vehicle and
attempted to leave the scene. Officer D. A. Wright (“Wright”), who
stopped the vehicle, testified that the four occupants in the
vehicle were uncooperative and smelled of marijuana. He stated
that upon pulling the vehicle over and interviewing the driver, he
observed a lot of movement in the vehicle, and saw one of the
passengers grab something and put it down in the back seat. Wright
saw that a purse which originally had been in the front of the
vehicle, in between the driver's and passenger's seats, was now
gone. He also saw that the jacket juvenile had been wearing at thetime of the stop was now laying in the middle of the back seat
beside where juvenile was sitting.
Wright called for backup before searching the vehicle, and
Officer Lucas Veith (“Veith”) responded. Veith testified that he
obtained the driver's consent to search the vehicle. Two of the
passengers then exited the vehicle, leaving juvenile alone in the
vehicle's back seat. Before asking juvenile to exit the vehicle,
Veith searched the jacket he found laying on the backseat. Upon
doing so, he noticed a black purse on the floor of the back seat
which was partially covered by juvenile's legs. Veith asked
juvenile if the purse was hers, to which she responded “no.” Veith
then stated that since the purse was not hers, she would not mind
if he searched it. As he reached for the purse, juvenile lunged
for the purse and stated that Veith could not search it. When
Veith picked up the purse, he stated it felt heavy for its size,
and upon searching the purse, he found a loaded silver .22 caliber
revolver.
On 23 March 2005, two juvenile petitions alleging delinquency
were filed alleging juvenile had committed the misdemeanors of
carrying a concealed weapon and possession of a handgun by a minor.
A single juvenile summons and notice of hearing was filed on 28
March 2005, and served upon both juvenile and her parent or
guardian on 3 April 2005. Only one docket number was assigned to
both petitions. On 27 May 2005, juvenile filed a motion to
suppress the evidence obtained during the officer's search of the
purse. At a 6 June 2005 hearing, juvenile's motion was denied andshe subsequently entered admissions to the allegations contained in
both petitions. Juvenile preserved the right to appeal the denial
of her motion to suppress evidence. The trial court entered a
disposition order ordering a Level I disposition which included,
inter alia, six months of probation, a curfew, and community
service. Juvenile appeals from the adjudication and entry of the
disposition order on 6 June 2005.
We note that juvenile presents arguments in her brief only for
one of her three assignments of error, thus, the assignments of
error for which no argument was presented are deemed abandoned.
N.C. R. App. P. 28(b)(6) (2005).
On appeal, juvenile contends the trial court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to adjudicate juvenile as delinquent and to
enter disposition for the two charges when only a single summons
was issued. Juvenile contends that the issuance of a single
summons, when juvenile was charged with two offenses in two
separate petitions, gave the trial court subject matter
jurisdiction over only one of the charges. We disagree.
“Jurisdiction of the court over the subject
matter of an action is the most critical
aspect of the court's authority to act.
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to the
power of the court to deal with the kind of
action in question[, and] . . . is conferred
upon the courts by either the North Carolina
Constitution or by statute.”
In re T.R.P., __ N.C. App. __, __, 619 S.E.2d 525, 527 (2005)
(quoting In re McKinney, 158 N.C. App. 441, 443, 581 S.E.2d 793,
795 (2003) (citations omitted)). The issue of whether a trial
court has subject matter jurisdiction over an action may be raisedat any time, and this Court will review the issue when it is raised
for the first time in an appeal. In re S.D.A., 170 N.C. App. 354,
357-58, 612 S.E.2d 362, 364 (2005) (citing In re J.B., 164 N.C.
App. 394, 396, 595 S.E.2d 794, 795 (2004)). Thus, although
juvenile failed to raise the issue of a lack of subject matter
jurisdiction before the trial court, we now properly review the
issue on appeal.
In a juvenile delinquency action, the petition stating the
offenses the juvenile is alleged to have committed serves as the
pleading, whereas the issuance of a summons serves as the process
upon the juvenile. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1801 (2005). It is not
disputed that both petitions were served on the juvenile and her
mother. A petition alleging delinquency must provide the juvenile
with “a plain and concise statement, . . . asserting facts
supporting every element of a criminal offense” such that the
juvenile is sufficiently put on notice as to “the conduct which is
the subject of the allegation.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1082 (2005).
Once a petition has been filed with the clerk of court, alleging
that the juvenile is delinquent, “the clerk shall issue a summons
to the juvenile and to the parent, guardian, or custodian requiring
them to appear for a hearing at the time and place stated in the
summons. A copy of the petition shall be attached to each
summons.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1805(a) (2005). The summons and
petition must then be served upon the juvenile, and the parent,
guardian or custodian. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1806 (2005). Pursuant to section 7B-1805, a juvenile summons must be
printed on a form supplied by the Administrative Office of the
Courts, and must include the following:
(1) Notice of the nature of the proceeding
and the purpose of the hearing scheduled
on the summons.
