IN THE MATTER OF: Mecklenburg County
T.R. No. 04 J 1033, 1034
T.S.
Klein & Freeman, PLLC, by Katherine Freeman, Guardian ad
Litem, and J. Edward Yeager, Jr., Associate County Attorney
for Mecklenburg County, for petitioner-appellee.
Richard Croutharmel for respondent-appellant mother.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals the district court's order
terminating her parental rights to her children, T.R. and T.S. For
the reasons discussed herein, we affirm.
Respondent is the natural mother of T.R. and T.S., born
October 1995 and July 1992, respectively. The Mecklenburg
Department of Social Services (DSS) became involved with the family
in 1998 following reports of inappropriate supervision of the
children, substance abuse, and medical neglect. DSS substantiated
the neglect and began providing treatment services to the family.
Respondent struggled to comply with the terms of the case plan over
the ensuing years, testing positive for cocaine and failing to pay
household bills, including power bills during winter months. Respondent also had problems meeting the medical needs of her
children. She failed to take them to the doctor or dentist for
scheduled appointments or arrived too late for the doctor to see
them. Respondent also let the Medicaid coverage for her children
expire because she failed to fill out required paperwork. A social
worker eventually had to complete the forms to reinstate Medicaid
coverage. During this period, respondent also failed to maintain
employment and was convicted of food stamp fraud. T.R.'s father
lived in the home with respondent and the children. He worked
part-time and gave his check to respondent. T.S.'s father lived in
Charlotte and did not provide any financial support.
On 29 July 2003, DSS filed a juvenile petition alleging the
children were neglected and dependant. The trial court found the
allegations in the petition to be true and entered an order
granting DSS non-secure custody of both children. The children
were placed in the home of their maternal grandfather and step-
grandmother, where they remained until 14 June 2004 when DSS moved
the children to a foster home.
On 17 September 2003, respondent signed a mediation agreement
stipulating to certain findings of fact for adjudication purposes.
An adjudicatory hearing was held on 21 October 2003, at which time
the trial court accepted the mediated settlement agreement, under
the terms of which respondent acknowledged her history of substance
abuse and medical neglect of the children. The trial court
adjudicated the children to be neglected and dependent.
Immediately thereafter, the trial court held a disposition hearingand awarded DSS custody of the minor children. The trial court
adopted the mediated case plan, which provided a goal of
reunification. Pursuant to the case plan, respondent agreed to
complete a substance abuse assessment, comply with all drug
treatment recommendations, obtain appropriate housing and
employment, and complete parenting classes. Respondent completed
the assessment, which recommended she obtain substance abuse
treatment. She initially sought treatment, but never completed any
substance abuse treatment program.
Following a permanency planning hearing in June 2004, DSS made
several attempts to have respondent obtain substance abuse
treatment. These attempts were unsuccessful. During this time,
the trial court issued several Orders to Show Cause for
respondent's failure to comply with its orders to obtain substance
abuse treatment. The trial court found respondent to be in willful
contempt of court and sentenced her to jail for short periods of
time, although most of these sentences were suspended. Respondent
also failed to maintain employment for any length of time. At the
time of the termination of parental rights (TPR) hearing, she had
been working at the Courtyard Marriott Hotel as a cook for
approximately one month. Respondent completed parenting classes.
She did not visit the children on a regular basis, despite having
ready access to them. Respondent only visited the children twice
between March and June 2004.
On 29 September 2004, DSS filed a petition for termination of
parental rights to T.R. and T.S. The petition alleged as groundsfor termination: (1) respondent had neglected the minor children as
defined by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-101(15) (N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a)(1)); and (2) respondent willfully left her children in
foster care for more than twelve months without demonstrating she
had made reasonable progress to correct the conditions which led to
their removal (N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2)). The matter came
on for hearing on 2 August 2005. The trial court terminated
respondent-mother and the fathers' parental rights to both
children, finding each of the grounds for termination alleged in
the petition existed. The trial court further determined it was in
the best interests of both children that the parents' rights be
terminated and entered an order providing for termination. Neither
of the children's fathers contested the termination of their
parental rights and neither are parties to this appeal. Respondent
appeals.
Respondent contends the trial court's findings of fact and
conclusion of law, that it was in the children's best interest to
terminate her parental rights, were not supported by the evidence.
She further contends the trial court abused its discretion when it
ordered her parental rights be terminated. We disagree.
A termination of parental rights proceeding is conducted in
two separate phases: adjudication and disposition. In re McMillon,
143 N.C. App. 402, 408, 546 S.E.2d 169, 173 (2001). At the
adjudicatory stage, the petitioner bears the burden of proving by
clear, cogent, and convincing evidence at least one of the
statutory grounds for termination listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. §7B-1111 exists. Id. at 408, 546 S.E.2d at 173-74. If the
petitioner meets the burden of proving at least one ground for
termination exists, the trial court proceeds to the dispositional
phase and considers whether termination is in the best interests of
the child. Id. at 408, 546 S.E.2d at 174.
