IN RE:
Haywood County
N.E.G., No. 04-J-88
A minor child
Ira L. Dove for petitioner-appellee Haywood County Department
of Social Services.
Ann H. Davis for Guardian ad Litem appellee.
Carol Ann Bauer for respondent-appellant.
HUNTER, Judge.
R.E.G. (“respondent”) appeals an order terminating his
parental rights as the father of N.E.G. For the reasons stated
herein, we affirm.
The Haywood County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) took
nonsecure custody of N.E.G. on 11 June 2002. A month later, the
trial court entered a “Consent Order on Adjudication,” in which
respondent and the mother of the minor child admitted that N.E.G.
was a neglected juvenile
in that the Respondent mother had the sole
care of the juvenile on or about June 10, 2002
and was too impaired to provide proper care
for him; the juvenile lives in an environment
injurious to his welfare; and the Respondentfather left the juvenile in the care of the
Respondent mother for extended periods of time
and should have known that the mother was
unable to provide proper care for the
juvenile.
The trial court subsequently entered a “Consent Order on
Disposition” and ordered respondent, among other things, to visit
with N.E.G. on a weekly basis. Respondent made the weekly visits
with N.E.G. between July 2002 and March 2003.
In June 2004, DSS filed a petition to terminate the parental
rights of both respondent and the minor child's mother pursuant to
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1), (2), (3), (6) and (7). Respondent
subsequently spoke with N.E.G. on the phone several times, but only
made one weekly visit. The trial court conducted an adjudication
hearing on the petition in October 2004. After the hearing,
respondent resumed his weekly visits with N.E.G. In its
adjudication order dated 12 November 2004, the trial court
concluded that based upon clear, cogent, and convincing evidence,
sufficient grounds existed for terminating respondent's parental
rights in that N.E.G. was neglected pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-1111(a)(1); respondent willfully left N.E.G. in foster care for
more than twelve months without reasonable progress under the
circumstances pursuant to section 7B-1111(a)(2), and respondent
failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost of care for N.E.G.
pursuant to section 7B-1111(a)(3). Respondent continued his weekly
visits with N.E.G. until the trial court conducted its
dispositional hearing in January 2005. The trial court entered its dispositional order on 11 February
2005 and made the following pertinent findings of fact:
2. That the minor child, NEG . . . has been
diagnosed with attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder (ADHD),
oppositional defiance disorder, and mood
disorder.
3. That attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder is best treated by providing NEG
with consistency and structure and by
setting limits for him. His activities
need to be modified to maximize his
chance for success. NEG's parent or
caretaker needs to implement strategies
to help the child deal with the symptoms
of ADHD. The appropriate medications
together with the required help with
social skills are necessary for proper
treatment.
4. That NEG's mood disorder is not exactly
the same as bi-polar disorder or
depression, but has some features of
both. NEG is not on medication for this
disorder at this time. Treatment
consists of helping NEG to express
himself appropriately and by helping him
deal with emotional issues.
5. That oppositional defiance disorder is
characterized by an irritable mood and
oppositional behavior. This mood and
behavior are often triggered by limits
being set for NEG, causing him to act out
and to be argumentative.
6. That since November, 2004, NEG has
deteriorated emotionally, with anxiety
about his future and about the loss of
his mother. He has suffered from both
encopresis and enuresis during this
period of time.
7. The child has been observed banging his
head against the wall when he is angry,
biting other children on the playground
and displaying an incredible amount of
anger. NEG has also had difficulty
focusing.
8. That since the adjudication hearing in
November of 2004, [REG] has increased the
frequency of his visits with NEG. During
that same time, the child's actions,
referred to above, have increased.
9. After the visits, NEG refuses to follow
directions, is angry and has difficulty
getting along with the other children at
Broyhill Children's Home. NEG's behavior
was not as aggressive when [REG] was not
visiting.
10. That during the visits, NEG and [REG]
interact appropriately, playing and
having a good time. They walk the campus
together and display affection toward one
another. The visits generally last 2
hours and [REG] has brought clothes and
toys for his son during some of the
visits. NEG appears happy to see his
father when visits begin.
