Filed: 4 September 2007
1. Firearms and Other Weapons_-felony firearm statute--right to bear arms--rational
relation--ex post facto--bill of attainder--due process--equal protection
The trial court did not err by granting defendant State's motion for summary judgment
and by denying plaintiff's motion for summary judgment thus declaring constitutional N.C.G.S. §
14-415.1 as amended 1 December 2004, which expressly prohibited defendant's possession of
any firearm due to his status as a convicted felon, because: (1) the General Assembly has made a
determination that individuals who have been convicted of a felony offense shall not be able to
possess a firearm, and this statutory scheme which treats all felons the same serves to protect and
preserve the health, safety, and welfare of the citizens of this state, and thus rationally related to a
legitimate state interest; (2) N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 does not violate the ex post facto clause under
either the North Carolina or United States Constitutions since the intent of the legislature was to
create a nonpunitive regulatory scheme, and the result of the statute is not so punitive in nature
and effect as to override the legislative intent; (3) N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 does not constitute a
prohibited bill of attainder since there was nothing in the statute to indicate the General
Assembly enacted it as a form of retroactive punishment, nor does such a statute fall within the
historical meaning of punishment; and (4) plaintiff's right to possess firearms was not a vested
right and thus the statute did not violate his rights to due process or equal protection or his
Second Amendment right to bear arms.
2. Firearms and Other Weapons--felony firearm statute-_motion for summary
A de novo review revealed that the trial court did not err by granting defendant's motion
for summary judgment and by failing to interpret N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 to allow plaintiff the right
to bear firearms, because: (1) there is no dispute between the parties as to the fact that defendant
is a convicted felon; (2) N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 clearly states plaintiff may not possess a firearm for
any reason; and (3) the proscription in the statute shows that it is intended to apply to anyone
ever convicted of a felony offense in North Carolina without exception.
Judge ELMORE dissenting.
Appeal by plaintiff from order entered 31 March 2006 by Judge
Michael R. Morgan in Wake County Superior Court. Heard in the
Court of Appeals 24 January 2007.
Dan L. Hardway Law Office, by Dan L. Hardway, for plaintiff-
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Special Deputy Attorney
General John J. Aldridge, III and Assistant Attorney General
Ashby T. Ray, for defendant-appellee.
Barney Britt (plaintiff) appeals from an order entered 31
March 2006 granting the State of North Carolina's (defendant's)
motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiff's motion for
summary judgment, declaring constitutional N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-
415.1, as amended 1 December 2004.
Plaintiff is a resident of Wake County, North Carolina. In
1979, plaintiff was convicted of felony possession with intent to
sell and deliver a controlled substance, completed his sentence in
1982 and in 1987 his civil rights, including his right to possess
a firearm, were restored by operation of law under that current
version of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1. In this action plaintiff
challenges the 2004 version of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1, which
expressly prohibits plaintiff's possession of any firearm due to
his status as a convicted felon.
The trial court, based on affidavits submitted by both
parties, determined there was sufficient evidence that plaintiff
was advised he would be subject to a charge under the 2004
revisions to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1 if he were found in
possession of firearms. Citing State v. Johnson, 169 N.C. App.
301, 610 S.E.2d 739 (2005) and United States v. Farrow, 364 F.3d
551 (4th Cir. N.C. 2004), the trial court concluded that N.C.G.S.
§ 14-415.1, as amended effective 1 December 2004, was rationally
related to a legitimate government interest and was not an
unconstitutional Ex Post Facto law or Bill of Attainder. The trial
court also found N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1 (2004) constitutionalon its face and as applied to plaintiff. The trial court granted
defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment. Plaintiff appeals.
Plaintiff appeals three issues: whether the trial court erred
by (I) concluding the 1 December 2004 version of N.C. Gen. Stat. §
14-415.1 is constitutional; (II) granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment; and (III) failing to interpret the statute to
allow plaintiff the right to possess firearms.
