Appeal by defendant from judgment entered on or about 30
January 2006 by Judge A. Moses Massey in Superior Court, Surry
County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 5 February 2007.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, III by Assistant Attorney General
John P. Scherer II for the State.
Hartsell & Williams, P.A. by Christy E. Wilhelm for defendant-
appellant.
STROUD, Judge.
Defendant appeals from the judgment entered following his
entry of guilty pleas to six felony drug offenses and to carrying
a concealed weapon. The dispositive question before this Court is
whether the trial court erred by denying defendant's motion to
suppress evidence seized by a law enforcement officer during a
search of defendant's car at a traffic stop. We conclude that the
law enforcement officer conducted a valid traffic stop based on
probable cause to believe defendant committed a traffic infraction.
We further conclude that the law enforcement officer properly
seized a shotgun, pistol, drugs, and drug paraphernalia during a
valid “weapons frisk” of defendant's car, which was based on a
reasonable belief that defendant was dangerous and that the car
contained a firearm; and that the officer properly seized drug
paraphernalia after conducting a valid consent search of a
passenger's purse. Based upon the evidence seized during the
“weapons frisk” and consent search, we hold that the law
enforcement officer had probable cause to search defendant's car,
including the interior of a locked briefcase found therein, for
additional drugs and drug paraphernalia. Because we have
determined that the officer possessed probable cause to search
defendant's briefcase, we do not reach the additional question ofwhether the officer conducted a valid consent search of the
briefcase. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court order
denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his car
and briefcase.
I. Background
On 6 June 2005, the Surry County Grand Jury indicted defendant
for manufacturing cocaine, maintaining a vehicle used for keeping
and selling a controlled substance, possession of cocaine with
intent to sell or distribute, carrying a concealed weapon, and
three counts of trafficking in methamphetamine. Surry County
Sheriff's Department Detective Matt Darisse seized evidence
supporting these charges from the passenger compartment of
defendant's car and from a briefcase found therein during a traffic
stop. The seized evidence included a shotgun, pistol, substances
that Detective Darisse believed to be methamphetamine, and
paraphernalia used for distribution of controlled substances,
specifically small plastic storage bags, vials, and scales. On 10
November 2005, defendant filed a motion to suppress all evidence
seized from his car. Defendant's motion was heard at the 5
December 2005 Criminal Session of Superior Court, Surry County,
with Judge A. Moses Massey presiding.
At a hearing to resolve a defendant's motion to suppress, the
State carries the burden to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the challenged evidence is admissible.
State v.
Breeden, 306 N.C. 533, 538-39, 293 S.E.2d 788, 791-92 (1982);
State
v. Johnson, 304 N.C. 680, 686, 285 S.E.2d 792, 796 (1982). Here,the State called Detective Darisse to testify in opposition to
defendant's motion. On direct examination Detective Darisse
explained that he stopped defendant on Highway 268 after observing
defendant drive approximately sixty miles per hour in a forty-five
mile per hour speed zone, and observing defendant pass another
vehicle at approximately eighty miles per hour in a fifty-five mile
per hour speed zone. At that time, Detective Darisse was
conducting surveillance of defendant in response to a complaint
from a “concerned citizen” that defendant was trafficking
methamphetamine.
When Detective Darisse stopped defendant, defendant stepped
out of the car and approached Detective Darisse's vehicle.
Defendant told Detective Darisse that he knew he was speeding and
that he was trying to outrun Detective Darisse's headlights.
Detective Darisse ordered defendant to return to his car, but
defendant would not do so.
Thereafter, Detective Darisse secured defendant in the
backseat of defendant's own vehicle, which was a hatchback Camaro.
Two passengers, Sandra Fletcher and Travis Fletcher, were also
seated in the car. While seated in the backseat, defendant told
Detective Darisse that there was a gun in the car.
Detective Darisse opened the door to the front passenger seat
where Sandra Fletcher was sitting and discovered a Mossberg 12-
gauge shotgun located between the seat and the door. He assisted
Sandra Fletcher, who had difficulty standing, out of the passenger
seat and sat her down on the ground in front of defendant's car. As Sandra Fletcher stood up to exit the car, Detective Darisse
observed a piece of newspaper fall to the ground and he made a
mental note of its location. Then Detective Darisse removed Travis
Fletcher from the car and secured him as well.
