STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v
.
Forsyth County
No. 05 CRS 50267
CHRISTOPHER LAMONT CHAPLIN
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Daniel P. O'Brien, for the State.
Appellate Defender Staples Hughes, by Assistant Appellate
Defender Constance E. Widenhouse, for defendant.
LEVINSON, Judge.
Christopher Lamont Chaplin (defendant) appeals judgment
entered upon his convictions for trafficking in cocaine by
possession and possession with intent to sell or deliver cocaine.
We find no error.
The pertinent facts may be summarized as follows:
On 7
January 2005, Lauren Abrahams went to a girlfriend's house to wait
for defendant to pick her up. Abrahams testified that defendant
called her at 10:00 p.m. and apologized for being late, and stated
that he was in the process of acquiring lodging for the two of them
for the night. When defendant arrived at Abraham's girlfriend's
home, he informed Abrahams that he had to go somewhere and would
return in 30-45 minutes. When defendant returned, he and Abrahamsdecided to take Abraham's vehicle, as defendant's friend planned to
borrow his Ford Explorer. When defendant and Abrahams got to a
motel room at the Crosslands Economy Studios in Winston-Salem, they
had a sexual encounter; thereafter, Abrahams asked defendant to
bring her food from a nearby Taco Bell. Abrahams testified that
she and defendant had been in the room for approximately 20-25
minutes. Abrahams also testified that she did not know if
defendant had been in the room before he came to pick her up. It
was later determined that the room had been rented in the name of
another individual.
In the early morning of 8 January 2005, Officer T.A Blevins
and Corporal Ronald Beasley responded to a report of a break-in
near the Crosslands Economy Studios. Because defendant's vehicle
matched the description of the suspects, Blevins stopped defendant
as he was parking the car behind the motel upon his return from
Taco Bell. Blevins determined that defendant
was not involved with
the reported break-in. However, Blevins ascertained that there was
an outstanding warrant for defendant's arrest on an unrelated
matter, and informed defendant he was going to take him into
custody. While patting down defendant, Blevins found three large
bundles of cash in three separate pockets: his right front pants
pocket, his left front pants pocket, and his coat pocket. There
was one large bundle of one dollar bills; a bundle of hundreds; and
a large bundle made up of smaller groups of 20's, 10's and 5's.
The cash totaled $2109, and fell into the following denominations:
$600 in 100 dollar bills, $780 in 20 dollar bills, $160 in 10dollar bills, $395 in 5 dollar bills, and $174 in one dollar bills.
One of the three bundles consisted mainly of twenties, folded
distinctively in groups. Even though they were in the same pocket,
the groups of bills could be distinguished from one another.
Specifically, one group of bills was folded in half horizontally,
and the next group vertically. These groups could therefore be
distinguished visibly. Based upon his law enforcement training,
Beasley testified that bundling cash in these ways is typically
associated with the manner drug dealers handle money.
Defendant subsequently gave his consent to a search of the
motel room. Inside a kitchen cabinet, in a pot covered with a lid,
Beasley found what was later determined to be 86 grams of cocaine
and a set of digital scales. Having found a large quantity of
cocaine, Beasley instructed Blevins to place Abrahams under arrest.
Defendant was calm during the encounter, and had no reaction when
informed that cocaine was located in the motel room. In addition,
at the magistrate's office, defendant told law enforcement that
Abrahams did “not have anything to do with it” and asked the police
to release Abrahams.
Defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine by
possession in violation of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 90-95(h)(3) (2005),
and possession with intent to sell and deliver cocaine in violation
of N.C. Gen. Stat. §
90-95(a) (2005). Defendant appeals.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to dismiss the charges beca
use the State failed topresent substantial evidence that defendant had actual or
constructive possession of the cocaine. We disagree.
When ruling on a motion to dismiss, “the trial court must
determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each
essential element of the offense charged and of the defendant being
the perpetrator of the offense.” State v. Crawford, 344 N.C. 65,
73, 472 S.E.2d 920, 925 (1996).
