IN THE MATTER OF:
K.L.I. Guilford County
No. 04 J 169
JACKSON, Judge.
On 19 April 2004, the Guilford County Department of Social
Services (“DSS”) filed a petition alleging that K.L.I. was a
neglected juvenile in that he lived in an environment injurious to
his welfare. At the time, the child was living with his mother,
and the child's father, David C. (“respondent”) was incarcerated.
DSS assumed custody through a non-secure custody order, and in an
order entered 28 May 2004, K.L.I. was adjudicated a neglected
juvenile.
On 24 November 2004, DSS filed a petition seeking to terminate
respondent's parental rights, as well as the parental rights ofK.L.I.'s mother. On 24 March 2005, the mother's parental rights
were terminated. On 16 May 2005, hearings were held on the motion
to terminate respondent's parental rights. The trial court
concluded that grounds existed pursuant to section 7B-1111(a)(3)
and (7) to terminate respondent's parental rights. The court
further concluded that it was in the child's best interest that
respondent's parental rights be terminated. Respondent appeals.
Respondent first argues the trial court erred by taking
judicial notice of certain findings of fact from the order
terminating the mother's parental rights. Respondent contends the
findings were made without any evidence being presented to the
trial court, and without any request for judicial notice or for a
stipulation. Respondent further argues the findings concerning the
child's mother were improper because he was neither present during
the acts nor had knowledge of them. Respondent asserts the trial
court abused its discretion by including these findings in the
record, and argues that consideration of the findings demonstrated
bias towards him. We are not persuaded.
This Court has stated that “'[a] trial court may take judicial
notice of earlier proceedings in the same cause.'” In re J.B., 172
N.C. App. 1, 16, 616 S.E.2d 264, 273 (2005) (quoting In re
Isenhour, 101 N.C. App. 550, 553, 400 S.E.2d 71, 73 (1991)).
Moreover, “[n]either party was required to offer the file into
evidence.” Isenhour, 101 N.C. App. at 553, 400 S.E.2d at 73. This
Court has also “
previously held that in a termination of parental
rights proceeding, prior adjudications of abuse or neglect areadmissible, but they are not determinative of the ultimate issue.”
J.B., 172 N.C. App. at 16, 616 S.E.2d at 273
(citing In re Huff,
140 N.C. App. 288, 300, 536 S.E.2d 838, 846 (2000), disc. review
denied, 353 N.C. 374, 547 S.E.2d 9 (2001); In re Beck, 109 N.C.
App. 539, 545, 428 S.E.2d 232, 236 (1993)). Accordingly, we
conclude the trial court properly took judicial notice of the
juvenile file.
Respondent next contends the trial court erred by finding
there were grounds to support the termination of his parental
rights. After careful review of the record, briefs and contentions
of the parties, we affirm.
North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B-1111 sets out the
statutory grounds for terminating an individual's parental rights.
A finding of any one of the separately enumerated grounds is
sufficient to support a termination. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App.
57, 64, 387 S.E.2d 230, 233-34 (1990). “[T]he party petitioning
for the termination must show by clear, cogent, and convincing
evidence that grounds authorizing the termination of parental
rights exist.” In re Young, 346 N.C. 244, 247, 485 S.E.2d 612, 614
(1997)(citing sections N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-289.30(d) and (e)
(1995)September 25, 2006).
In the case sub judice, the trial court found that since the
time that DSS took custody of K.L.I., respondent had attempted to
contact him only
once. The court noted that in September 2004, DSS
provided respondent with five postage-free envelopes so that he
could contact his son. However, respondent did not attempt tocontact K.L.I. until 1 March 2005, after the petition to terminate
his parental rights had been filed. The court thus concluded that
respondent had willfully abandoned K.L.I. for at least six
consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the petition
to terminate his parental rights in that he did not have any
contact with him. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(7). Respondent
did not assign error to these findings of fact, nor did he assign
error to the conclusion of law that he abandoned his son. Thus,
the findings of fact are deemed supported by competent evidence and
are conclusive on appeal. See In re Padgett, 156 N.C. App. 644,
648, 577 S.E.2d 337, 340 (2003). Accordingly, we conclude that
grounds exist pursuant to section 7B-1111(a)(7) to support the
termination of respondent's parental rights.
Since grounds exist pursuant to section 7B-1111(a)(7) to
support the trial court's order, the remaining grounds found by the
trial court to support termination of respondent's parent rights
need not be reviewed by the Court. Taylor, 97 N.C. App. at 64, 387
S.E.2d at 233-34.
Affirmed.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge CALABRIA concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).
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