Detective Darisse next conducted a “weapons frisk” of
defendant's car “for officer safety, to make sure there were no
other weapons in the vehicle.” During the “weapons frisk,”
Detective Darisse examined the newspaper and found that it was
covering a drawstring bag. Inside the bag, Detective Darisse found
a substance that he believed to be methamphetamine and a “smoking
device.” Detective Darisse also found a pistol under the front
passenger seat. Defendant told Detective Darisse “that he was
looking for that pistol, and he was . . . glad [Detective Darisse]
found it for him.”
Thereafter, Sandra Fletcher consented to a search of her
purse, which Detective Darisse had observed in defendant's car.
Inside the purse, Detective Darisse discovered a straw containing
white powder residue that he believed to be “[d]rug paraphernalia
used to ingest an illegal controlled substance.”
Finally, Detective Darisse testified that he believed he would
“find more drugs in the vehicle.” Detective Darisse searched the
car's interior and found a briefcase in the hatchback portion of
defendant's Camaro. Defendant stated that the briefcase belonged
to him and that it held his pencils and other work-related items.
Detective Darisse testified that defendant volunteered consent tosearch the briefcase saying, “Go ahead and search it.” Defendant
then gave Detective Darisse a combination to open the briefcase.
When the combination did not unlock the briefcase, Detective
Darisse's partner, Detective Sardler, took the briefcase into the
Sheriff's vehicle and pried it open with a screwdriver. Inside,
the detectives discovered a plastic cylinder containing a bag of a
substance Detective Darisse believed to be methamphetamine. The
briefcase also contained several additional small plastic storage
bags and vials of the substance, as well as a set of scales.
On cross-examination, Detective Darisse testified that he
followed defendant's car for approximately ten minutes before
stopping defendant. During this time, the blue lights of Detective
Darisse's Sheriff's vehicle were turned off. Detective Darisse
also testified that he was assigned to the narcotics section of the
Surry County Sheriff's Department and that the primary reason he
followed defendant was that he had received a complaint that
defendant was trafficking methamphetamine.
Defendant did not present evidence at the hearing. In support
of his motion to suppress, defendant argued that Detective Darisse
had conducted illegal surveillance and that Detective Darisse's
traffic stop was a pretext to search defendant's car for drugs. In
particular, defendant emphasized that Detective Darisse conducted
the surveillance in response to the complaint of an unnamed
“concerned citizen” and that Detective Darisse did not actually
cite defendant for a traffic infraction. Defendant further argued
that even if he had committed a traffic infraction, DetectiveDarisse did not have the right to search his car. The trial court
denied defendant's motion to suppress.
(See footnote 1)
Shortly thereafter,
defendant accepted a plea bargain and pleaded guilty to
manufacturing cocaine, maintaining a vehicle used for keeping and
selling a controlled substance, possession of cocaine with intent
to sell or distribute, carrying a concealed weapon, and three
counts of trafficking in methamphetamine. In the written
transcript of plea, defendant expressly reserved the right to
appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress as a
condition of the plea. Pursuant to additional terms of defendant'sconditional plea, the trial court consolidated the three charges of
trafficking in methamphetamine and also consolidated the remaining
charges for sentencing.
Defendant appeals from the trial court order denying his
motion to suppress. In so doing, defendant reiterates the
arguments raised during the suppression hearing and further argues
that Detective Darisse's search of the briefcase exceeded the scope
of defendant's consent. Notwithstanding defendant's guilty plea,
defendant preserved his right to appeal from the trial court's
denial of the motion to suppress by expressly communicating his
intent to appeal the denial to the trial court at the time he
pleaded guilty and by including the conditional nature of his plea
in the written transcript of plea. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(b)
(2005) (“An order finally denying a motion to suppress evidence may
be reviewed upon an appeal from a judgment of conviction, including
a judgment entered upon a plea of guilty.”);
see State v. Brown,
142 N.C. App. 491, 492, 543 S.E.2d 192, 193 (2001) (dismissing the
defendant's appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress because the defendant did not notify the court of his
intent to appeal at the time he entered a guilty plea);
State v.
McBride, 120 N.C. App. 623, 625, 463 S.E.2d 403, 404 (1995)
(explaining that under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-979(b), “a defendant
bears the burden of notifying the state and the trial court during
plea negotiations of the intention to appeal the denial of a motion
to suppress, or the right to do so is waived after a plea of
guilty”),
aff'd, 344 N.C. 623, 476 S.E.2d 106 (1996).