(2) Notice of any right to counsel and
information about how to seek the
appointment of counsel prior to a
hearing.
(3) Notice that, if the court determines at
the adjudicatory hearing that the
allegations of the petition are true, the
court will conduct a dispositional
hearing and will have jurisdiction to
enter orders affecting substantial rights
of the juvenile and of the parent,
guardian, or custodian, . . . .
(4) Notice that the parent, guardian, or
custodian shall be required to attend
scheduled hearings and that failure
without reasonable cause to attend may
result in proceedings for contempt of
court.
(5) Notice that the parent, guardian, or
custodian shall be responsible for
bringing the juvenile before the court at
any hearing the juvenile is required to
attend and that failure without
reasonable cause to bring the juvenile
before the court may result in
proceedings for contempt of court.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1805(b) (2005). Thus, the purpose of the
juvenile summons is to provide notice to the juvenile and the
juvenile's parent or guardian of the juvenile's rights, and of the
date and time of the pending hearings. In delinquency proceedings,
juveniles are entitled to “[a]ll rights afforded adult offenders
except the right to bail, the right of self-representation, and the
right of trial by jury.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2405(6) (2005).
These rights include “[t]he right to written notice of the factsalleged in the petition.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-2405(1) (2005). In
the criminal prosecution of an adult, an adult defendant is
entitled to an indictment or criminal summons that informs the
defendant of the nature of the crime of which he is accused. State
v. Coker, 312 N.C. 432, 437, 323 S.E.2d 343, 347-48 (1984). Our
courts have long held that juvenile delinquency proceedings are not
“criminal prosecutions,” and a finding of delinquency is not
synonymous with a “conviction of a crime.” In re Burrus, 275 N.C.
517, 529, 169 S.E.2d 879, 886-87 (1969), aff'd, 403 U.S. 528, 29 L.
Ed. 2d 647 (1971); see also In re N.B., 167 N.C. App. 305, 308, 605
S.E.2d 488, 490 (2004). Thus, “[s]o long as proceedings in the
juvenile court meet the requirements of due process, they are
constitutionally sound and must be upheld.” Id. at 529, 169 S.E.2d
at 887. These requirements include the juvenile's right to notice,
“which would be deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil or
criminal proceeding; that is, notice must be given to the juvenile
and his parents sufficiently in advance of scheduled court
proceedings to afford them reasonable opportunity to prepare, and
the notice must set forth the alleged misconduct with
particularity.” Id. at 530, 169 S.E.2d at 887 (citing In Re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 18 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1967)).
In a juvenile delinquency proceeding, the juvenile petition
and summons, when served together, act as an indictment or
criminal summons would in an adult criminal prosecution, in that
the petition provides the juvenile and his parent or guardian with
notice of the offenses he is alleged to have committed and thefacts giving rise to the charges, and the summons provides notice
of the hearing. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1082 (2005); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1805 (2005); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-303 (2005); N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-644 (2005). Thus, when a petition and summons have
been issued in accordance with our statutes, the juvenile and his
parent or guardian are given proper notice of the charged offenses
and the forthcoming hearings on the matters, such that due process
is satisfied.
In the instant case, the petitions alleging carrying a
concealed weapon and possession of a handgun by a minor satisfied
the statutory requirements, and were served upon juvenile and her
parent or guardian, along with a single summons. Juvenile contends
the issuance of a single summons, rather than a separate summons
for each petition constituted error and prevented the trial court
from acquiring subject matter jurisdiction over both petitions.
Juvenile does not challenge the sufficiency of the summons apart
from the fact there was only one summons rather than two. Juvenile
relies on In re Mitchell, 126 N.C. App. 432, 485 S.E.2d 623 (1997),
in support of her argument that when only one summons is issued for
two separate petitions, the trial court acquires jurisdiction over
only one of the petitions. However, in juvenile's case, neither
party disputes that juvenile and her parent were both properly
served with the summons and both petitions. Neither party contends
that both petitions were not attached to the summons as required by
section 7B-1805(a), or that the petitions or summons failed to
provide proper notice of the offenses charged and the hearing onthe charges. Also, we find nothing in our juvenile delinquency
statutes that requires separate summons be issued for each petition
alleging delinquency when all documents in the case are under one
file or docket number.
Juvenile's reliance on Mitchell is misplaced. In Mitchell, we
held the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because no
summons whatsoever had been issued in the case. Id. at 433, 485
S.E.2d at 624. In the instant case, a summons was issued, and it
was properly served upon juvenile and her parent or guardian. The
contents of the summons complied with the statutory requirements,
and it was properly attached to the juvenile petitions. We
therefore hold the trial court had jurisdiction over the subject
matter alleged in both petitions, and thus the trial court had the
authority to adjudicate juvenile as delinquent and to enter
dispositions against juvenile for both petitions. Juvenile's
assignment of error is overruled.
Affirmed.
Judges TYSON and GEER concur.
Report per Rule 30 (e).
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