11. That a parent of a child with NEG's
disorders, as described above, needs to
be accountable for his own actions as
well as his own mental health needs in
order to be able to maintain the
necessary consistent contact, build a
relationship, and attend to the child's
physical and emotional needs. Consistence
and stability are necessary for effective
parenting. Absent that stability, it
would be difficult for a parent to
provide the child's emotional needs.
12. That with NEG's problems, a parent with
[REG's] mental health issues (as set
forth in adjudication findings of fact
numbers 14-18), if untreated, would find
it very difficult to meet the child's
physical and emotional requirements and
would damage the child emotionally.
13. That from a therapeutic point of view,
termination of parental rights would be
in the best interest of the child, in
that NEG continues to deteriorate
emotionally, suffers high anxiety, and is
angry at [his] mother and father.
Continued placement and the ensuing lack
of permanency are emotionally damaging.
14. That [REG] is currently unemployed and
has been since about two weeks after the
adjudication hearing. He still receives
Social Security disability for his bi-
polar disorder. Currently, [REG]
receives no medication or treatment for
any of the conditions listed in the
adjudicatory findings of fact.
15. That [REG] currently lives in Greenville,
South Carolina with his mother. He has
lived in South Carolina with his mother
since May of 2004.
16. That [REG] had a vehicle when he left
North Carolina in May of 2004, but sold
it approximately a week after his arrival
because it had a bad transmission. [REG]
currently has a car and a valid driver's
license.
17. That [REG's] case plan provided for
visitation, which he exercised while
living in North Carolina.
18. That since the hearing on adjudication,
[REG] has visited with the child every
week, making the three hour round-trip
drive with his mother from Greenville, SC
to Waynesville, NC.
19. That [REG] and NEG engage in different
activities, including watching videos,
playing on the playground and at the
gymnasium, playing basketball and
football together. NEG is happy to see
him when he arrives for visitation and
generally in good spirits. He runs to
[REG] and hugs him upon his arrival for
visitation.
20. That [REG] has talked with NEG's
counselors about how he is doing.
21. That it is in NEG's best interest that
the parental rights of this father,
[REG], be terminated.
Based upon these findings, the trial court terminated respondent's
parental rights. Respondent appeals. Respondent does not challenge the trial court's conclusion
that grounds existed to terminate his parental rights. In his sole
argument on appeal, respondent contends the trial court abused its
discretion by concluding that it was in the best interests of
N.E.G. to terminate his parental rights.
A termination of parental rights proceeding is conducted in
two phases: (1) the adjudication phase which is governed by N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 7B-1109, and (2) the disposition phase which is
governed by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1110. See In re Brim, 139 N.C.
App. 733, 738, 535 S.E.2d 367, 370 (2000). The trial court has
discretion, if it finds by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
that at least one of the statutory grounds exists, to terminate
parental rights upon a finding that it would be in the best
interests of the child. In re Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. 607, 613,
543 S.E.2d 906, 910 (2001). In considering evidence relevant to
the dispositional stage, “[t]he children's best interests are
paramount, not the rights of the parent.” In re Smith, 56 N.C.
App. 142, 150, 287 S.E.2d 440, 445 (1982). A trial court may
decline to terminate parental rights only where “there is
reasonable hope that the family unit within a reasonable period of
time can reunite and provide for the emotional and physical welfare
of the child[.]” Blackburn, 142 N.C. App. at 613, 543 S.E.2d at
910. One of the underlying principles guiding the trial court in
the dispositional stage is the recognition of the necessity for any
child to have a permanent plan of care at the earliest possible
age, while at the same time recognizing the need to protect allchildren from the unnecessary severance of a relationship with
biological parents or legal guardians. Id. at 612, 543 S.E.2d at
910.
Respondent asserts that because he and N.E.G. were allowed to
continue to develop their relationship after the adjudication
hearing, the trial court abused its discretion in terminating his
parental rights. In light of the fact that stability and
consistency are necessary for N.E.G.'s emotional needs and that
N.E.G.'s behavior worsened when R.E.G. increased the frequency of
his visits after the adjudication hearing, we cannot conclude that
the trial court's decision to terminate respondent's parental
rights was an abuse of discretion. Accordingly, the order
terminating respondent's parental rights is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Judges WYNN and McGEE concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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