Felony Firearms Act
In State v. Johnson
, this Court thoroughly reviewed the
history of the N.C. Felony Firearms Act.
In 1971, the General Assembly enacted the
Felony Firearms Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. §
14-415.1, which made unlawful the possession
of a firearm by any person previously
convicted of a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than two years. N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-415.2 set forth an exemption for
felons whose civil rights had been restored.
1971 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 954, § 2.
In 1975, the General Assembly repealed N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-415.2 and amended N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-415.1 to ban the possession of
firearms by persons convicted of certain
crimes for five years after the date of such
conviction, or unconditional discharge from a
correctional institution, or termination of a
suspended sentence, probation, or parole upon
such convictions, whichever is later. 1975
N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 870, § 1. This was the law
in effect in  when defendant was
convicted of a felony covered by the statute
and in [1987 when his rights were restored].
In 1995, the General Assembly amended N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1 to prohibit possession
of certain firearms by all
of any felony. 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 487, §3. [In 2004, the statute was again amended to
provide] it shall be unlawful for any person
who has been convicted of a felony to
purchase, own, possess, or have in his
custody, care, or control any firearm . . . .
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1(a) (2004). The
current statute applies to felony convictions
in North Carolina that occur before, on, or
after 1 December 1995. N.C. Gen. Stat. §
, 169 N.C. App. at 303, 610 S.E.2d at 741 (emphasis in
original). Effective 23 August 2006, the legislature modified
N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 to exempt antique firearms from the
proscription of felons possessing firearms. 2006 N.C. Sess. Law,
ch. 259, sec. 7(b). It also modified the definition of antique
firearms in N.C.G.S. § 14-409.11 to exclude conventional cartridge
firearms. 2006 N.C. Sess. Law, ch. 259, sec. 7(a).
 Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by concluding the
1 December 2004 version of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1 is
constitutional. Specifically, plaintiff contends N.C.G.S. §
14-415.1 (2004) sweeps too broadly and is not reasonably related to
a legitimate government interest. Plaintiff argues that because he
was not convicted of a violent
felony and because his conviction is
so far in the past, the statute prohibiting all convicted felons
from possessing any type of firearm is unconstitutional. We
A convicted felon is prohibited from possessing a firearm if
the State shows a rational relation to a legitimate state interest,
such as the safety and protection and preservation of the healthand welfare of the citizens of this state. United States v.
Farrow, 364 F.3d 551, 555 (4th Cir. N.C. 2004) (holding N.C. Felony
Firearms law intended to protect the public, not further punish
felons); Black v. Snow, 272 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2003) (rational
relationship exists between the federal statute and maintaining
community peace under equal protection analysis); United States v.
O'Neal, 180 F.3d 115, 123-24 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 528 U.S.
980, 145 L. Ed. 2d 339 (1999) (N.C. Felony Firearms Act was
rationally related to the non-punitive intent of the statute);
United States v. McLean, 904 F.2d 216, 219, cert. denied, 498 U.S.
875, 112 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1990) (prohibition applies even if
citizenship is restored); State v. Jackson, 353 N.C. 495, 502, 546
S.E.2d 570, 573-74 (2001) (holding felons may not possess
inoperative firearms for the purpose of preventing felons from
making a show of force); Johnson, 169 N.C. App. at 309, 610 S.E.2d
at 746 (holding N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1 prohibition of felons
possessing a firearm is not an ex post facto law); State v. Tanner,
39 N.C. App. 668, 670, 251 S.E.2d 705, 706, appeal dismissed and
disc. rev. denied, 297 N.C. 303, 254 S.E.2d 924 (1979) (equal
protection clause does not require exact classification, felons
convicted of any violent crime fall under N.C. Gen. Stat. §
14-415.1 in order to protect the public). Legislative
classifications will be upheld, provided the classification is
founded upon reasonable distinctions, affects all persons similarly
situated or engaged in the same business without discrimination,
and has some reasonable relation to the public peace, welfare andsafety. In re Moore, 289 N.C. 95, 221 S.E.2d 307 (1976). A court
