I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
II. INTERLOCUTORY NATURE OF APPEAL
 As a preliminary matter, we note that Judge Doughton's
order denying Plaintiff's motion to compel arbitration is
interlocutory because it does not determine all of the issues
between the parties and directs some further proceeding preliminary
to a final judgment. See Martin v. Vance, 133 N.C. App. 116, 119,
514 S.E.2d 306, 308 (1999) (citing Futrelle v. Duke Univ., 127 N.C.
App. 244, 488 S.E.2d 635, disc. review denied, 347 N.C. 398, 494S.E.2d 412 (1997)). However, this Court has previously determined
that an appeal from an order denying arbitration, although
interlocutory, is immediately appealable because it involves a
substantial right which might be lost if appeal is delayed. Prime
South Homes, Inc. v. Byrd, 102 N.C. App. 255, 258, 401 S.E.2d 822,
825 (1991) (citations omitted). Accordingly, we reach the merits
of this appeal.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
 Plaintiff brings forward two arguments on appeal.
Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the trial court erred by
concluding as a matter of law that Plaintiff waived his right to
arbitration (1) by imposing substantial litigation costs on
Nationwide and (2) by participating in discovery not available
Arbitration is a contractual right, and therefore, the right
to arbitration may be waived by the conduct of the party seeking to
enforce its right. Miller Bldg. Corp. v. Coastline Assoc. Ltd.
, 105 N.C. App. 58, 411 S.E.2d 420 (1992).
'strong public policy in North Carolina favoring arbitration,'
courts 'must closely scrutinize any allegation of waiver' of the
right to arbitration. O'Neal Constr., Inc. v. Leonard S. Gibbs
, 121 N.C. App. 577, 580, 468 S.E.2d 248, 250 (1996)
(quoting Cyclone Roofing Co. v. David M. LaFave Co.
, 312 N.C. 224,
229, 321 S.E.2d 872, 876 (1984) (citations omitted)). Therefore,
doubts over whether a certain issue is appropriate for arbitration
should be resolved in a manner which favors arbitration. Smith v.Young Moving & Storage, Inc.
, 141 N.C. App. 469, 540 S.E.2d 383
(2000), aff'd per curiam
, 353 N.C. 521, 546 S.E.2d 87 (2001). This
is true 'whether the problem at hand is the construction of the
contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a
like defense to arbitrability.' Cyclone Roofing
, 312 N.C. at 229,
321 S.E.2d at 876 (quoting Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury
, 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 74 L. Ed. 2d 765, 785 (1983)).
In order to defeat an attempt to compel arbitration, the
opposing party must demonstrate prejudice.
Our Supreme Court has described the type of
prejudice [a party] must demonstrate in order
to prevail. A party may be prejudiced by his
adversary's delay in seeking arbitration if
(1) it is forced to bear the expense of a long
trial, (2) it loses helpful evidence, (3) it
takes steps in litigation to its detriment or
expends significant amounts of money on the
litigation, or (4) its opponent makes use of
judicial discovery procedures not available in
, 141 N.C. App. at 472-73, 540 S.E.2d at 386 (quoting
Servomation Corp. v. Hickory Constr. Co.
, 316 N.C. 543, 544, 342
S.E.2d 853, 854 (1986)).
Waiver of a contractual right to arbitration
is a question of fact. In this regard,
findings of fact, when supported by any
evidence, are conclusive on appeal.
Conclusions of law, even if stated as factual
conclusions, are reviewable. Nevertheless,
when there is evidence in the record which
supports the trial court's findings of fact,
and those findings support its conclusions of
law that a party has waived its right to
compel arbitration, the decision must be
Moose v. Versailles Condo. Ass'n
, 171 N.C. App. 377, 382, 614
S.E.2d 418, 422 (2005) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Because we agree with the trial court that Plaintiff waived
his right to arbitration by participating in discovery not
available during arbitration, we affirm the order of the trial
IV. QUESTIONS PRESENTED
 Plaintiff argues the trial court erred in denying his
motion to compel on the ground that Plaintiff waived his right to
arbitration by engaging in discovery unavailable during
(See footnote 3)
Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the discovery
procedures he utilized were contemplated by and incorporated into
the arbitration agreement between the parties. We disagree.
Nationwide's policy states:
Unless the insured and we agree otherwise,
arbitration will take place in the county and
state in which the insured lives. Arbitration
will be subject to the usual rules of
procedure and evidence in such county and
. The arbitrators will resolve the
issues. A written decision on which two
arbitrators agree will be binding on the
insured and us.