While respondent assigned as error numerous findings of fact
in the termination order, she does not make any specific argument
in her brief that any of these findings of fact were not supported
by clear, cogent and convincing evidence. Having failed to argue
these assignments of error in her brief, they are deemed abandoned.
Accord In re E.T.S., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 623 S.E.2d 300, 304
(2005) (citing N.C. R. App. P. Rule 28(b)(6)). Therefore, the
trial court's findings are binding on appeal. Id; In re Padgett,
156 N.C. App. 644, 648, 577 S.E.2d 337, 340 (2003).
In her brief, respondent concedes that grounds existed to
terminate her parental rights as alleged in the petition and that
the trial court properly considered evidence of her changed
circumstances at the time it conducted the TPR hearing. Rather,
she asserts the trial court abused its discretion at the
dispositional phase when it determined that termination of her
parental rights were in her children's best interests. We review
the trial court's decision to terminate a parent's rights during
the dispositional phase under an abuse of discretion standard. In
re Nesbitt, 147 N.C. App. 349, 352, 555 S.E.2d 659, 662 (2001). An
abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court's decision “is so
arbitrary that it could not have been the result of a reasoneddecision.” In re J.B., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 616 S.E.2d 385,
387, aff'd, 360 N.C. 165, 622 S.E.2d 495 (2005).
Respondent argues that several factors combined to create the
trial court's alleged abuse of discretion. First, she asserts the
trial court's failure to conduct a review hearing between the last
permanency planning hearing held on 21 June 2004 and the date of
the TPR hearing held 2 August 2005 violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
906 and prejudiced her because the trial court did not know the
progress she was making in her case and that progress was not made
part of the underlying file. “[T]he scope of review on appeal is
confined to a consideration of those assignments of error set out
in the record on appeal . . . .” N.C. R. App. P. 10(a).
Respondent does not assign the trial court's violation of N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-906 in the record on appeal; therefore, this issue is
not properly before this Court. Respondent also argues she was
prejudiced by the delay between the filing of the petition to
terminate her parental rights and the TPR hearing. Respondent
cites no authority in support of her argument as required by N.C.
R. App. P. 28()(6)), nor does she adequately articulate any
prejudice she suffered from the delay. In re As.L.G., ___ N.C.
App. ___, ___, 619 S.E.2d 561, 564-65 (2005). Therefore, we do not
address this argument.
It also appears respondent is asserting the trial court's
refusal to consider a bond between her children and herself and the
children's wishes, or make any findings of fact about these
matters, contributed to its abuse of discretion. To the extentrespondent contends the trial court prevented her from questioning
the social worker about her bond with her children, the trial court
allowed the social worker to testify that the children stated they
loved their mother and inquired about her progress with her case
plan. Moreover, the trial court is not required to recite every
evidentiary fact presented at the hearing in its order, but must
only make “specific findings of the ultimate facts established by
the evidence, admissions and stipulations which are determinative
of the questions involved in the action and essential to support
the conclusions of law reached.” Quick v. Quick, 305 N.C. 446,
452, 290 S.E.2d 653, 658 (1982) (citing N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1,
Rule 52(a)). Just because the trial court did not make a finding
regarding whether and to what extent the children were bonded with
their mother does not mean it did not consider this in deciding
what was in the children's best interest.
Next, respondent challenges the judgments of contempt entered
by the trial court, arguing they thwarted her ability to comply
with her case plan, such as finding a job and visiting with her
children. Respondent did not timely appeal any of these judgments
in her notice of appeal as required by N.C. R. App. P. 3(d), nor
has she assigned error to them on appeal. N.C. R. App. P. 10(a).
Accordingly, any challenge to these orders has been waived.
Lastly, respondent asserts she was making considerable
progress on her case plan at the time of the TPR hearing, and
therefore, the trial court abused its discretion in concluding it
was in the children's best interests to terminate her parentalrights. Whether a parent has made reasonable progress to correct
the conditions that led to the removal of their children is an
issue to be addressed during the adjudication phase of the
termination hearing. See J.B., ___ N.C. App. ___, ___, 616 S.E.2d
264, 277 (2005) (noting that at the adjudication stage, the trial
court must determine the existence of one or more of the grounds
for termination listed in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111, of which,
whether a parent has made reasonable progress pursuant to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2), is included). On appeal, respondent has not
challenged any of the trial court's findings on this matter, thus
they are binding on appeal. E.T.S., ___ N.C. App. at ___, 623
S.E.2d at 304. In addition, respondent concedes in her brief that
grounds existed to terminate her parental rights for the reasons
asserted in the petition, which included N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(2), and that the trial court properly considered evidence
of her changed circumstances at the time it conducted the TPR
hearing. Thus, this argument is without merit.
AFFIRMED.
Judge MCCULLOUGH and CALABRIA concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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