may not substitute its judgment of what is reasonable for that of
the legislative body when the reasonableness of a particular
classification is to be determined. Lamb v. Wedgewood South Corp.,
308 N.C. 419, 302 S.E.2d 868 (1983). Where the language of an Act
is clear and unambiguous the courts must give the statute its plain
and definite meaning. State ex rel. Utilities Com. v. Edmisten,
291 N.C. 451, 232 S.E.2d 184 (1977).
In this case, plaintiff argues that a more appropriate
legislation would allow convicted felons the ability to apply for
restoration of the right to possess firearms. Plaintiff also
argues that long guns, such as rifles and shotguns should be lawful
for certain types of convicted felons to possess. We disagree.
The General Assembly has made a determination that individuals who
have been convicted of a felony offense shall not be able to
possess a firearm. This statutory scheme which treats all felons
the same, serves to protect and preserve the health, safety and
welfare of the citizens of this State. Here, the legislature
intended to prevent convicted felons from possessing firearms in
its 2004 amendments. The 2004 amendment to N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 is
rationally related to a legitimate state interest.
EX POST FACTO
Plaintiff contends application of the challenged provision of
the Felony Firearms Act would violate the ex post facto clauses of
the U.S. and N.C. Constitutions arguing the 2004 amendment changed
the law to retroactively deprive him of his formerly restored rightand punish him for conduct that was previously not criminal. We
The United States and the North Carolina Constitutions
prohibit the enactment of ex post facto laws. See U.S. Const. art.
I, § 10 (No state shall . . . pass any bill of attainder, ex post
facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts . . . .);
N.C. Const. art. I, § 16 (Retrospective laws, punishing acts
committed before the existence of such laws and by them only
declared criminal, are oppressive, unjust, and incompatible with
liberty, and therefore no ex post facto law shall be enacted.).
This Court previously addressed the ex post facto question and
found it without merit with respect to the 1995 amendment to N.C.
Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1. See Johnson, 169 N.C. App. at 307, 610
S.E.2d at 743 (holding N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1 does not violate
either state or federal ex post facto clauses adding the 
amendment to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1 constituted a retroactive
civil or regulatory law, and as such does not violate the ex post
facto clause). North Carolina has made clear that its intent was
to enact a civil disability to protect the public from those felons
whose possession of guns there was the most reason to fear, not to
impose any punishment or penalty on felons. Farrow, 364 F.3d at
554-555 (citing O'Neal, 180 F.3d at 123); see also Tanner, 39 N.C.
App. at 670, 251 S.E.2d at 706; State v. Cobb, 18 N.C. App. 221,
225, 196 S.E.2d 521, 524 (1973), rev'd on other grounds, 284 N.C.
573, 201 S.E.2d 878 (1974). We find Melvin v. United States, 78 F.3d 327 (7th Cir. Ill.
1996), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 963, 136 L. Ed. 2d 301 (1996) to be
an instructive analysis of felony firearm statutes. In Melvin, the
defendant was convicted of felony offenses in 1974 and 1975. He
was released from prison on 27 May 1977 and his firearm rights were
restored as of 27 May 1982, under Illinois law. In 1984, Illinois
enacted a firearms statute making it illegal for felons to possess
weapons regardless of their date of conviction. In other words,
[t]he Illinois felon in possession law clearly forbids all
convicted felons from possessing guns, regardless of whether they
were convicted before or after 1984. Melvin, 78 F.3d at 330. The
Seventh Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals held the defendant's prior
convictions were predicate offenses under Illinois' felon in
possession law. The court reasoned that even though the defendant
could have legally possessed firearms between 27 May 1982 (five
years from prison release) and 1 July 1984 (the date of the
enactment of the current Illinois statute), the Illinois law as
modified did not permanently exclude his three Illinois convictions
as predicate offenses. Id.