II. Standard of Review
When evaluating a trial court's ruling on a motion to
suppress, the standard of review is whether the court's findings of
fact are supported by competent evidence and whether those findings
of fact support the trial court's conclusions of law.
State v.
Downing, 169 N.C. App. 790, 793, 613 S.E.2d 35, 38 (2005).
Findings of fact that are supported by competent evidence are
conclusive on appeal,
State v. Wilson, 155 N.C. App. 89, 93-94, 574
S.E.2d 93, 97 (2002),
cert. denied, 540 U.S. 843, 157 L. Ed. 2d 78
(2003), and conclusions of law “'must be legally correct,
reflecting a correct application of applicable legal principles to
the facts found,'”
State v. Barden, 356 N.C. 316, 332, 572 S.E.2d
108, 120-21 (2002) (reviewing a the trial court's denial of a
defendant's motion to suppress) ((quoting
State v. Eason, 336 N.C.
730, 745, 445 S.E.2d 917, 926 (1994),
cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1096,
130 L. Ed. 2d 661 (1995)),
cert. denied, 538 U.S. 1040, 155 L. Ed.
2d 1074 (2003). However, a trial court's conclusion that a police
officer had either probable cause or reasonable suspicion to detain
or search a defendant is reviewable
de novo,
State v. Baublitz, 172
N.C. App. 801, 806, 616 S.E.2d 615, 619 (2005).
See also State v.
Young, 148 N.C. App. 462, 466, 559 S.E.2d 814, 818,
appeal
dismissed, 355 N.C. 500, 565 S.E.2d 233 (2002).
III. Search and Seizure
A. Surveillance
Government surveillance of an individual in a location where
the individual possesses “a subjective expectation of privacy thatsociety recognizes as reasonable” is a “search” within the meaning
of the Fourth Amendment.
Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33,
150 L. Ed. 2d 94, 101 (2001). Because “a person traveling in an
automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of
privacy in his movements from one place to another,” a law
enforcement officer's observation of that person's movements on a
public road is not a “search” for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.
United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 281, 75 L. Ed. 2d 55, 62
(1983).
B. Traffic Stops
A law enforcement officer may stop a motorist when the officer
has “probable cause” to believe that the motorist has committed a
readily observed traffic infraction.
Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806, 819, 135 L. Ed. 2d 89, 101 (1996);
see also State v.
Wilson, 155 N.C. App. 89, 94-95, 574 S.E.2d 93, 97-98 (2002)
(recognizing a distinction between an investigative “Terry” stop
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal
wrongdoing and a traffic stop supported by probable cause to
believe the driver has committed a readily observable traffic
violation). “'Probable cause is “a suspicion produced by such
facts as indicate a fair probability that the person seized has
engaged in or is engaged in criminal activity.”'”
Wilson, 155 N.C.
App. at 94, 574 S.E.2d at 97-98 (quoting
State v. Young, 148 N.C.
App. 462, 471, 559 S.E.2d 814, 818,
appeal dismissed and disc.
review denied, 355 N.C. 500, 564 S.E.2d 233 (2002)). In
determining whether a law enforcement officer has acted uponprobable cause, the trial court may consider the officer's opinion
(formed after observing the motorist driving) that a motorist
exceeded the speed limit.
State v. Barnhill, 166 N.C. App. 228,
233, 601 S.E.2d 215, 218 (2004) (concluding that the officer's
estimate of the defendant's speed, based upon personal observation,
supplied probable cause to justify a traffic stop),
appeal
dismissed and disc. review denied, 359 N.C. 191, 607 S.E.2d 646
(2004).
A law enforcement officer's subjective motivation for stopping
a motorist is irrelevant to the validity of a traffic stop if the
stop is supported by probable cause.
Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 135 L.
Ed. 2d 89;
accord State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 635-36, 517
S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999) (adopting
Whren under the North Carolina
State Constitution). The fact that an officer conducting a traffic
stop did not subsequently issue a citation is also irrelevant to
the validity of the stop if objective circumstances surrounding the
stop indicate that the defendant committed a readily observed
traffic infraction.
Baublitz, 172 N.C. App. at 806, 616 S.E.2d at
619-20 (concluding that an officer's “objective observation” that
a defendant's vehicle crossed the center line of a highway twice,
provided the officer with probable cause to stop the defendant for
a traffic violation regardless of the officer's subjective
motivation for making the stop and that the officer's failure to
issue a traffic ticket to the defendant after arresting him for
possession of cocaine was irrelevant).
