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Constitutional Law--double jeopardy--habitual misdemeanor assault--habitual felon
statute--same argument previously rejected
Although defendant contends his convictions for habitual misdemeanor assault and under
the habitual felon statute violate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy, he
is not entitled to a new trial, because: (1) the Court of Appeals has already rejected this argument;
and (2) defendant has offered no other basis for reversal.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General
Dahr Joseph Tanoury, for the State.
Bruce T. Cunningham, Jr. for defendant-appellant.
GEER, Judge.
Defendant Gregory Requint Artis appeals from his conviction of
malicious conduct by a prisoner and habitual misdemeanor assault
and his sentencing as a habitual felon. His appeal rests solely on
his contention that, under the United States Supreme Court's
decisions in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 147 L. Ed. 2d
435, 120 S. Ct. 2348 (2000), and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S.
296, 159 L. Ed. 2d 403, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004), the habitual felon
and habitual misdemeanor assault statutes can no longer be
considered sentence-enhancing statutes. Instead, according to
defendant, they now must be viewed as setting out substantive
crimes and, therefore, sentencing as a habitual felon or forhabitual misdemeanor assault violates the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Because our Court has already rejected such reasoning in State v.
Massey, 179 N.C. App. 803, 635 S.E.2d 528 (2006), we uphold
defendant's conviction and sentence.
On 23 August 2004, defendant was indicted for malicious
conduct by a prisoner, habitual misdemeanor assault, and attaining
the status of habitual felon. The charges arose from an incident
that took place on 4 December 2003 at the Pitt County Detention
Center in Greenville, North Carolina, where defendant was
incarcerated. On 13 October 2004, defendant was found guilty of
(1) throwing bodily fluids at a local government employee in the
performance of his duties and (2) assault on a local government
employee, which in turn supported a conviction of habitual
misdemeanor assault. Defendant then pled guilty to being a
habitual felon.
On appeal, this Court affirmed the convictions of malicious
conduct by a prisoner and habitual misdemeanor assault, but
concluded that the trial court had failed to comply with N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1022(a) (2003) in connection with defendant's guilty
plea as to his habitual felon status. State v. Artis, 174 N.C.
App. 668, 677, 622 S.E.2d 204, 210 (2005), disc. review denied, 360
N.C. 365, 630 S.E.2d 188 (2006). The Court, therefore, vacated the
habitual felon conviction and remanded for resentencing.
On remand, the State presented evidence that defendant had
three prior felony convictions: two for habitual misdemeanorassault and one for felony eluding arrest.
(See footnote 1)
After the jury found
defendant guilty of being a habitual felon, the trial court
sentenced defendant as a habitual felon to 168 to 211 months for
the malicious conduct conviction and to a concurrent term of 151 to
191 months for the habitual misdemeanor assault conviction.
Defendant timely appealed.
Relying exclusively on the Apprendi and Blakely decisions,
defendant contends that his conviction for habitual misdemeanor
assault and under the habitual felon statute violate the Fifth
Amendment's prohibition against double jeopardy. Specifically, he
argues that those two decisions have eliminated sentence-
enhancement statutes, rendering all recidivist statutes substantive
crimes with the result, according to defendant, that sentencing for
either habitual misdemeanor assault or as a habitual felon violates
the Double Jeopardy Clause's prohibition against multiple
punishments for the same offense. Defendant recognizes that our courts have already held that
neither the habitual felon statute nor the habitual misdemeanor
assault statute violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. See State v.
Todd, 313 N.C. 110, 117, 326 S.E.2d 249, 253 (1985) (upholding
habitual felon statute); State v. Carpenter, 155 N.C. App. 35, 47-
48, 573 S.E.2d 668, 676-77 (2002) (addressing habitual misdemeanor
assault), disc. review denied, 356 N.C. 681, 577 S.E.2d 896 (2003).
Nevertheless, he urges that we reconsider this precedent in light
of Apprendi and Blakely.
Defendant's novel interpretation of Apprendi and Blakely was,
however, recently rejected by this Court in Massey. In addressing
precisely the arguments made in this case, this Court held:
Although defendant contends that the
Apprendi line of cases renders habitual
misdemeanor assault unconstitutional as
violative of the prohibition against double
jeopardy, defendant reads too much into
Apprendi and its progeny. Blakely explicitly
permits sentence enhancements provided that
sentence enhancements, with the exception of
prior convictions, are found beyond a
reasonable doubt by the jury. In fact, the
United States Supreme Court expressly
permitted sentence enhancements imposed by a
judge when the defendant stipulates to the
relevant facts or consents to judicial fact-
finding. . . . In essence, Apprendi and
Blakely applied the Sixth Amendment right to a
jury trial to sentence enhancements.
Defendant's argument, however, is directed at
the Fifth Amendment prohibition against double
jeopardy, and accordingly, Apprendi and
Blakely are inapposite.
We decline to extend the Supreme Court's
holdings in Apprendi and Blakely to the
habitual misdemeanor assault statute, and as
we are bound by prior decisions of a panel of
this Court, defendant's argument is precludedby State v. Carpenter, 155 N.C. App. 35, 573
S.E.2d 668 [(2002)].
Massey, 179 N.C. App. at 808, 635 S.E.2d at 531-32 (internal
citations omitted).
Although Massey addressed only the habitual misdemeanor
assault statute, its analysis _ rejecting defendant's contention
that Apprendi and Blakely have transformed recidivist offenses from
sentence-enhancing statuses into solely substantive criminal
offenses _ is equally controlling as to defendant's arguments in
this case regarding the habitual felon statute. We continue,
therefore, to be bound by Todd. Since defendant has offered no
other basis for reversal, we hold that defendant received a trial
free of error.
No error.
Judges LEVINSON and JACKSON concur.
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