Here, as in Melvin, even though plaintiff could have lawfully
possessed firearms before the 2004 amendment to N.C. Gen. Stat. §
14-415.1, an ex-felon would still have been convicted within the
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)
(See footnote 1)
and within the meaning ofN.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 (as amended 2004), which both expressly
prohibit the possession of firearms regardless of the date of
felony conviction. The General Assembly clearly intended its
application to be retroactive by specifically stating that
prohibited convictions are those convictions occurring before, on,
or after 1 December 2004. In other words, all felony convictions
are subject to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1 (2004).
In the instant case, the General Assembly did not intend to
punish plaintiff for actions that occurred prior to the 2004
amendment to N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1. Because the intent of the
legislature was to create a non-punitive, regulatory scheme by
amending N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1, and because the result of the amended
statute is not so punitive in nature and effect as to override the
legislative intent, N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 is a non-punitive,
regulatory scheme that does not violate the ex post facto clause
under either the North Carolina Constitution or the United States
Constitution. See O'Neal, 180 F.3d at 124 ([T]he rational
connection between the [N.C. Felony Firearms] law and its intent is
undeniable. A legislature's judgment that a convicted felon . . .
is among the class of persons who should be disabled from dealing
in or possessing firearms because of potential dangerousness is
rational.). Here, as in Johnson, plaintiff has the status of a
convicted offender; even though plaintiff's status as a felon wasacquired prior to the amendment, N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 applies to
plaintiff. This assignment of error is overruled.
BILL OF ATTAINDER
Plaintiff also argues the 2004 amendment to N.C.G.S. § 14-
415.1 amounts to an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder because it
stripped him of his restored right to possess a firearm. We
Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution
prohibits states from enacting bills of attainder defined as bills
of pains and penalties which are legislative acts inflicting
punishment on a person without a trial. Citicorp v. Currie, 75
N.C. App. 312, 316, 330 S.E.2d 635, 638, appeal dismissed and disc.
rev. denied, 314 N.C. 538 (1985); see N.C. Const. art. I, § 16.
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the test for
determining whether a legislative act amounts to a bill of pains
In deciding whether a statute inflicts
forbidden punishment, we have recognized three
necessary inquiries: (1) whether the
challenged statute falls within the historical
meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether
the statute, viewed in terms of the type and
severity of burdens imposed, reasonably can be
said to further nonpunitive legislative
purposes; and (3) whether the legislative
record evinces a congressional intent to
Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research
Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852, 82 L. Ed. 2d 632, 643 (1984) (quotation
marks and citations omitted). There is nothing in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1 (2004) to
indicate the General Assembly enacted such statute as a form of
retroactive punishment, nor does such a statute fall within the
historical meaning of punishment. Furthermore, plaintiff's
status as a convicted felon was not punishment imposed without
judicial process. Plaintiff would not be prohibited from
possessing a firearm for belonging to a designated class of people,
but for his violation of a statute which the legislature enacted to
lessen the danger to the public of convicted felons who possess
firearms. See Johnson, 169 N.C. App. at 310, 610 S.E.2d at 740
(the statutory prohibition of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1 against
felons possessing firearms outside of their home or business does
not constitute a prohibited bill of attainder). Consequently, we
find the 2004 amended version of N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 does not
constitute a prohibited bill of attainder. This assignment of
error is overruled.
DUE PROCESS & EQUAL PROTECTION
Plaintiff argues that application of the 2004 version of
N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 violates his right to due process, equal
protection under the state and federal constitutions and his second
amendment right to bear arms. Plaintiff contends in 1987 his right
to possess firearms became vested and that the 2004 amendment took
away those vested rights. Plaintiff alleges that N.C.G.S. §
14-415.1, as amended in 2004, violates the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 19 of the
North Carolina State Constitution. Further, plaintiff asserts thatN.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 violates the Second Amendment to the United
States Constitution and Article I, Section 30 of the North Carolina
State Constitution. We disagree.
