STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v. Harnett County
No. 04 CRS 51117
STEPHEN KEITH CHAMPION
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Nancy R. Dunn, for the State.
Terry F. Rose for defendant-appellant.
CALABRIA, Judge.
Stephen Keith Champion (“defendant”) appeals from a judgment
of the trial court, revoking his probation and activating his
suspended sentence. We find no error.
On 5 May 2004, defendant pled guilty pursuant to a plea
agreement to financial card fraud and financial identity fraud.
The trial court sentenced defendant for the financial identity
fraud to a minimum of ten months to a maximum of twelve months in
the North Carolina Department of Corrections. The trial court also
sentenced defendant for financial card fraud to a minimum of six
months and a maximum of eight months, to run concurrently with the
sentence for financial identity fraud. The trial court then
suspended defendant's sentences and placed him on supervisedprobation for thirty-six months.
Defendant's probation officer subsequently filed violation
reports that alleged defendant had violated his probation by
failing to report and to make his whereabouts known to his
probation officer.
On 8 September 2005, the trial judge held a
probation violation hearing in Harnett County Superior Court. At
this hearing, defendant admitted willfully violating his probation.
Defendant's counsel then requested that defendant be placed on
intensive probation. The State countered “we've already tried
that” and requested that the trial court revoke his probation and
activate his sentence. The trial court then determined defendant
willfully violated the terms of his probation, revoked defendant's
probation, and sentenced defendant to an active term of
imprisonment in the North Carolina Department of Correction.
Defendant appeals.
Defendant's sole argument on appeal is that the trial court
abused its discretion
by not considering placing him on intensive
probation. Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by relying on the prosecutor's statement that
intensive probation had already been tried since there is no
indication in the record that he had ever participated in intensive
probation.
Our Supreme Court has held, “Any violation of a valid
condition of probation is sufficient to revoke defendant's
probation. All that is required to revoke probation is evidence
satisfying the trial court in its discretion that the defendant
violated a valid condition of probation without lawful excuse.” State v. Tozzi, 84 N.C. App. 517, 521, 353 S.E.2d 250, 253 (1987)
(citations omitted). An abuse of discretion occurs if a trial
court's determination is “manifestly unsupported by reason or is so
arbitrary it could not have been the result of a reasoned
decision.” State v. Pendleton, __ N.C. App. __, __, 622 S.E.2d
708, 710 (2005).
In the case sub judice, defendant admitted that he willfully
violated the terms of his probation, and thus, it was within the
trial court's discretion to revoke his probation. See Tozzi,
supra. Moreover, “the trial court was not required to consider
alternate means of punishment other than incarceration,” State v.
Jones, 78 N.C. App. 507, 510, 337 S.E.2d 195, 198 (1985), and there
is nothing in the record to support a contention that the trial
court would have considered alternatives to incarceration but for
the prosecutor's claim that defendant had already been on intensive
probation. Accordingly, defendant has failed to show an abuse of
discretion, see Stone v. Stone, 96 N.C. App. 633, 634, 386 S.E.2d
602, 603 (1989) (“[t]he rulings . . . of the trial judge are
presumed to be correct, and the burden is on the appealing party to
rebut the presumption of verity on appeal”), and we find no error.
No error.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge JACKSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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