But see State v. Villeda,
165 N.C. App. 431, 438-39, 599 S.E.2d 62, 67 (2004) (concludingthat a law enforcement officer did not have probable cause to stop
a defendant for a seat belt violation because the evidence
indicated that the officer could not see inside vehicles driving in
front of him at night on the stretch of road on which the defendant
was stopped).
C. Vehicle Frisk
When the law enforcement officer conducting a traffic stop
reasonably believes that an occupant of the car is dangerous and
may gain immediate control of a weapon, the officer may conduct a
protective search of areas inside the passenger compartment of the
vehicle where a weapon may be located.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1049-50, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 1219-20 (1983). This brief
search is known as a “vehicle frisk,” and its purpose is to ensure
officer safety.
Id. at 1050, n.14, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 20, n.14. The
scope of a valid “vehicle frisk” does not extend to searching for
evidence.
Id. at 1049, 77 L. Ed. 2d at 1220 (explaining that a
protective search of an automobile must be “limited to those areas
in which a weapon may be placed or hidden” but that the searching
officer is not required to ignore contraband that he discovers in
carrying out the protective search).
D. Consent Search
During a valid traffic stop, a law enforcement officer may
search areas of the detained vehicle or items contained therein
with the owner's consent.
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,
219, 36 L. Ed. 2d 854, 858 (1973);
State v. Pearson, 348 N.C. 272,
277, 498 S.E.2d 599, 601 (1998) (The scope of a consent search islimited to the places the defendant agrees may be searched; thus,
consent to search a vehicle did not support an officer's search of
the defendant's person). If the officer's request for consent to
search is unrelated to the initial purpose for the stop, then the
request must be supported by reasonable articulable suspicion of
additional criminal activity.
McClendon, 350 N.C. at 636, 517
S.E.2d at 132 (“In order to further detain a person after lawfully
stopping him, an officer must have reasonable suspicion, based on
specific and articulable facts, that criminal activity is afoot.”);
State v. Hernandez, 170 N.C. App. 299, 308, 612 S.E.2d 420, 426
(2005) (“To expand the scope of a lawful detention, an officer must
have reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts,
that criminal activity is afoot.”). Without additional reasonable
articulable suspicion of additional criminal activity, the
officer's request for consent exceeds the scope of the traffic stop
and the prolonged detention violates the Fourth Amendment.
Florida
v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L. Ed. 2d 229, 238 (1983). (“The
scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying
justification.”);
State v. Jolley, 68 N.C. App. 33, 38, 314 S.E.2d
134, 137 (“When the State relies upon consent as a basis for a
warrantless search, the police have no more authority than they
have been given by the consent.”),
rev'd on other grounds, 312 N.C.
296, 321 S.E.2d 883 (1984),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051, 84 L. Ed.
2d 816 (1985).
E. Automobile Exception When a law enforcement officer stops a motorist based on
probable cause to believe the motorist has committed a traffic
infraction, the detention may last only as long as necessary to
effectuate the purpose of investigating that infraction. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 15A-1113(b) (2005) (“A law enforcement officer who has
probable cause to believe a person has committed an infraction may
detain the person for a reasonable period in order to issue and
serve him a citation.”);
McClendon, 350 N.C. at, 636, 517 S.E.2d at
132. However, during investigation of the traffic infraction or a
valid “weapons frisk” or consent search conducted in conjunction
therewith, the officer may observe facts sufficient to establish
probable cause to believe the car contains evidence of a separate
crime.
If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe
that the vehicle contains evidence of a crime, the officer may
conduct an immediate warrantless evidentiary search of the vehicle,
including closed containers found therein.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at
580, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 634 (1991) (“The police may search an
automobile and the containers within it where they have probable
cause to believe contraband or evidence is contained.”);
State v.
Holmes, 109 N.C. App. 615, 622, 428 S.E.2d 277, 280,
disc. review
denied, 334 N.C. 166, 432 S.E.2d 367 (1993). This is known as the
“automobile exception” to the warrant requirement of the Fourth
Amendment. The scope of such an evidentiary search is limited to
areas and containers capable of concealing the evidence suspected
to be present.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580, 114 L. Ed. 2d at 633.