A statute cannot be applied retrospectively if it will
interfere with rights that have 'vested.' Gardner v. Gardner, 300
N.C. 715, 718-19, 268 S.E.2d 468, 471 (1980). A vested right is
a right 'which is otherwise secured, established, and immune from
further legal metamorphosis.' Bowen v. Mabry, 154 N.C. App. 734,
736, 572 S.E.2d 809, 811 (2002) (quoting Gardner, 300 N.C. at 718-
19, 268 S.E.2d at 471), disc. rev. improvidently allowed, 357 N.C.
574 (2003). Plaintiff's right to possess firearms was not a vested
right. Our case law has consistently pointed out that the right
of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to
regulation. State v. Dawson, 272 N.C. 535, 546, 159 S.E.2d 1, 9
(1968) (the basic requirement of the Felony Firearms Act was that
the regulation must be reasonable and related to the achievement of
public peace and safety); see State v. Fennell, 95 N.C. App. 140,
143, 382 S.E.2d 231, 232-33 (1989).
The General Assembly made a determination that individuals who
have been convicted of a felony offense shall not be able to
possess most firearms. This statutory scheme, which treats all
felons the same, serves to protect and preserve the health, safety
and welfare of the citizens of this State. See Johnson 169 N.C.
App. at 311, 610 S.E.2d at 746; Farrow, 364 F.3d at 555. This
assignment of error is overruled.
II & III
 Plaintiff argues the trial court erred by granting
defendant's motion for summary judgment and by failing to interpret
the statute to allow plaintiff the right to possess firearms. This
Court reviews de novo a trial court's grant of summary judgment.
Virginia Electric & Power Co. v. Tillett, 80 N.C. App. 383, 385,
343 S.E.2d 188, 191, cert. denied, 317 N.C. 715, 347 S.E.2d 457
(1986) (Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter
anew and freely substitute[s] its own judgment for [that of] the
Summary judgment is proper if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to
any material fact and that any party is entitled to a judgment as
a matter of law. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1A-1, Rule 56(c) (2005). When
reviewing the trial court's grant of summary judgment, our standard
of review is de novo, and we view all evidence in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. Stafford v. County of Bladen,
163 N.C. App. 149, 592 S.E.2d 711, appeal dismissed and disc.
review denied, 358 N.C. 545, 599 S.E.2d 409 (2004).
Plaintiff asserts that in an October 2004 meeting with Wake
County Sheriff, Donnie Harrison, Sheriff Harrison told plaintiff
that if he saw plaintiff with a firearm on his own property,
plaintiff would be charged under N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1 (2004) as a
felon in possession of a firearm. Sheriff Harrison asserts that
his comments were in response to a hypothetical question posed by
plaintiff. Sheriff Harrison stated in an affidavit that he did notthreaten plaintiff with an arrest, but rather, in response to
plaintiff's hypothetical question at the end of their meeting,
plaintiff was advised that he could be subject to a charge under
the 2004 revisions to N.C.G.S. § 14-415.1, if he were found in
unlawful possession of firearms. Plaintiff contends that, having
voluntarily dispossessed himself of all firearms after his
conversation with Sheriff Harrison, he has been deprived of the
ability to hunt on his land.
Taking the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff,
the trial court did not err in granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment. There is no dispute between the parties as to
the fact that plaintiff is a convicted felon. Moreover, pursuant
to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1 (2004), the law at issue in this case
clearly states plaintiff may not possess a firearm for any reason.
North Carolina General Statute, Section 14-415.l(b)(1) provides
that, [p]rior convictions which cause disentitlement under this
section shall only include felony convictions in North Carolina
that occur before, on, or after December 1, 1995. Given its plain
meaning, this proscription is intended to apply to anyone ever
convicted of a felony offense in North Carolina, without exception.
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1 (2004). The trial court properly ruled
that plaintiff is prohibited from possessing firearms. These
assignments of error are overruled.