Evidence is substantial if it is relevant and
adequate to convince a reasonable mind to
accept a conclusion. In considering a motion
to dismiss, the trial court must analyze the
evidence in the light most favorable to the
State and give the State the benefit of every
reasonable inference from the evidence. The
trial court must also resolve any
contradictions in the evidence in the State's
favor. The trial court does not weigh the
evidence, consider evidence unfavorable to the
State, or determine any witness' credibility.
State v. Robinson, 355 N.C. 320, 336, 561 S.E.2d 245, 255-56 (2002)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). “[T]he rule for
determining the sufficiency of evidence is the same whether the
evidence is completely circumstantial, completely direct, or both.”
State v. Crouse, 169 N.C. App. 382, 389, 610 S.E.2d 454, 459 (2005)
(quoting State v. Wright, 302 N.C. 122, 126, 273 S.E.2d 699, 703
(1981)).
Defendant was convicted of trafficking in cocaine by
possession, in violation of G.S. § 90-95, which provides in
relevant part that “[a]ny person who . . . transports, or possesses
28 grams or more of cocaine . . . shall be guilty of a felony . .
. known as 'trafficking in cocaine.'” G.S. § 90-95(h)(3). Accordingly, the State must prove that defendant: (1) knowingly (2)
possessed or transported a given controlled substance, and that (3)
the amount transported was greater than the statutory threshold
amount. State v. Shelman, 159 N.C. App. 300, 307-08, 584 S.E.2d
88, 94 (2003). Defendant was also convicted of possession with
intent to sell or deliver cocaine. In this regard, the State must
prove that defendant possessed a controlled substance and that
defendant had the intent to sell or deliver the same. See N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 90-95(a)(1) (2005); State v. Carr, 122 N.C. App. 369,
372, 470 S.E.2d 70, 72-73 (1996).
“An accused's possession of narcotics may be actual or
constructive.” State v. Harvey, 281 N.C. 1, 12, 187 S.E.2d 706,
714 (1972). “A person has actual possession of a substance if it
is on his person, he is aware of its presence, and either by
himself or together with others he has the power and intent to
control its disposition or use.” State v. Reid, 151 N.C. App. 420,
428-29, 566 S.E.2d 186, 192 (2002). However, the State is not
required to prove actual physical possession of the controlled
substance; proof of constructive possession by defendant is
sufficient to carry the issue to the jury. State v. Perry, 316
N.C. 87, 96, 340 S.E.2d 450, 456 (1986). Consequently,
“[c]onstructive possession exists when a person, while not having
actual possession, has the intent and capability to maintain
control and dominion over a controlled substance.” State v.
Williams, 307 N.C. 452, 455, 298 S.E.2d 372, 374 (1983). Where a
controlled substance is found on premises under the defendant'scontrol, this fact alone may be sufficient to overcome a motion to
dismiss and to take the case to the jury. Harvey, 281 N.C. at 12,
187 S.E.2d at 714. Nevertheless, if a defendant does not maintain
exclusive control of the premises, “other incriminating
circumstances” must be established for constructive possession to
be inferred. State v. Alston, 91 N.C. App. 707, 710, 373 S.E.2d
306, 309 (1988). Our determination then “'depends on the totality
of the circumstances in each case. No single factor controls, but
ordinarily the questions will be for the jury.'” State v. Butler,
147 N.C. App. 1, 11, 556 S.E.2d 304, 311 (2001)(quoting State v.
Jackson, 103 N.C. App. 239, 243, 405 S.E.2d 354, 357 (1991)).
In the instant case, as the cocaine was not found in
defendant's actual possession, we evaluate defendant's argument in
the context of constructive possession. Additionally, we consider
whether defendant's non-exclusive control of the motel room was
coupled with other incriminating circumstances sufficient to show
constructive possession of the narcotics.
Here, evidence of other incriminating circumstances included:
$2109 in defendant's pockets folded alternatively horizontally and
vertically in groups, such that the groups of bills could be
visibly distinguished from one another;
evidence that bundling cash
is typically associated with how drug dealers handle money;
and
defendant's statement that Abrahams did “not have anything to do
with it” _ a statement jurors could reasonably infer concerned the
cocaine.
Taken in the light most favorable to the State, we
conclude there was sufficient record evidence to show thatdefendant had the intent and capability to maintain control and
dominion
over the cocaine. This assignment of error is overruled.
