IN THE MATTER OF:
L.L., Jr., Mecklenburg County
A Minor Child No. 04 J 795
J. Edward Yeager, Jr. for petitioner-appellee Mecklenburg
County Attorney's Office.
Leslie C. Rawls for respondent-appellant father.
Matt McKay as guardian ad litem.
ELMORE, Judge.
This appeal arises from the district court's decision entered
29 April 2005 to terminate L.L., Sr.'s (respondent) parental rights
to his son, L.L., Jr. (Jr.). After careful review, we affirm the
order of the trial court.
The minor child, Jr., was born in January 2002. After the
newborn tested positive for cocaine, he was discharged into the
care of his maternal aunt. On 27 March 2003, Mecklenburg County
DSS-Youth and Family Services (YFS) filed a petition alleging that
the child was neglected and dependent. The trial court held a
hearing on 29 May 2003, after which it determined Jr. to be
dependent as to respondent. Respondent was assigned a case plan,
which required that he (1) complete a Family Drug Court substanceabuse assessment, complying with its recommendations, (2) complete
the SAIL program, complying with its recommendations, (3) attend
AA/NA meetings, providing documentation thereof, (4) obtain and
maintain a sponsor, (5) complete random drug testing, (6) complete
parenting classes, (7) complete the NOVA program, complying with
its recommendations, and (8) obtain suitable housing and
demonstrate that he could meet the child's financial, medical, and
emotional needs. On 23 July 2004, DSS filed a petition to
terminate respondent's parental rights, alleging, inter alia, that
respondent failed to comply sufficiently with his case plan by not
completing substance abuse or domestic violence treatment and by
proving unable to secure appropriate housing and employment. In an
order entered 29 April 2005 the trial court concluded that
respondent had willfully left Jr. in a placement outside the home
for more than twelve months without showing reasonable progress in
the correction of the conditions which led to the removal of the
child. As a result, the court ordered that respondent's parental
rights be terminated. It is from this order that respondent
appeals.
The standard of review is well-estabished:
When reviewing an appeal from an order
terminating parental rights, our standard of
review is whether: (1) there is clear, cogent,
and convincing evidence to support the
district court's findings of fact; and (2) the
findings of fact support the conclusions of
law. Clear, cogent, and convincing evidence
is greater than the preponderance of the
evidence standard required in most civil
cases, but not as stringent as the requirement
of proof beyond a reasonable doubt required in
criminal cases. If the decision is supportedby such evidence, the district court's
findings are binding on appeal even if there
is evidence to the contrary.
In re A.D.L. J.S.L., C.L.L., 169 N.C. App. 701, 710, 612 S.E.2d
639, 645 (2005) (citations and quotations omitted).
Respondent first contends that the trial court erred by
finding as fact that his housing situation has been unstable. This
assignment of error is without merit. With respect to this
finding, there was “clear, cogent, and convincing evidence to
support the district court's findings of fact.” Id. Respondent
seeks to demonstrate the stability of his housing via his and his
fiancée's testimony that he had been staying with his fiancée since
November 2003. Respondent argues that the trial court, ignoring
this testimony, based its finding on the testimony of Felicia
Brown, respondent's former case worker. Ms. Brown testified that
respondent moved three times in the thirteen-month span in which
she worked with him. Respondent now claims that because she had
not been his caseworker for at least eight months prior to the
hearing, Ms. Brown's information was stale. He also notes that his
then-current case worker, Leslie Burros, gave no information as to
his housing situation. Respondent chooses to ignore, however, Ms.
Burros's testimony to the effect that she did not know where he was
living. Indeed, when Ms. Burros requested a specific address at
which he could be reached he had been unable to provide one to her,
instead coming to her office to be served with his paperwork.
Likewise, in his own testimony respondent acknowledged that he
continued to receive mail at a prior address, that he had recentlyspent the night at that address, and that his name was not on the
lease of his fiancée's apartment, despite his having discussed the
option with his fiancée. He also acknowledged that he was entirely
dependent on his fiancée for all of his housing expenses. Under
these circumstances, the trial court had “clear, cogent, and
convincing evidence to support [its] findings of fact.” Id.
Because this finding is so supported, respondent's evidence to the
contrary is of no help to him. See id.
Respondent next assigns error to the trial court's conclusion
that respondent neglected Jr., arguing that this conclusion is not
supported by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence. Neglect is
one ground upon which parental rights may be terminated. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(1) (2005). “The juvenile shall be deemed . . .
neglected if the court finds the juvenile to be . . . a neglected
juvenile within the meaning of G.S. 7B-101.” Id. Section 7B-
101(15) defines “neglected juvenile,” in pertinent part, as “[a]
juvenile who does not receive proper care, supervision, or
discipline from the juvenile's parent . . . .” N.C. Gen. Stat. §
7B-101(15) (2005). “This Court has additionally 'required that
there be some physical, mental, or emotional impairment of the
juvenile or a substantial risk of such impairment as a consequence
of the failure to provide “proper care, supervision, or
discipline”' in order to adjudicate a juvenile neglected.” In re
Helms, 127 N.C. App. 505, 511, 491 S.E.2d 672, 676 (1997) (quoting
In re Safriet, 112 N.C. App. 747, 752, 436 S.E.2d 898, 901-02
(1993)). Respondent makes much of the trial court's findings thathe had completed parenting classes, was engaged in substance abuse
treatment, and visited regularly with the child. Respondent quotes
this Court in In re Phifer to support his assertion that a finding
of substance abuse, standing alone, “without proof of adverse
impact upon the child, is not a sufficient basis for an
adjudication of termination of parental rights for neglect.” In re
Phifer, 67 N.C. App. 16, 25, 312 S.E.2d 684, 689 (1984).