Judge MCGEE concurs.
Judge ELMORE dissents in a separate opinion.
ELMORE, Judge, dissenting.
Because I would hold that the 2004 amendment to N.C. Gen.
Stat. § 14-415.1 is unconstitutional, I respectfully dissent from
the majority opinion.
As this Court stated in Johnson, we apply a two-part test to
analyze whether a law imposes punishment retroactively:
First, the court must determine whether it was
the legislature's intent to impose a
punishment or merely enact a civil or
regulatory law. In reaching this
determination, the court may consider the
structure and design of the statute along with
any declared legislative intent. Second,
where it appears the legislature did not
intend to impose a punishment, we must then
consider whether the effect of the law is so
punitive as to negate any intent to deem the
scheme civil. Stated another way, the second
prong of the test focuses upon whether the
sanction or disability that the law imposes
may rationally be connected to the
legislature's non-punitive intent, or rather
appears excessive in light of that intent.
Johnson, 169 N.C. App. at 307, 610 S.E.2d at 743-44 (quotations and
In Johnson, on which the majority bases much of its opinion,
we held that the 1995 statute was constitutional. At that time, it
was clear to this Court that the intent of legislature was to
regulate the possession of dangerous weapons. Likewise, we held
that the law [was] not so punitive in effect that it should be
considered punitive rather than regulatory. Id. at 308, 610
S.E.2d at 744. In so holding, this Court relied on the following
facts: [The law] continue[d] to exempt the possession of firearms
within one's home or lawful place of business. The prohibitionremain[ed] limited to weapons that, because of their
concealability, pose a unique risk to public safety. Id. (quoting
Farrow, 364 F.3d at 555) (citations, quotations, and alterations
Applying the same analysis to the statute as amended, I would
reach a different result. The amended statute does not exempt the
possession of firearms within one's home or business. Furthermore,
rather than limiting the proscription to weapons that, because of
their concealability, pose a unique risk to public safety, the
legislature broadened the ban to essentially all weapons.
(See footnote 2)
(citations and quotations omitted). The result is that the statute
is no longer narrowly tailored to regulate only the sorts of
firearm possession by felons that, because of the concealability,
power, or location of the firearm, are most likely to endanger the
general public, as it was when the Farrow court reached its
decision. Farrow, 364 F.3d at 555 (citation and quotations
(See footnote 3)
The exceptional broadness of the statute serves toundermine the legislature's stated intent of regulation and serves
instead as an unconstitutional punishment.
I would also hold that the application of the statute to
plaintiff violated plaintiff's due process rights. I recognize
that the right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is
subject to regulation. Johnson, 169 N.C. App. at 311, 610 S.E.2d
at 746 (quoting State v. Dawson, 272 N.C. 535, 546, 159 S.E.2d 1,
9 (1968)). Despite the majority's attempted reliance on Johnson
for support of a rational relationship test, however, I believe
that the proper standard, as articulated in Johnson, requires that
the regulation must be reasonable and be related to the achievement
of preserving public peace and safety. Id. (citing Dawson, 272
N.C. at 547, 159 S.E.2d at 10). Rather than simply requiring that
the statute be rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose, I therefore would require that the regulation also be
The major differences between the 1995 and current versions of
the statute lead me to conclude that the statute in its current
form is no longer a reasonable regulation. Instead, I would hold
that the current statute operates as an outright ban, completely
divesting plaintiff of his right to bear arms without due process
of law. Cf. id. (holding that the Johnson defendant was not
completely divested of his right to bear arms as [the then
current] N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-415.1 allow[ed] him to possess a
firearm at his home or place of business.). In enacting the 2004 amendment, the legislature simply
overreached. Thereafter, the statute operated as a punishment,
rather than a regulation. Moreover, the statute as amended
stripped plaintiff of his constitutional right to bear arms without
the benefit of due process. I would therefore reverse the trial
court's grant of summary judgment.