IV. Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
Defendant argues that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to suppress all evidence seized by Detective Darisse during
the search of his car and briefcase. In support of his argument,
defendant contends that Detective Darisse conducted illegal
surveillance, that Detective Darisse's traffic stop was a pretext
to search defendant's car for drugs, and that even if he committed
a traffic infraction, Detective Darisse did not have the right to
search his car. Defendant emphasizes that Detective Darisse was
conducting surveillance in response to the complaint of an unnamed
“concerned citizen” and that Detective Darisse did not actually
cite defendant for a traffic infraction. We conclude that
Detective Darisse possessed requisite knowledge of objective
circumstances sufficient to undertake each act of search or seizure
and that Detective Darisse's ultimate search of defendant's car and
briefcase was supported by probable cause. Although defendant
further argues that Detectives Darisse and Sardler exceeded the
scope of his consent to search the briefcase by opening it with a
screwdriver, we do not reach that issue.
A. Surveillance
[1] First, Detective Darisse conducted surveillance of
defendant while defendant drove his Camaro from his residence on
Bledsoe Farm Road to Highway 268. The State presented competent
evidence to show that in carrying out the surveillance, Detective
Darisse followed defendant's car for approximately ten minutes and
visually observed defendant's driving. Because “a person travelingin an automobile on public thoroughfares has no reasonable
expectation of privacy in his movements from one place to another,”
Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281, 75 L. Ed. 2d at 62, Detective Darisse's
visual observation of defendant's movements on Bledsoe Farm Road
and Highway 268 was not a “search” for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.
B. Traffic Stop
[2] Second, Detective Darisse stopped defendant's car after
observing defendant commit a traffic infraction. The State
presented competent evidence to show that Detective Darisse saw
defendant drive approximately sixty miles per hour in a forty-five
mile per hour speed zone and also saw defendant pass another
vehicle at approximately eighty miles per hour in a fifty-five mile
per hour speed zone. These speeding violations were readily
observable to Detective Darisse and Detective Darisse's estimate of
defendant's speed is competent evidence to support a trial court
finding that defendant exceeded the speed limit.
Barnhill, 166
N.C. App. at 233, 601 S.E.2d at 218. Because Detective Darisse
acted with “probable cause” to believe that defendant committed a
traffic infraction, his initial stop of defendant's car did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. It is irrelevant to the validity of
the stop that Detective Darisse's primary reason for following
defendant was that he had received a complaint that defendant was
trafficking methamphetamine,
see Whren, 517 U.S. 806, 135 L. Ed. 2d
89 and
McClendon, 350 N.C. at 635-36, 517 S.E.2d at 132, or thatDetective Darisse did not subsequently issue defendant a citation
for speeding,
Baublitz, 172 N.C. App. at 806, 616 S.E.2d at 619-20.
C. Vehicle Frisk
[3] Third, the State presented competent evidence to show that
Detective Darisse conducted a protective search of defendant's car
after defendant approached Detective Darisse's vehicle, disobeyed
Detective Darisse's order to return to his own car, and told
Detective Darisse that there was a firearm in his car. At the time
defendant informed Detective Darisse that there was a firearm in
his car, defendant was secured in the backseat of his Camaro and
two other passengers were also seated in the car. We conclude that
these circumstances were sufficient to create a reasonable belief
that defendant was dangerous and had immediate access to a weapon
located in the car; thus, Detective Darisse's possessed the
requisite knowledge necessary to conduct a vehicle frisk of
defendant's Camero.
See Long, 463 U.S. at 1049-50, 77 L. Ed. 2d at
1219-20.
Further, Detective Darisse's testimony demonstrated that the
“weapons frisk” was brief and tailored to the purpose of ensuring
his personal safety during the traffic stop. While conducting, the
weapons frisk, Detective Darisse discovered a Mossberg 12-gauge
shotgun and a pistol. He seized these firearms from areas inside
the passenger compartment of the car that were within the reach of
defendant and his companions.
During the “weapons frisk,” Detective Darisse also seized a
substance that he believed to be methamphetamine and a “smokingdevice.” He found this contraband inside a drawstring bag located
underneath a piece of newspaper that fell to the ground when he
assisted Sandra Fletcher out of the car. The bag was in close
proximity to the shotgun, was within reach of defendant and his
companions, and was at least large enough to contain
methamphetamine and a “smoking device.” Detective Darisse's
testimony shows that immediately preceding his search of the
drawstring bag, defendant told Detective Darisse there was a
firearm in the car and Detective Darisse observed a shotgun between
Sandra Fletcher's seat and the car door. This was competent
evidence to support Detective Darisse's search of the drawstring
bag during the “weapons frisk.” Correspondingly, the items
Detective Darisse seized during the vehicle frisk are contraband
and evidence of drug crimes from which Detective Darisse could form
probable cause to believe the vehicle contained additional drugs or
drug paraphernalia.