In defendant's next argument on appeal, he contends that the
trial court committed reversible error by excluding evidence of his
hearsay statement to Blevins that he intended to use the $2109 to
pay off a mortgage. This, defendant contends, would have countered
the State's evidence that the money was related to illegal
narcotics trade.
Even assuming, arguendo, that the court erred by excluding
this evidence, we are unpersuaded that its admission would have
changed the outcome of the trial. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A -
1443(a) (2005) (“A defendant is prejudiced by errors relating to
rights arising other than under the Constitution of the United
States when there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error
in question not been committed, a different result would have been
reached at the trial out of which the appeal arises”). We first
observe that the intended use of the $2109 has little or no
relationship with its origin, and little to do with the State's
theory that how one bundles his cash can suggest whether he is
involved in narcotics trade. Moreover, defendant did present some
evidence suggesting that the money was not related to narcotics.
Specifically, on cross-examination by defense counsel, Officers
Beasley and Blevins testified that the drug trade is not ordinarily
marked by the use of single dollar bills, and acknowledged that
defendant had 174 single dollar bills in his possession.
This
assignment of error is overruled.
In defendant's next argument on appeal, he contends that the
trial court erred by allowing a substitute chemical analyst to
testify for the State. Specifically, while the State listed Agent
“R.W. Evans, SBI or any other Chemical Analyst from the SBI” on the
its list of prospective witnesses, it called Agent Sheila Baylor to
testify regarding the analysis of the cocaine. Therefore,
defendant argues the State violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-903(a)(2)
(2005) by not providing a separate report and opinion prepared by
Agent Baylor, and by failing to identify Agent Baylor and provide
her Curriculum Vitae (CV) before trial.
“'The purpose of discovery under our statutes is to protect
the defendant from unfair surprise by the introduction of evidence
he cannot anticipate.'” State v. Patterson, 335 N.C. 437, 455, 439
S.E.2d 578, 589 (1994) (quoting State v. Payne, 327 N.C. 194, 202,
394 S.E.2d 158, 162 (1990)). A trial court's order regarding
matters of discovery is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Morin
v. Sharp, 144 N.C. App. 369, 374, 549 S.E.2d 871, 874 (2001).
N.C. Gen. Stat. §
15A-903(a)(2) sets forth particular items
the State must provide to a defendant regarding an expert witness.
Specifically, the statute provides, in pertinent part, that:
Upon motion of the defendant, the court must
order the State to . . . [g]ive notice to the
defendant of any expert witnesses that the
State reasonably expects to call as a witness
at trial. Each such witness shall prepare,
and the State shall furnish to the defendant,
a report of the results of any examinations or
tests conducted by the expert. The State
shall also furnish to the defendant the
expert's curriculum vitae, the expert's
opinion, and the underlying basis for that
opinion. The State shall give the notice andfurnish the materials required by this
subsection within a reasonable time prior to
trial, as specified by the court.
Additionally, once the State has provided discovery, there is a
continuing duty to provide discovery and disclosure. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-907 (2005).
Assuming arguendo that the State committed a technical
violation of G.S. §
15A-903(a)(2) by failing to provide certain
documents, including the CV of Agent Baylor, until the morning of
trial, we conclude such error would not constitute reversible
error. See G.S. § 15A-1443(a).
As a preliminary matter, we observe that the record on appeal
did not include the CV of either Agent Evans or Agent Baylor _
something that would have assisted this Court's evaluation of this
issue. In addition, the “State's List of Prospective Witnesses”
noted that “R.W. Evans, SBI or any other Chemical Analyst from the
SBI” would appear to testify. Defendant was therefore notified
that someone other than Evans might testify at trial. In his
testimony, Baylor relied largely on the reports and opinion of
Evans, which were already provided to defendant. Finally,
defendant had a full and fair opportunity to cross-examine Baylor
to expose weaknesses or inconsistencies in her testimony.
Consequently, because the record does not support a conclusion that
a different result would have occurred at trial had defendant
received additional materials regarding Agent Baylor before the day
of trial, defendant is not entitled to a new trial. This
assignment of error is overruled. We have considered defendant's remaining arguments and
conclude they are without merit.
No error.
Judges TYSON and BRYANT concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
*** Converted from WordPerfect ***