Here, however, there were multiple other findings that, in
combination with his substance abuse problems, allow for a
conclusion of neglect. Though respondent notes it only briefly, he
was at the time of the hearing enrolled in substance abuse classes
for the second time, having been discharged for positive drug use
and rules violations on his first attempt. As a result of the
delay caused by his initial failure to successfully complete the
SAIL program, respondent was unable to participate in the NOVA
program as prescribed by his case plan. Respondent attempts to
characterize his renewed efforts at treating his substance abuse
problems as a significant step towards “removing the impediment to
participation in [the] domestic violence program.” While his
efforts are indeed laudable, they do not relieve him of the
responsibility to take the steps outlined in his case plan. His
case plan instructed him to complete a substance abuse program and
participate in a domestic violence program; his failure to
accomplish the former promptly does not exempt him from his
obligation to perform the latter in a timely manner. Moreover, the trial court found that the evidence did not
support respondent's contention that he was unable to work due to
his disability. Throughout the proceedings, respondent was waiting
to hear about a disability claim; at no point does it appear from
the record that he sought employment. Respondent essentially
concedes this point; he argues only that without the “improper
findings” regarding the domestic violence program and housing, the
finding of respondent's failure to secure employment is
insufficient to find neglect. Because we hold that the findings
concerning housing and the domestic violence treatment were proper,
we need not further address respondent's lack of employment.
Respondent suggests that were he a woman, the employment issue
would be moot. Yet he admits that he can find no case law to
support his contention that the system itself is sexist. Moreover,
respondent's argument misses the underlying point: this matter is
about Jr.'s situation, not respondent's. Lacking any visible means
of income or support, or a formal relationship with his fiancée
that would provide for such, respondent is simply unable to show
how he would provide “proper care” to the child.
Finally, as noted above, the court found that respondent's
housing situation remained unstable. “The inability to maintain
secure living arrangements is relevant to a determination of
whether there is a substantial risk of injury to the juvenile.” In
re Helms, 127 N.C. App. at 511, 491 S.E.2d at 676 (citation
omitted). Based on the foregoing, we hold that there was clear, cogent,
and convincing evidence to form the basis of the trial court's
conclusion that respondent neglected Jr. Because respondent failed
to participate in the domestic violence program, to obtain and
maintain employment, and to obtain and maintain appropriate
housing, the trial court acted properly in finding “a substantial
risk of . . . impairment as a consequence of the failure to provide
'proper care, supervision, or discipline.'” Id. (citation,
quotation, and emphasis omitted).
Having found a legitimate basis for the trial court's
termination of respondent's parental rights, we need not address
respondent's additional assignment of error concerning another
ground for termination. “The finding of any one of the grounds is
sufficient to order termination.” In re C.L.C., K.T.R., A.M.R.,
E.A.R., 171 N.C. App. 438, 447, 615 S.E.2d 704, 709 (2005) (quoting
Owenby v. Young, 357 N.C. 142, 145, 579 S.E.2d 264, 267 (2003)).
Finally, respondent argues that the trial court abused its
discretion by holding that the child's best interests were served
by terminating respondent's rights. As respondent notes, “After an
adjudication that one or more grounds for terminating a parent's
rights exist, the court shall determine whether terminating the
parent's rights is in the juvenile's best interest.” N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 7B-1110(a) (2005).
(See footnote 1)
Even “upon a finding that groundsexist to authorize termination, the trial court is never required
to terminate parental rights under any circumstances, but is merely
given the discretion to do so.” Bost v. Van Nortwick, 117 N.C.
App. 1, 7, 449 S.E.2d 911, 914 (1994) (quoting In re Tyson, 76 N.C.
App. 411, 419, 333 S.E.2d 554, 559 (1985)). “The trial court has
discretion to terminate parental rights if it finds termination
would be in the best interest of the juvenile. The standard for
appellate review of the trial court's decision to terminate
parental rights is abuse of discretion.” In re M.N.C., ___ N.C.
App. ___, ___, 625 S.E.2d 627, 633 (2006) (citations omitted).
It appears here that there was no abuse of discretion. Based
on its findings that Jr. was neglected, that respondent had failed
to follow his case plan, and, perhaps most importantly, that
respondent had failed to show that he was capable of obtaining or
maintaining appropriate housing or employment, the trial court had
adequate grounds for determining that termination was in the
child's best interest. Moreover, the child's situation following
the adjudication is well settled: Jr. will be adopted by his aunt,
who has been his caretaker since birth, and with whom the record
indicates he is safe and happy. Respondent's recitation of the
facts concerning his relationship with his son are not enough to
convince this Court that there was an abuse of discretion.
Affirmed.
Judges McGEE and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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