NORTH COUNTRY DEVELOPMENT
OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, INC.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. Davidson County
No. 01 CVS 2238
LOIS AUBIN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by Reid
L. Phillips and Andrew J. Haile, for plaintiff-appellant.
Brinkley Walser, by G. Thompson Miller, for defendant-
appellee.
McGEE, Judge.
North Country Development of Jefferson County, Inc.
(plaintiff) seeks review of the trial court's order of 24 June
2005, which denied its motion for relief from an order entered 1
December 2003. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule upon
plaintiff's motion, however, because an appeal from the earlier
order was still pending before this Court at that time. We must
therefore vacate the 24 June 2005 order.
The trial court entered an order on 1 December 2003, in which
it approved exemptions claimed pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1C-1603(e) (2005) by Lois Aubin (defendant). Plaintiff and Anthony
Susi (Susi) gave notice of appeal from that order on 3 December
2003. Plaintiff and Susi filed a joint record on appeal with this
Court in that matter on 26 March 2004.
After filing a "motion for relief from order" with the trial
court on 7 October 2004, plaintiff filed a "notice of filing of
Rule 60(b) motion with trial court" with this Court on 12 October
2004. Plaintiff's and Susi's appeal from the 1 December 2003 order
was heard by this Court on 18 November 2004. While plaintiff's
appeal was still pending, the trial court heard its Rule 60(b)
motion. In an order entered 24 June 2005, the trial court denied
plaintiff's Rule 60(b) motion. Plaintiff gave notice of appeal
from the order on 19 July 2005 and filed the present record on
appeal with this Court on 29 September 2005. This Court
subsequently filed its opinion in the parties' earlier appeal on 4
October 2005 and issued its mandate on 24 October 2005. Susi v.
Aubin, ___ N.C. App. ___, 620 S.E.2d 682 (2005). From the trial
court's order of 24 June 2005, plaintiff appeals.
In its first argument, plaintiff contends the trial court
lacked jurisdiction to enter its order of 24 June 2005 during the
pendency of the parties' earlier appeal. Defendant agrees in her
brief that the trial court's authority to address the Rule 60(b)
motion was limited to indicating how it would be inclined to rule
on the motion were the appeal not pending.
Generally, "an appeal removes a case from the jurisdiction of
the trial court and, pending the appeal, the trial judge is functusofficio." Bowen v. Motor Co., 292 N.C. 633, 635, 234 S.E.2d 748,
749 (1977). This general rule has two exceptions and one
qualification. Id. "[N]otwithstanding the pendency of an appeal
the trial judge retains jurisdiction over the cause (1) during the
session in which the judgment appealed from was rendered and (2)
for the purpose of settling the case on appeal." Id. "The
qualification to the general rule is that 'the trial [court], after
notice and on proper showing, may adjudge the appeal has been
abandoned' and thereby regain jurisdiction of the cause." Id.
(quoting Machine Co. v. Dixon, 260 N.C. 732, 735-36, 133 S.E.2d
659, 662 (1963)). Because the trial court was addressing a Rule
60(b) motion, neither the two exceptions nor the qualification of
the general rule was applicable.
"A trial court may consider a Rule 60(b) motion which is filed
though an appeal is pending in order to indicate how it would rule
on the motion were the appeal not pending." Pheasant v. McKibben,
100 N.C. App. 379, 385, 396 S.E.2d 333, 337 (1990), disc. review
denied, 328 N.C. 92, 402 S.E.2d 417 (1991); see also Bell v.
Martin, 43 N.C. App. 134, 258 S.E.2d 403 (1979), rev'd on other
grounds, 299 N.C. 715, 264 S.E.2d 101 (1980). The trial court in
this case did not just indicate how it would have been inclined to
rule were the appeal not pending, but actually denied plaintiff's
Rule 60(b) motion during the pendency of the earlier appeal.
Because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to rule upon the
motion,
see Bruggeman v. Meditrust Co., LLC, 165 N.C. App. 790,
793-95, 600 S.E.2d 507, 510-11, appeal dismissed, 359 N.C. 67, 604S.E.2d 308 (2004),
its order of 24 June 2005 is vacated.
Vacated.
Judges WYNN and HUNTER concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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