D. Consent Search
[4] Fourth, Detective Darisse seized a straw containing white
powder residue that he believed to be “paraphernalia used for
ingestion of controlled substances” during a consent search of
Sandra Fletcher's purse. Although Detective Darisse's request for
consent to search Sandra Fletcher's purse was unrelated to the
traffic infraction for which Detective Darisse initially stopped
defendant, the request was supported by reasonable articulable
suspicion that the purse would contain contraband or evidence of adrug crime. In particular, Detective Darisse had just discovered
a substance that he believed to be methamphetamine and a “smoking
device” inside a drawstring bag that fell out of the front
passenger door of defendant's car where Sandra Fletcher was
sitting. Because Detective Darisse's request for consent to search
Sandra Fletcher's purse was based on reasonable articulable
suspicion that he would find additional contraband therein, his
request did not exceed the scope of the traffic stop and
continuation of the detention to complete the search did not
violate the Fourth Amendment. See McClendon, 350 N.C. at 636, 517
S.E.2d at 132; Hernandez, 170 N.C. App. at 308, 612 S.E.2d at 426.
Again, the items Detective Darisse seized during the consent search
of Sandra Fletcher's purse are contraband and evidence of drug
crimes from which Detective Darisse could form probable cause to
believe the vehicle contained additional drugs or drug
paraphernalia.
E. Automobile Exception
[5] Finally, Detective Darisse searched the interior of
defendant's car for additional evidence of drug crimes, including
the interior of a locked briefcase located in the hatchback portion
of defendant's Camaro. At the time Detective Darisse conducted
this search, he had seized a straw containing white powder reside
that Detective Darisee believe to be “paraphernalia used for
ingestion of controlled substances” from Sandra Fletcher's purse,
a substance that he believed to be methamphetamine and a “smokingdevice” from a drawstring bag that fell out of defendant's car, and
a Mossberg 12-gauge shotgun and a pistol from the passenger
compartment of defendant's car. Detective Darisse had also
observed defendant exit his car and approach his Sheriff's vehicle
and was compelled to secure defendant in the backseat of
defendant's own vehicle because defendant refused to comply with
his instructions during the stop. We conclude that these objective
circumstances, taken together, created probable cause to support
Detective Darisse's search of defendant's car for contraband and
other evidence of drug crimes.
Because Detective Darisse had probable cause to believe
defendant's car contained contraband or other evidence of drug
crimes, Detective Darisse could properly conduct an immediate
warrantless search of areas inside the car capable of concealing
those items, including locked containers contained therein.
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 580, 114 L.E.2d at 634; Holmes, 109 N.C. App.
at 622, 428 S.E.2d at 280.
We recognize that the trial court concluded defendant
consented to a search of his briefcase; however, consent is
unnecessary to support a warrantless search undertaken pursuant to
the “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment. Because we
conclude that Detective Darisse had probable cause to search
defendant's car and briefcase for evidence of drug crimes, we do
not reach defendant's argument that Detectives Darisse and Sardler
exceeded the scope of his consent by opening the briefcase with a
screwdriver.
V. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, we conclude that Detective
Darisse conducted a valid traffic stop based on probable cause to
believe defendant committed a traffic infraction. We further
conclude that Detective Darisse properly seized a shotgun, pistol,
drugs, and drug paraphernalia during a valid “weapons frisk” of
defendant's car, which was based on a reasonable belief that
defendant was dangerous and that the car contained a firearm; and
that Detective Darisse properly seized drug paraphernalia after
conducting a valid consent search of a Sandra Fletcher's purse.
Based upon the evidence seized during the “weapons frisk” and
consent search, we hold that Detective Darisse had probable cause
to search defendant's car, including the interior of a locked
briefcase found therein, for additional drugs and drug
paraphernalia. For these reasons, we affirm the trial court order
denying defendant's motion to suppress evidence seized from his car
and briefcase.
AFFIRMED.
Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge HUNTER concur.
Footnote: 1