IN THE MATTER OF: New Hanover County
M.E.W. No. 05 J 168
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Karen A. Blum, for the State.
Sofie W. Hosford for juvenile-appellant.
STEELMAN, Judge.
Juvenile appeals the trial court's order adjudicating him
delinquent and responsible for committing the offense of sexual
battery in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.5A. For the
reasons discussed herein, we find no error.
The State's evidence tended to show the following: On 20
January 2005, T.B., then nine years old, was in the library at her
elementary school when she saw the juvenile showing everyone there
a condom. T.B. testified she heard the juvenile telling his
friends that he was going to use the condom on a certain person.
T.B. reported the incident to Ms. Brenda Rice, a fourth grade
teacher at the school. Several other students confirmed to Ms.
Rice that the juvenile had shown them a condom and was telling them
“what he [was] going to do to the girls with the condom and, um,things like that[.]” Ms. Rice informed the principal of what she
had heard and that she had checked the juvenile's desk, but the
condom was not there.
The juvenile was sent to Assistant Principal Natalie
Stalling's office. Ms. Stalling inquired about the situation, but
the juvenile denied having the condom at school. The juvenile
asked to use the bathroom and Ms. Stalling permitted him to use her
private bathroom so he could not leave the office, but instructed
him not to flush the commode. After Ms. Stalling allowed the
juvenile to leave her office, she inspected the bathroom and found
a condom wrapper behind the commode. At the hearing, the juvenile
admitted he had a condom at school and left it in Ms. Stalling's
bathroom. However, he denied ever telling anyone what he planned
to do with the condom.
When T.B. returned home, she told her mother the juvenile had
a condom at school that day and she did not feel comfortable around
him. T.B.'s mother called the principal the next morning about the
incident.
The next day, T.B. was in art class with the juvenile. The
juvenile and another boy were throwing clay and the juvenile threw
clay at T.B. who was working at another table. T.B. asked the
juvenile not to throw clay at her. The juvenile got up and walked
toward T.B.'s table and grabbed her between her legs in her
“private parts” as he passed by. The juvenile then walked around
the table and started laughing. T.B. told the juvenile to stop,
leave her alone, and not touch her. When Ms. Rice came to get the students at the end of art
class, T.B. asked to speak to her. Ms. Rice took her into the
hallway, where T.B. told her that the juvenile had touched her in
her private area during art class and that she was embarrassed by
it. Ms. Rice sent T.B. to speak with the principal, to whom she
recounted the same incident. The juvenile admitted hitting T.B.
with the clay, but denied touching her in her private area.
The juvenile was charged with sexual battery and the matter
came on for hearing at the Juvenile Session of New Hanover District
Court. At the close of all the evidence, the juvenile made a
motion to dismiss the charge of sexual battery by reason of the
failure of the evidence to support all of the elements of the
charge. The trial court denied this motion. On 17 May 2005, the
trial court adjudicated the juvenile delinquent and responsible for
committing the offense of sexual battery. The court continued the
disposition hearing until 30 August 2005 pending resolution of two
additional charges against the juvenile. The trial court entered
a disposition order on 30 August 2005 resolving all three offenses.
The trial court placed the juvenile on probation for twelve months,
ordered that he complete both sexual offender treatment and a level
three treatment program, and have no contact with the victim. The
juvenile appeals.
In his first argument, the juvenile contends the trial court
erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charge of sexual battery
because the State did not present sufficient evidence that hecommitted the battery for the purposes of sexual gratification. We
disagree.
In order to survive a motion to dismiss based on the
insufficiency of the evidence, the State must present substantial
evidence of each element of the offense charged. In re T.C.S., 148
N.C. App. 297, 301, 558 S.E.2d 251, 253 (2002). In addition, such
evidence must be “sufficient to convince a rational trier of fact
beyond a reasonable doubt of defendant's guilt.” Id. (citations
and internal quotation marks omitted). We review the evidence in
the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit
of every reasonable inference. Id. It is irrelevant whether the
State's evidence is direct, circumstantial, or both; the test for
resolving a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is the
same. Id. This standard, which applies in criminal trials against
adults, also applies when evaluating the evidence in a juvenile
hearing. In re T.S., 133 N.C. App. 272, 275, 515 S.E.2d 230, 232
(1999).
The essential elements of sexual battery are: (1) sexual
contact with another person; (2) by force or against the person's
will; and (3) for the purpose of sexual arousal, gratification or
abuse. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-27.5A (2005). Specifically, the
juvenile contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence
he made sexual contact with the victim for the purpose of sexual
arousal or gratification. This Court has held that although
“intent is seldom provable through direct evidence[,] . . . intent
to arouse or gratify sexual desires may [not] be inferred inchildren under the same standard used to infer sexual purpose to
adults.” T.S., 133 N.C. App. at 276, 515 S.E.2d at 233. We
reasoned the legislature's addition of this requirement in a
similar juvenile statute indicated a “recognition that a lewd act
by adult standards may be innocent between children, and unless
there is a showing of the child's sexual intent in committing such
an act[,]” the child cannot be held criminally accountable. Id.
Since the juvenile's intent to act for the purpose of sexual
arousal or gratification cannot be inferred from the very act
itself, as is the case in certain adult proceedings, the State may
meet its burden by presenting some evidence of “[t]he child's
maturity, intent, experience, or other factor indicating his
purpose in acting[.]” Id. at 277, 515 S.E.2d at 233.
We find the evidence when viewed in the light most favorable
to the State was sufficient to establish that the juvenile made
sexual contact with the victim for the purpose of sexual arousal or
gratification. A reasonable inference of intent indicating the
juvenile acted with the purpose of sexual arousal or gratification
could be drawn from the fact the juvenile, who was nine years old:
(1) brought a condom to school; (2) was overheard telling other
students whom he planned to use the condom on; and (3) attempted to
hide the condom wrapper in the bathroom immediately after the
assistant principal asked him if he had anything at school he
should not. All of this occurred the day before the juvenile
inappropriately touched T.B. Furthermore, the juvenile laughed
after he touched T.B. in her private parts. The State also put on sufficient evidence that the contact was
against the victim's will. T.B. testified she did not want the
juvenile touching her there, she told him to stop and leave her
alone, his touching her there embarrassed her, she immediately told
her teacher what had happened, and also told her mother upon
returning home that day. Thus, the evidence considered in the
light most favorable to the State sufficiently establishes the
juvenile touched the victim against her will.
In the instant case, the juvenile does not contend the State
failed to provide sufficient evidence that the contact constituted
“sexual contact,” therefore, we need not address this element of
the crime.
This argument is without merit.
The juvenile also contends the trial court erred in
adjudicating the juvenile delinquent for committing sexual battery
because the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he
committed the offense for the purpose of sexual gratification.
In order to support an adjudication of delinquency, the State
must present substantial evidence of every essential element of the
crime charged. In re Heil, 145 N.C. App. 24, 29, 550 S.E.2d 815,
819 (2001). For the reasons stated above, we hold the State
presented substantial evidence of the essential elements of sexual
battery. This argument is without merit.
For the reasons discussed herein, we find the juvenile's
arguments to be without merit and we find the trial court did not
err in denying the juvenile's motion to dismiss. AFFIRMED.
Judges LEVINSON and STEPHENS concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***