IN MATTER OF:
WGR, EMK, and MAK Wake County
Minor Children No. 05 J 200
Wake County Attorney's Office, by Deputy Wake County Attorney
Corinne G. Russell, for petitioner-appellee.
Richard Croutharmel, for Wake County Guardian Ad Litem
Program, appellee.
The Turrentine Group, PLLC, by Karlene Scott-Turrentine, for
respondent-appellant.
STEELMAN, Judge.
On 24 March 2005 Wake County Human Services filed a petition
to terminate the parental rights of respondent, mother of the three
children: W.G.R., E.M.K. and M.A.K., on the following grounds: (1)
respondent neglected the children and it is probable that the
neglect will be repeated if the children are returned to
respondent's care; (2) respondent willfully abandoned the children
for at least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition; (3) respondent willfully left the children in foster care
or placement outside of the home for more than twelve months
without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable
progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting theconditions which led to the removal of the children; and (4)
respondent willfully failed to pay a reasonable portion of the cost
of care of the children for a continuous period of six months
preceding the filing of the petition. Following a hearing on 25
May 2005, at which respondent appeared and testified, the court
entered an order terminating respondent's parental rights on the
first three grounds. From this order respondent appeals.
By her sole assignment of error, respondent contends “[t]he
trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error by
terminating respondent's parental rights when by DSS' own evidence,
respondent was making extraordinary progress before going to jail,
and was continuing her progress with reasonable plans and goals to
be able to again parent her children once she got out of jail.”
Respondent has not assigned error to any of the court's findings of
fact or conclusions of law. Findings of fact to which no
assignment of error is taken are presumed to be correct and are
binding. Creech v. Ranmar Props., 146 N.C. App. 97, 100, 551 S.E.2d
224, 227 (2001), cert. denied, 356 N.C. 160, 568 S.E.2d 191 (2002).
Consequently, our review is limited to the determination of whether
the findings of fact support the conclusions of law and judgment.
Okwara v. Dillard Dep't Stores, Inc., 136 N.C. App. 587, 591-92,
525 S.E.2d 481, 484 (2000).
The court's findings of fact show that the three children came
into the custody of Wake County Human Services on 20 February 2004.
The mother and children first came under the care of Wake County
Human Services in September 2003 when a report of physical abuse oftwo of the children by the mother was substantiated. Respondent
worked with Wake Human Services in attempting to follow a case plan
directed toward treatment of her alcoholism. However, conditions
deteriorated resulting in the removal of the children from the home
on 20 February 2004. The circumstances causing the removal of the
children included: poor school attendance by the children;
perpetration of domestic violence upon the mother by her male
companions; leaving the children alone without adequate
supervision; leaving the children overnight with a seventeen-year-
old; respondent being found unconscious in the home after consuming
an unidentified substance; and respondent being convicted of child
abuse related to an incident of physical disciplining of the
children.
On 31 March 2004, the children were adjudicated neglected.
Respondent was notified by the court of steps she must take and
complete before the court would consider restoring custody to the
mother. Respondent failed to comply. She attended only the first
seven-day hearing and none thereafter. Respondent continued to
drink and at some point, started to use crack cocaine. On 1
February 2005, she began serving a two-year active sentence for
driving while impaired. Respondent failed to sign a visitation
plan after the children were removed; and she had no visitations
with the children after 20 February 2004.
The court's findings further show that since respondent has
been incarcerated, she has taken advantage of programs offered to
her, such as treatment for substance abuse and mental healthissues. She has worked on obtaining a GED and participated in
employment preparation programs.
The court further found that although respondent states when
she is released from prison in November 2005, she intends to
continue to follow through with rehabilitative efforts, she has in
the past “failed to remain committed to recovery and sobriety.”
Additionally, the court found “[t]hat the circumstances of the
mother are such that the parent did not make reasonable progress
toward correcting the conditions which led to the removal of the
children prior to the filing of the Petition for Termination of
Parental Rights.”
The court's findings further relate how the children's school
attendance and academic performance, behavior, and mental health
have improved since they were removed from the mother's custody.
Based upon these findings, the court concluded that respondent
neglected the children, abandoned them, and left them in foster
care without showing to the satisfaction of the court that
reasonable progress had been made in correcting the conditions
which led to the removal of the children from the home.
We now examine whether the court's findings of fact support
its conclusions of law. The first stated ground for termination of
respondent's parental rights, that respondent abused or neglected
the juveniles, is a ground established by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-
1111(a)(1) (2005). A neglected juvenile is one “who does not
receive proper care, supervision, or discipline from the juvenile's
parent, guardian, custodian, or caretaker; or who has beenabandoned; or who is not provided necessary medical care; or who is
not provided necessary remedial care; or who lives in an
environment injurious to the juvenile's welfare; or who has been
placed for care or adoption in violation of law.” N.C. Gen. Stat.
§ 7B-101(15)(2005). When the juvenile is removed from the custody
of a parent based upon a finding of neglect, the court may not
terminate the parent's parental rights on this ground without
considering evidence of changed conditions in light of the evidence
of prior neglect and the probability of repetition of the neglect.
In re Ballard, 311 N.C. 708, 715, 319 S.E.2d 227, 232 (1984).
The findings of the court show that respondent neglected the
juveniles by not providing them with proper care, supervision or
discipline and by subjecting them to an unsafe environment marked
by domestic violence. The findings further show that the neglect
is likely to be repeated following respondent's release from
incarceration. Respondent effectively abandoned the children by
not making any arrangements for visiting the children and by not
visiting them after 20 February 2004. “[I]f a parent withholds his
presence, his love, his care, the opportunity to display filial
affection, and wilfully neglects to lend support and maintenance,
such parent relinquishes all parental claims and abandons the
child.” Pratt v. Bishop, 257 N.C. 486, 501, 126 S.E.2d 597, 608
(1962). Respondent's alcoholism and incarceration do not preclude
a conclusion that she willfully abandoned the children. See In re
McLemore, 139 N.C. App. 426, 430-31, 533 S.E.2d 508, 510-11 (2000).
We hold the court's conclusion of law terminating respondent'sparental rights on the ground respondent neglected the juveniles is
supported by the findings of fact. As only one ground is needed to
support termination of parental rights, it is not necessary for us
to consider the other grounds. In re Stewart Children, 82 N.C. App.
651, 655, 347 S.E.2d 495, 498 (1986).
We hold the court did not err or abuse its discretion by
terminating respondent's parental rights.
AFFIRMED.
Judges McCULLOUGH and HUDSON concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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