Prior to 1 January 2004, the Uniform Arbitration Act applied
to all agreements to arbitrate unless (1) the arbitration agreement
stipulated that the Uniform Arbitration Act would not apply or (2)the arbitration agreement was between employers and employees, or
between their respective representatives, although employers and
employees, or their representatives, may stipulate that the Act
(See footnote 4)
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-567.2 (2001).
In this case, the
was entered into before 1 January 2004;
therefore, the Uniform Arbitration Act applies. See Register v.
, 358 N.C. 691, 599 S.E.2d 549 (2004) (recognizing that
because the Uniform Arbitration Act was in effect at the time the
parties entered into the contract, it was applicable to the case).
In Palmer v. Duke Power Co.
, 129 N.C. App. 488, 491, 499
S.E.2d 801, 803 (1998), this Court recognized that the North
Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to arbitrations,
unless incorporated into the arbitration agreement. The
unambiguous language in the arbitration agreement at issue here
be subject to the usual rules of
procedure and evidence in the county and state where the insured
lives and where the arbitration will take place. This language
clearly refers to the rules and procedures set forth in the Uniform
Arbitration Act, not the usual rules of civil procedure and
evidence. The Uniform Arbitration Act contains its own rules for
discovery. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-567.8 (2001). This section
provides binding rules and procedure for witnesses, subpoenas, and
depositions in arbitration proceedings. Id
. Although there is abroad right to discovery under the Rules of Civil Procedure,
discovery in arbitration proceedings is at the discretion of the
arbitrator[.] Prime South Homes
, 102 N.C. App. at 260, 401 S.E.2d
at 826 (citation omitted).
In his order denying Plaintiff's motion to compel arbitration,
Judge Doughton found, inter alia
, that Plaintiff served on
Nationwide a set of interrogatories, a request for admissions, and
three requests for production of documents. In his request for
admissions, Plaintiff prompted Nationwide to admit certain facts
regarding the automobile accident, to admit that the accident
proximately caused Plaintiff's injuries, and to admit that
Plaintiff was entitled to compensation in excess of $10,000.00.
Additionally, in his interrogatories and requests for production of
documents, Plaintiff requested, inter alia
, information and
documents regarding those with knowledge of the accident,
photographic or video surveillance made of Plaintiff since the
accident, all written and recorded statements obtained by
Nationwide regarding the accident, and all reports generated as a
result of the accident.
Arbitration is a process to privately adjudicate a final and
binding settlement of disputed matters quickly and efficiently,
without the costs and delays inherent in litigation. WMS, Inc. v.
, 166 N.C. App. 352, 602 S.E.2d 706, disc. review denied
N.C. 197, 608 S.E.2d 330 (2004). Parties agree to arbitrate in
order to avoid the costs and delays associated with litigation,
specifically the costs and delays inherently incurred in civildiscovery. Applying the Rules of Civil Procedure and Evidence to
arbitration negates the very purpose for agreeing to arbitrate.
The procedural and evidentiary rules governing judicial proceedings
do not apply to arbitrations absent plain and unambiguous language
in the arbitration agreement that those rules apply. Crutchley v.
, 306 N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d 793 (1982); Pinnacle Group,
Inc. v. Shrader
105 N.C. App. 168, 412 S.E.2d 117 (1992). It is
clear that Plaintiff's discovery requests exceeded the scope
allowed by the Uniform Arbitration Act. Plaintiff thereby waived
his right to compel arbitration.
 In further support of his determination that Plaintiff had
waived his right to arbitration, Judge Doughton found that on or
about January 7, 2005, without objection, the Plaintiff appeared
for deposition noticed by Defendant Nationwide[.] We do not agree
with Nationwide's position that Plaintiff waived his right to
arbitration by participating in this deposition. The deposition
was of Plaintiff and was noticed by Nationwide. Under the terms of
Plaintiff's insurance policy, he was required to [s]ubmit as often
as [Nationwide] reasonably require[d] to examinations under oath
and subscribe the same. Had Plaintiff not participated in his
deposition, Nationwide could have considered Plaintiff in breach of
the contract and not provided coverage for Plaintiff's injuries.
Therefore, Plaintiff was required to participate in this
deposition, and his appearance for such deposition, in and of
itself, is insufficient to constitute a waiver of his arbitration
rights. In sum, we hold that Judge Doughton did not err in concluding
that Plaintiff waived his contractual right to arbitration by
participating in judicial discovery not available during
arbitration. Accordingly, Judge Doughton's order is affirmed.
Because we hold that this conclusion is sufficient to affirm the
trial court's order, we need not address Plaintiff's argument
regarding litigation costs or Nationwide's cross-assignment of
For the reasons stated, the order of the trial court denying
Plaintiff's motion to compel arbitration is affirmed.
Judges TYSON and STROUD concur.