PATRICIA “SUSIE” CHURCH, DWIGHT
TIMOTHY BARE, and JACQUELINE
ATWOOD, DAVID RAY BARE,
        Plaintiffs,

        v.                        Ashe County
                                No. 04 CVS 430
RICHARD R. BARE, JERRY L. BARE,
DONALD BARE, JR., DANNY JOE BARE,
and GLORIA VOSS,
        Defendants.

    Appeal by defendants from a declaratory judgment entered 1 November 2005 by Judge L. Todd Burke in Ashe County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 September 2006.

    Sherrill and Cameron, Attorneys at Law, by Carlyle Sherrill for plaintiff-appellees.

    Sherrie R. Hodges, Attorney at Law, PLLC, for defendant- appellants.

    BRYANT, Judge.

    Richard R. Bare, Jerry L. Bare, Donald Bare, Jr., Danny Joe Bare, and Gloria Voss (defendants) appeal from a declaratory judgment entered 1 November 2005, which detailed the manner in which certain real estate was to be partitioned between defendants and Patricia “Susie” Church, Dwight Timothy Bare, Jacqueline Atwood, and David Ray Bare (plaintiffs). For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court's order.

    Dessie Raye Bare (the testatrix) died on 6 February 2002,leaving a will that provided, in pertinent part:
        I will and devise all of my real property, subject to the conditions here and after set out, in equal share, in fee simple, to Donald Carl Bare, Richard Raye Bare, and Jerry Lewis Bare. This devise of my real property as set out above is subject to the condition that the following payments be made by the said Devisees of my real property, said payments to be made on or before two (2) years after my death:
        
        1. The sum of ten thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars in cash to my daughter, Gloria Irene Voss.
        
        2. The sum of ten thousand ($10,000.00) Dollars in cash to my daughter, Peggy Jacqueline Bare Atwood.
        
        3. The sum of two thousand five hundred ($2,500.00) Dollars in cash to my granddaughter, Susie Bare Church.
        
        4. The sum of two thousand five hundred ($2,500.00) Dollars in cash to my grandson, Danny Joe Bare.
        
        5. The sum of two thousand five hundred ($2,500.00) Dollars in cash to my grandson, David Ray Bare.

        6. The sum of two thousand five hundred ($2,500.00) Dollars in cash to my grandson, Dwight Timothy Bare.

On 25 August 2004, a Complaint for Declaratory Judgment was filed in Ashe County Superior Court on behalf of plaintiffs. Plaintiffs sought a declaration from the trial court as to their own rights and the rights of defendants in the real property named in the testatrix's will. On 1 November 2005, the trial court entered an order instructing the Clerk of Superior Court of Ashe County to partition the realty in question among the parties in accordancewith the rules of intestate succession. It is from this order that defendants appeal.

    Defendants present a single issue on appeal: whether conclusions of law made by the trial court were supported by the court's findings of fact or by the evidence presented at trial.
    We note at the outset that defendants fail to make specific exceptions to any of the trial court's findings of fact, choosing instead to make a general exception to several of the court's conclusions of law. “Absent specific exceptions to findings of fact, this Court's review is limited to a determination of whether the trial court's findings of fact support its conclusions of law.” Woodring v. Woodring, 164 N.C. App. 588, 590, 596 S.E.2d 370, 372 (2004). We therefore need look no further than the findings of fact in determining whether the trial court's conclusions of law were proper.
    The declaratory judgment at issue here may be reviewed in the same manner as other judgments. Cumberland Homes, Inc. v. Carolina Lakes Prop. Owners' Ass'n, 158 N.C. App. 518, 520, 581 S.E.2d 94, 96 (2003). “In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury[,] . . . the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon and direct the entry of the appropriate judgment.” N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 52(a)(1) (2005). When a trial court fails to make the required findings of fact or conclusions of law, this Court “'may order a new trial or allow additional evidence to be heard by the trial court or leaveit to the trial court to decide whether further findings should be on the basis of the existing record or on the record as supplemented.'” Harris v. N.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 91 N.C. App. 147, 150, 370 S.E.2d 700, 702 (1988) (citation omitted). “Remand is unnecessary, however, where the facts of the case are undisputed and those facts lead to only one inference.” Cumberland Homes, 158 N.C. App. at 520-21, 581 S.E.2d at 96.
    Defendants contend that the trial court's judgment should be reversed, or alternatively that this case should be remanded, because the trial court did not make findings of fact regarding the intent of the testatrix. Reversal or remand would be unjustified in the instant case, however, because the facts lead to only one inference in this regard. The only reasonable interpretation of the testatrix's intent was to create a condition precedent to the devise of her real property: namely, that the specified sums be paid as directed on or before two years after the testatrix's death. It was therefore unnecessary for the trial court to make findings of fact regarding the testatrix's intent. Accordingly, we uphold the trial court's conclusion that the language of the paragraph created a condition precedent.
    Defendants also challenge two additional conclusions of law made by the trial court based on the court's failure to make findings as to the testatrix's intent. These arguments are likewise without merit. The trial court found, and it is uncontested, that none of the payments required by the will were made within the designated time period. This finding supports thetrial court's conclusion that the condition precedent was not satisfied and that the devise therefore failed. Also uncontested is the trial court's finding that the will contained no residuary clause. Where a devise lapses for failure to satisfy a condition precedent, and the will contains no residuary clause, the property at issue passes to the testator's heirs by intestate succession. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 31-42(b) (2005). The trial court therefore properly concluded that the testatrix's real property should pass by intestacy.
    Lastly, defendants argue that satisfaction of the condition precedent was impossible because of the uncertainty regarding the property interest at issue. It was this uncertainty that gave rise to the declaratory judgment action below. We note in response that the supposed uncertainty of which defendants complain has no bearing upon the express terms of the will, and also that there is no evidence in the record to demonstrate that it was not feasible for defendants to satisfy the condition precedent. Furthermore, the declaratory judgment made by the trial court contains no findings or conclusions on this issue. We reiterate that this appeal is limited to a determination of whether the trial court's findings of fact support its conclusions of law. Woodring v. Woodring, 164 N.C. App. 588, 590, 596 S.E.2d 370, 372 (2004).
    For all the reasons stated herein, defendants' assignment of error is overruled.
    Affirmed.
    Judges TYSON and LEVINSON concur.
    Report per Rule 30(e).

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